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INTRODUCTION: STATE INACTION TO INCREASE JURY COMPENSATION
AND THE NEED TO IDENTIFY FORWARD-LOOKING STANDARDS
“I consider [the trial by jury] as the only anchor, ever yet imagined
by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of it’s
[sic] constitution.”1
—Thomas Jefferson, 1789
Jury service touches the lives of many Americans.2  As a binding
obligation to the government, jury participation is virtually unique.
Aside from paying taxes or registering with the Selective Service, it is
the only public service that is presently compulsory in American soci-
ety.3  Because Americans theoretically cannot refuse to participate
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 269 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
2. According to varied studies, between sixteen and twenty-nine percent of Ameri-
cans serve as jurors.  Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Anonymous Ju-
ries: In Exigent Circumstances Only, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 457, 474
(1999); see also John Cornyn, Texas Courts: Deliberating Jury Reform, TEX. LAW.,
June 3, 1996, at 26, LEXIS, Txlawr File (reviewing studies indicating that fifteen
million Americans are summoned to appear for jury duty each year and partake in
approximately 160,000 jury trials).
3. LYN CARSON & BRIAN MARTIN, RANDOM SELECTION IN POLITICS 67 (1999)
(“Jury duty is one of a small number of things that the modern liberal state compels
citizens to do.”).
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when summoned, jurors sacrifice both their time and their potential
earnings during that time to the service of the justice system.  While
the average trial lasts only a week,4 jurors potentially endure severe
stresses that can stay with them for a lifetime, including trauma result-
ing from exposure to violence, guilt over sentencing decisions, or lost
wages.5  But for those who do serve on a jury, the experience is re-
portedly overwhelmingly positive.6  While critics have argued that the
jury should be revamped,7 or even abolished altogether,8 the Supreme
4. See Patrick E. Longan, The Case for Jury Fees in Federal Civil Litigation, 74
OR. L. REV. 909, 936 (1995) (estimating five days); Joanna Sobol, Note, Hardship
Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment of the “Fair Cross-Section of
the Community”, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 173 (1995) (observing, based on extensive
interviews with court personnel, that “[a]n average jury trial lasts about a week, in-
cluding deliberations”).
5. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister & W. Larry Ventis, Juror Stress: What Bur-
den Have We Placed on Our Juries?, 56 TEX. B.J. 586, 588 (1993) (describing inci-
dences of psychological and physical harm resulting from jury service); Stanley M.
Kaplan & Carolyn Winget, The Occupational Hazards of Jury Duty, 20 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 325 (1992) (on file with the New York University Journal of
Legislation and Public Policy) (reporting research results indicating health problems
related to jurors’ unpleasant experiences during criminal trials).  One juror, who
served during the trial of serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer, revealed how that trial influ-
enced his life: “Somewhere down the road, this may hit me like a ton of bricks. I am
beginning to think there is no such thing as normal after this.”  Hafemeister & Ventis,
supra, at 588.
6. See, e.g., JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE
RELATIONSHIP OF JUROR FEES AND TERMS OF SERVICE TO JURY SYSTEM PERFORM-
ANCE 5–11 (1991) (on file with the New York University Journal of Legislation and
Public Policy) (reporting results of national study of multiple different courts, in
which eighty-one percent of respondents rated their experiences positively and con-
cluding that “[j]urors are very satisfied with their jury service and reported hardship is
minimal”); Steven Cann & Michael Kaye, Juror Satisfaction with the Kansas Court
System 6 (1998) (unpublished report to the Honorable Kay McFarland, Chief Justice
of the Kansas Supreme Court, on file with the New York University Journal of Legis-
lation and Public Policy) (surveying 1478 respondents and finding that “[t]hree
fourths of the sample (75%) rated the jury service experience as a positive one, (col-
lapsing the excellent, good and adequate categories)”); Amy Geiszler-Jones, The Ver-
dict on More Pay for Jury Duty, INSIDEWSU, Oct. 5, 2000, http://www.wichita.edu/
insidewsu/@10-5-2000/Jury_study.htm (reporting that “76.6 percent of the respon-
dents [in a recent study] believed the [$10 per day] compensation they received for
their jury service was less important than their civic duty”) (on file with the New York
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy).
7. See, e.g., Christie Davies, Trial by Jury Should Be Abolished, reprinted in THE
JURY SYSTEM 19, 21 (Mary E. Williams ed., 1997) (“[T]he jury must be replaced by a
small team of experienced professional legal assessors.”).
8. See, e.g., Leon Sarpy, Civil Juries, Their Decline and Eventual Fall, 11 LOY. L.
REV. 243 (1962–63) (claiming that abolishing civil juries would help remedy problem
of legal delays).
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Court has defended the jury against such attacks.9  Yet, despite the
Supreme Court’s endorsement, the jury system is far from trouble-
free.
Across the nation, many commentators and observers have ar-
gued that the jury system is operating on the brink of disaster due to
dwindling citizen participation.  In fact, as few as forty percent of all
summoned jurors10—twenty percent of jurors in bustling metropolitan
regions11—respond to the court’s summons.  Headlines in local news
publications tell of judges who have launched “jury round-ups,” ran-
domly compelling people on the street to serve within hours after noti-
fication by armed bailiffs.12  Jury commissioners have similarly sued
9. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968) (noting results of
studies concluding that “juries do understand and come to sound conclusions in most
of the cases presented to them”).
10. Mark Curriden, Jury Reform, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 72, 73 (observing that
“[n]ationwide, the [jury] no-show rate tops 60 percent”).
11. David Williams, Realistic Jury Service: One Small Step Towards Improving the
Civil Justice System, ARK. LAW., Summer 2000, at 16 (noting that ignorance of sum-
mons explains these results).  This was precisely the case in Dallas County, Texas,
when in 2000, “less than 20 percent” of citizens appeared because their summons,
which “end[ed] up in desk drawers or planners or trash cans, [were] dismissed or
simply forgotten.” Allen Pusey & Mark Curriden, Duty Calls, Few Answer, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 23, 2000, at 1A.  These figures are optimistic when compared
with data from Los Angeles, where only ten percent of jurors responded to the sum-
mons.  Mark Curriden, No Excuses, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 24, 2000, at 1A.
12. See John Sullivan, The Case of the Missing Jurors Has Counties Scrambling,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 24, 2000, LEXIS, Nwsobv File (docu-
menting round-up of fifty-five jurors at Wal-Mart in Cleveland County, North Caro-
lina in February of 2000).  In a number of these cases, citizens who simply appeared
in public were “collared on the street, like common criminals.”  John Stevenson, Sur-
prised Jurors for Robbery Trial Accept Fate, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Aug. 11,
1995, LEXIS, Hldsun File.  At the direction of Judge Orlando Hudson, who had been
outraged at the summons non-response rate in his court, marshals ordered people to
appear on one day’s notice and refused to answer a single question from any of them.
Id.  When one single mother finally came before Judge Hudson, explaining that she
had to pick up her child after school each day, the judge’s response was refusal of her
request to be excused, even under the extenuating circumstances of the roundup. Id.
Perhaps these experiences in North Carolina were still more accommodating than an-
other “juror nabbing” that occurred in Prince George’s County, Maryland, in which
citizens were forced to attend court the same day they were snatched and were further
threatened with confinement if they refused—even citizens who were working at the
time deputies approached them.  Benjamin Weiser, Deputies Sweep P.G. Streets to
Round Up Jurors for Judge, WASH. POST, May 22, 1980, at B1.  Though we may not
hear of these instances daily, judges have apparently relied upon the practice for quite
some time. See id. (noting sheriff’s observation that round-ups “used to happen with
great regularity,” to such pervasive degree that one moment you would be cashing
check, and “the next thing you know you’re a juror”).  Courts have upheld the validity
of this practice in light of allegations of prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 330
S.E.2d 450, 457 (N.C. 1985) (recognizing need “to ensure orderly, uninterrupted and
speedy trials”).
\\Server03\productn\n\nyl\5-2\nyl201.txt unknown Seq: 6 10-MAY-02 11:08
294 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5:289
their own mayors and municipal officials for failing to provide ade-
quate juror selection lists.13
Several state legislatures have taken jury reforms to heart,14 rea-
soning that showing jurors appreciation and helping to ease the bur-
dens of their service will increase the public’s willingness to comply
with court orders.15  A major step forward was Arizona’s development
of the Juror’s Bill of Rights, which prompted other states to reconsider
their own responsibilities.16  Those states that have adopted jury re-
forms did not respond to a crisis of conscience merely because they
cherished jurors’ participation.  They realized that the court systems
were in danger of violating the constitutional requirement for jury
panels to represent a cross-section of the community.17  In any county
13. See Dorris Sue Wong, AG Says Boston Reneged on Compiling Voter List,
Brings Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1993, at 68 (describing efforts of Massachu-
setts State Jury Commissioner Frank Davis to compel Mayor of Boston and Suffolk
County Clerk to update jury selection lists).
14. For example, the one-day/one-trial program is an administrative measure many
states have adopted to reduce juror inconvenience.  The process permits summoned
citizens to visit the court only one day and then return home if not selected for trial,
instead of returning to the court day after day. See, e.g., Court Reform Missing L.A.,
L.A. BUS. J., Nov. 29, 1999, 1999 WL 11382716 (noting that 1999 marked year in
which “50 of the state’s 56 court systems had fully complied” in transitioning to this
system).  For a general background, see JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS § II-2 (G. Thomas
Munsterman et al. eds., 1997) (compiling data on workings of jury system across
nation).
15. One report noted that, as of 1995, “Courts and bar associations in 27 states
ha[d] committees studying ways to improve the [jury] process.”  Curriden, supra note
10, at 73. R
16. See generally COMM. ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, ARIZ. SUPREME
COURT, JURORS: THE POWER OF TWELVE (1994) (recommending various reforms to
improve jury system in that state and including increased juror compensation as prior-
ity), http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/Jury/jury.htm (on file with the New York
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy).
17. Supreme Court cases have reconfirmed that the Sixth Amendment’s demand for
an “impartial jury,” U.S. CONST. amend. VI, requires a panel somewhat representative
of the community at large. See Theil v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“The
American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or
civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-sec-
tion of the community.”); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (“It is part of the
established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury
be a body truly representative of the community.”); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1869
(1994) (codifying Theil’s requirement in federal law).  While this requirement con-
templates the presence of cognizable groups that are not systematically excluded from
serving, it does not mean that defendants are guaranteed a jury which is “a perfect
mirror of the community or accurately reflect[s] the proportionate strength of every
identifiable group.”  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1964).
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where jurors do not respond to summons, the threat of a non-represen-
tative jury panel looms, and the search for a solution continues.18
Oddly enough, a factor that has largely been ignored by legisla-
tors is the need to remedy wholly inadequate jury compensation.  Jury
fees exist separately from concerns about discomfort over trial pro-
ceedings.  Largely, many jurors experiencing pay-related problems, let
alone those potential jurors who are anticipating them, will never
make it to the jury box.  As Part II.A, infra, explains, the low pay
offered by the great majority of states is perhaps the greatest impedi-
ment to the attainment of citizen participation on juries sufficient to
reflect the initial quote by Jefferson.  Jury compensation is a factor
worthy of consideration above and beyond the more traditional con-
cerns of courts pertaining to jurors’ comforts after trials have begun.
A. Jury Compensation and the Courts: A Neglected Issue
While observers cite many ironies about juries in America,19 the
minimal amount of compensation jurors receive is among the most
evident.20  Although juries admittedly do much to safeguard justice
18. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, IMPROVING CITIZEN
RESPONSE TO JURY SUMMONSES 4 (1998) (explaining that summons non-response is
problematic because of its potential to result in discrimination and thus deprivation of
defendants’ constitutional rights).  For a complete discussion of this threat, especially
among minority communities that already suffer from strikingly low levels of minor-
ity representation, see generally HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RA-
CIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (1993).
19. A number of scholars would agree that the jury “is an institution rife with para-
dox.” KENNETH W. STARR, JURIES AND JUSTICE 9 (Nat’l Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Inter-
est, The Gauer Distinguished Lecture in Law and Pub. Policy, Vol. 9, 2000).  Most
note that Americans cherish the idea of jury service until the moment they are called
on. See STEVEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: DISORDER IN THE COURTS, at xiii (1994) (ob-
serving that American citizens “love the idea of the jury but hate the way it works”).
Statistics indicate that most citizens believe jury service is a choice rather than a
responsibility and distrust the reliability of jury verdicts. See Maura Dolan, Jury Sys-
tem Is Held in Low Regard by Most, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at A1 (reporting that
57% of respondents “said they regard jury duty as a ‘personal choice’ that each citizen
should make individually compared to 41% who viewed it as a civic responsibility”);
Faith in the Jury System, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1995, at B3 (noting that nearly thirty
percent of Americans surveyed were either “not very confident” or “not at all confi-
dent” that  jury would acquit them if they were accused of crime they did not com-
mit).  Legal historians also point out the way the jury system ironically lost power
upon the advent of increased participation. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G.
Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
867, 868 (1994) (“[A]s the jury’s composition became more democratic, its role in
American civic life declined.”).
20. See discussion infra Part II.D and Figure 4 (describing wholly inadequate jury
compensation rates when compared to Americans’ income and costs of living).
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and fairness in society,21 most states pay them mere pennies on the
dollar compared to the wages they earn from employers.22  Through-
out the nation, legislators have set jurors’ average per diem compensa-
tion at nearly half the minimum wage and well below the daily
equivalent of the poverty threshold.23  This is true even though these
public figures often claim to be on crusades to ease jurors’ burdens.24
In fact, as Americans have found it harder to make ends meet in light
of increased costs of living,25 jury compensation has progressed at a
snail’s pace, with many states neglecting any type of raise for decades,
and, in some cases, generations.26  The financial difficulty faced by
jurors is compounded because most states do not require employers to
cover the difference between the pay jurors receive for their service
and the salary they would have received from their ordinary employ-
ment.27  In many cases, such a requirement would pose great financial
burdens for employers.28
The chief irony of the generally low pay available to jurors is not
that jurors are inadequately compensated for the difficult work that
they do.  Instead, it is the proclamation of most counties that the per
21. See infra Part I.C.2 and Figure 1 (describing many functions for which jury has
been recognized in American society).
22. See infra Part II.A.2 and Figure 2 (exploring current compensation rates across
the nation).
23. See infra Figures 6–7 (illustrating gaps between average state jury pay and
these thresholds).
24. See Curriden, supra note 10, at 73–74 (explaining that some states have devel- R
oped reforms to make jury service less burdensome); cf. Tom M. Dees, III, Juries: On
the Verge of Extinction? A Discussion of Jury Reform, 54 SMU L. REV. 1755,
1758–59 (2001) (reviewing number of state reform efforts).
25. JAMES HEINTZ ET AL., THE ULTIMATE FIELD GUIDE TO THE U.S. ECONOMY: A
COMPACT AND IRREVERENT GUIDE TO ECONOMIC LIFE IN AMERICA 34 (2000) (ex-
plaining how current “real wages remain well below their 1973 peak”).
26. See Appendix A (providing table of history of jury compensation).
27. See G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79
JUDICATURE 216, 217 (1996) (noting small proportion of states that require employers
to compensate jurors during their service).
28. Those who are most affected by this problem are small business owners. See,
e.g., Chris Rauber, Held Up in Court: Long Jury Duty Can Cost Employer Big, S.F.
BUS. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1996 (describing crisis faced by Exegy, small business, when
“25 percent of its tiny staff [were] serving on juries at the same time”), http://san-
francisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/1996/10/28/focus1.html.  In other
cases, the requirement would pose few problems, as many businesses already en-
courage employees to trade in their county pay for the equivalent of their full salary.
See Allan Cooper, Thinking Out of the Box, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 12,
2001, LEXIS, Rchtmd File (“Some employers don’t dock the pay of jurors and allow
them to keep the [state per diem].  Others pay the difference between the employee’s
salary and the jury stipend.  But many companies consider the employee absent from
work and make no allowance for the reason.”).
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diem is “a token of appreciation,”29 while, for many jurors who are
losing money, the rate may seem more like an insult.30  Although citi-
zens may refuse payment for jury service as a matter of principle,
contribute their pay to local charities,31 or earn enough income from
their employment for the per diem not to matter, pain stemming from
low compensation is felt especially by self-employed individuals,32
single parents without the means to obtain childcare,33 and part or full-
time workers who receive no compensation from their employers.34
29. Lisa Sink, Jurors Issue Ruling on Their Days in Court, MILWAUKEE J. SENTI-
NEL, Oct. 8, 2000, LEXIS, Miljnl File (citing Gail Richardson, court administrator
charged to review jury fees). Ms. Richardson, however, like most who share this view,
neglected to explain exactly what the “appreciation” is for when it fails to meet jurors’
most basic needs.
30. As Richard Gurfien, President of the New York State Trial Association, once
commented, “it’s degrading to ask a citizen to leave their daily routine and put them
into a hovel to perform their civic duty.”  William K. Rashbaum, High Tide in Jury
Pool, DAILY NEWS (New York), Jan. 1, 1996, at 6.
31. See Munsterman, supra note 27, at 217 n.5 (“Fees are important to some jurors R
and not others. This is clear from the success in many courts of jury fee donation
programs whereby jurors can donate their fees to charity . . . .”).  Munsterman notes
that thirty percent of jurors in Dallas, Texas had donated to such a program, id., while
most Texas counties pay the minimum fee permissible—six dollars per day.  See
Heather Todd, Justice Pays, But Not Enough, COUNTY, Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 18, 18
(noting how “most counties” in Texas pay “the state-set minimum of $6 a day” even
though the legislature made it permissible for them to raise fees to fifty dollars in
1997).
32. According to Ric Cortez, a self-employed mechanic who skipped out on jury
duty three times in a row: “If I don’t work, my family doesn’t eat . . . .  Doesn’t seem
like much of a choice.” Mark Curriden & Allen Pusey, A Poor Reflection: Number of
Minority, Lower-Income Jurors Doesn’t Mirror County Population, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Oct. 22, 2000, at 1A.  The problem hardly seems to be dissipating. In some
Texas counties, for example, it is estimated that at least one in eight jurors will be
self-employed. See Pusey & Curriden, supra note 11 (reporting statistic from survey R
results).
33. Though practically all jury improvement commissions recommend providing
childcare, the cost of meeting these demands are prohibitive.  See, for example, BOAT-
RIGHT, supra note 18, at 123, which explains why “[c]hild-care should be a priority of R
courts.”  Courts are already experiencing great financial difficulty implementing mea-
sures as simple as the one-day/one-trial program. See Court Reform Missing L.A.,
supra note 14 (explaining that, although great majority of courts in California had R
committed to implementing one-day/one-trial program, many courts could not afford
to complete process, thereby missing out on its potential benefits).
34. As of 2001, eight states required employers to compensate jurors for at least
some period of their service. See G. Thomas Munsterman, What Should Jurors Be
Paid?, CT. MANAGER, Quarter 2001, at 16 n.9 (noting regulations in Alabama, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, and Tennessee).
However, in many of these cases, the requirements cover jurors for the first three to
five days only. See id. (citing Louisiana, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Connecticut
as adhering to various forms of this limitation).  As it stands, many employers react to
jurors with hostility and discourage their participation. See Curriden & Pusey, supra
note 32 (presenting results of Dallas study finding that “people earning less than R
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While, historically, jurors were compensated at levels similar to the
average wage, jury compensation is currently low because states lack
a guideline indicating when to increase jury fees or by what amount.35
B. The Problem with Jury Compensation: Lack of an Index
Accounting for Inflation or the Cost of Living
The compensation of jurors is determined by the jurisdiction in
which they are called to serve.36  Federal jurors receive forty dollars
per day.37  State jurors may receive anywhere between two and fifty
dollars per day.38  Two states even rely on the minimum wage and pay
jurors the hours served rather than the days served.39  In response to
these varied jury compensation rates, both supporters and critics of the
courts have reviewed extensively the current fee structure and have
recommended changes.  Some say that jurors should be paid more,40
others urge that juror pay be held at its current level,41 and a few
$35,000 a year are twice as likely as other people to say that their employer tries to
discourage them in some way from serving,” with forty percent of this group reporting
“specifically that their employers cut their wages or refuse to pay them”); Paula Mc-
Mahon, Workers Say Jury Duty Cost Them Their Jobs: Two in Lengthy Trials Sue
After Being Forced Out, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), July 30, 2000,
LEXIS, Sunsen File (“[J]urors who give the most by serving on the longest and most
complicated cases are most at risk of reprisals [from their employers].”).
35. Cf. infra Parts II.E–F (discussing difficulty of establishing sliding scales or uni-
form standards for compensation applicable to jurors across nation).
36. For a detailed listing see infra Figure 2 (depicting current state compensation
rates).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1871 (1994) (permitting forty dollars per day and additional ten
dollars per day for jurors “required to attend more than thirty days in hearing one
case”).
38. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1370 (1977 & Supp. 2001) (indicating jurors
in some South Carolina counties are paid as little as two dollars per day), with Act of
Feb. 10, 1999, ch. 107, sec. 1, § 16-13-46, 1999 S.D. Laws 169, 169 (requiring jurors
to be compensated fifty dollars per day of attendance).
39. See Act of Apr. 5, 1979, ch. 285, sec. 1, § 38-5-15, 1979 N.M. Laws 1120,
1120 (prescribing all jurors be compensated at highest prevailing state minimum
wage); Act of Sept. 1, 1999, ch. 1085, § 4, 1999 Or. Laws 1085 (basing jury fees after
first two days on minimum wage, subject to ceiling of fifty dollars per day).
40. WASH. STATE JURY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE BOARD FOR JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION 23 (2000) (“The commission views a fee increase as its highest priority.
Citizens required to perform jury service should be compensated fairly and appropri-
ately.”), http://www.courts.wa.gov/jurycomm/report/report.pdf (on file with the New
York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy).  Chief justices of several
state supreme courts have also echoed these sentiments. See, e.g., Chief Justice
Thomas A. Zlaket, Remarks to the Arizona Legislature on the State of the Judiciary 6
(Jan. 29, 2001) (transcript on file with the New York University Journal of Legislation
and Public Policy) (recommending fee increases in light of recent jury reforms).
41. See, e.g., CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (LAO), ANALYSIS OF THE
2000–01 BUDGET BILL: JUDICIARY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE D-88 to D-89 (2000) (rec-
ommending that California legislature not support jury compensation increase from
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recommend far-reaching transformations in the way juror fees are col-
lected and dispersed.42  But, with the exception of New Mexico and
Oregon, no state has calculated jury pay in relation to transforming
societal standards like Americans’ daily income.43  Without a flexible
method of reflecting the financial demands faced by state residents
who serve as jurors, even those few states that currently pay jurors
above the minimum wage lack the guidance necessary to meet jurors’
future financial demands.  They instead depend wholly on advocacy of
the jurors’ financial interests—advocacy that has been anything but
constant in the fight for jury reform.44  Essentially, the problem relates
to collective action.  Economically, because there are no full-time ju-
rors, no one has sufficient interest in jury fees to spend the money or
expend the effort necessary to develop uniform rates.  To solve this
problem of collective action, this Article turns to the state legislatures.
This Article adopts a new perspective on the obligation of states
to compensate jurors on the basis of their financial needs.  It combs
the nation’s history for answers to a variety of significant questions:
Why do states compensate jurors?  Have there ever been minimal
levels of juror compensation among the states of the union?  Have any
legal challenges resulted in governments raising jury fees?  Have
states developed uniform standards for juror compensation in light of
varied economic conditions?  While, at times, the responses to these
questions will be brief, answering them is crucial to understanding
how jury fees can be set in accordance with both their purpose and
their history.  In order to set fees fairly, legislatures and courts should
use the federal minimum wage as a guideline for determining the min-
imum compensation owed to jurors.  This indexing process would in-
crease the amount of jury compensation as the federal minimum wage
increases.  The index would remedy the lack of foresight that resulted
five dollars to twelve dollars per day because compensation increase would fail to
show jurors appreciation they deserve), http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2000/
crim_justice/crimjust_anl00.pdf [hereinafter LAO REPORT] (on file with the New York
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy).  California legislators settled for
fifteen dollars per day, which by the LAO’s estimation would still leave most jurors
without money for lunch if they had to pay for parking. See id. at D-90; Act of July 8,
2000, ch. 127, sec. 1, § 215(a), 2000 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 127 (Deering) (permitting
only fifteen dollars per day after first day of service).
42. See generally Longan, supra note 4 (recommending that federal jury system R
compensate civil jurors solely on basis of fees charged to litigants).
43. See sources cited supra note 39 (providing citations for both states’ system of R
payment).
44. See generally Munsterman, supra note 27 (noting extensive advocacy on behalf R
of broader jury reforms, but little or no advocacy for increasing fees substantially
among majority of states); see also infra Parts I.A–B (discussing courts’ failure to
find legal violations in current jury compensation structures).
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from the pattern set by the initial jury compensation statutes.  Much
like legislation enacting pension increases for disabled veterans of the
Civil War,45 jury payment provisions of the same time frame only
cited then-current monetary values.46  This jury Cost of Living Adjust-
ment (COLA) immediately would increase the pay of most jurors and
remedy the legislative neglect of this issue evident in recent years.  It
would also serve to keep states abreast of the necessity to increase
their juror compensation in the future.
Part I of this Article inquires whether minimal jury compensation
violates jurors’ rights as articulated by the Fifth and Thirteenth
Amendments of the Constitution and other statutory provisions. This
Part examines how the many roles of the jury often create confusion
with respect to the issue of whether and how much jurors should be
compensated.  On closer analysis, while it may appear that there are
similarities between the tradition of requiring persons to provide un-
compensated service to the public in some capacity and jury service, it
is the case that jurors’ financial sacrifices are unique and often more
dramatic than those citizens called upon to serve in other capacities.
This Part concludes by situating existing theories of jury compensa-
tion in two theoretical models, which play a significant role in deter-
mining whether states should pay jurors any meaningful amount.
Because the crucial issue is not whether to pay jurors but how
much to pay them, Part II adopts a historical perspective to determine
the bases for juror compensation other than the often confusing no-
tions of the juror’s many roles. It traces current compensation methods
and rates back to their inception using the guidelines established by
the Supreme Court in Hurtado v. United States,47 a case that examined
the question of whether federal witness compensation was so inade-
quate as to effect an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amend-
ment.  This Part distinguishes federal and state jury compensation
histories and concludes that, until recent times, the same forces
seemed to motivate both pay rates.  Based on these similarities, this
Part proposes a numerical jury compensation index that represents the
historical relationship of the minimum wage and jury fees, providing a
guideline for determining minimal jury compensation amounts in the
45. See, e.g., Act of June 17, 1878, ch. 261, 20 Stat. 144 (1878) (repealed) (increas-
ing injured veterans’ pensions to “seventy two dollars per month” using “the same
manner as pensions are now paid to such persons” rather than basing increases on
economic indicators).
46. See sources cited infra note 262 (citing sources depicting federal fee increases); R
infra Appendix A (providing history of jury compensation in states and District of
Columbia).
47. 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
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future concurrent with changes in minimum wage rates.  Such an
equation would relieve state legislators of the burdensome task of
guessing when jury fee increases are necessary in the absence of any
definitive guidance.
Part III expands the inquiry by investigating the potential costs
and benefits of adopting the proposed index.  It uses the experience of
counties that have raised fees to explain how higher fees would likely
increase jury participation.  This Part also applies theories of motiva-
tion to show that jurors would likely devote more time and attention to
their duties if they were less concerned about financial pressures dur-
ing their service.  Part III also explains how survey research often mis-
characterizes the impact of jurors’ economic hardships by
downplaying the financial sacrifices they must make in order to serve.
It also addresses the potential undesired consequences that could stem
from the adoption of a compensation index.  For example, offering
higher wages could create a corps of “professional jurors” motivated
purely by financial gain, who might unduly prolong their service to
maximize their wealth.  Likewise, higher fees would insult those ju-
rors who are motivated to serve by a sense of civic duty rather than by
economic concerns, giving them incentive to ignore or trivialize their
obligations.  A final concern addressed in Part III is the inherent diffi-
culty of proving to a mathematical certainty that higher fees will actu-
ally increase summons-response rates.  In light of these many
concerns, policymakers must accept the fact that the jury serves a
number of functions at different times, an undeniable truth that man-
dates some sort of financial remuneration.  Because states pay other
public servants, like poll workers, enough to alleviate their financial
burdens, there should not be a double standard that requires jurors to
suffer an undue burden for their valuable service.
I
LEGAL ASPECTS OF JURY COMPENSATION
Courts have considered jury compensation in a number of con-
texts.  Several commissions on jury reform have spoken of the need
for a uniform standard of compensation and the risk that absent one,
jurors will have little legal recourse to escape significant financial
hardship during their service.48  Courts have examined both statutory
48. See, e.g., Richard W. Creswell, Georgia Courts in the 21st Century: The Report
of the Supreme Court of Georgia Blue Ribbon Commission on the Judiciary, 53 MER-
CER L. REV. 1, 20 (discussing how increasing juror compensation diminishes need for
hardship exemptions); Edwin J. Peterson, et al., Report of the Oregon Supreme Court
Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Judicial System, 73 OR. L. REV. 823,
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and constitutional grounds for increasing jury compensation with
mixed results—sometimes finding that inadequate jury compensation
creates a constitutional or statutory violation, but more often uphold-
ing low jury compensation.
A. Constitutional Implications
In alleging violations of their constitutional rights, jurors might
argue that their compelled service constitutes a government taking
without just compensation as articulated in the Fifth Amendment49 or
involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.50 In
both instances, the courts have justified payment of low jury fees by
invoking the concept that jury participation is expected of all citizens
as a civic obligation.  Often, courts have noted the similarity between
those called to serve on a jury and conscripted soldiers or citizens
compelled to conduct public roadwork.  However, these comparisons
are, in the end, inappropriate and fail to appreciate the essential differ-
ences between jury service and other forms of public duty.
1. Inadequate Pay as an Infringement on the Juror’s Fifth
Amendment Interest in Just Compensation
When government regulations deprive owners of the fair value of
their property, the government often must compensate the property
owners for the losses that result from those regulations.51  The takings
doctrine similarly applies when “the monetary value of [an individ-
ual’s] private time and labor has been appropriated.”52  While there
901–02 (1994) (noting problems created by present Oregon system of jury
compensation).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating, inter alia, “[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation”).  The Fifth Amendment only applies
to takings by the federal government, but the Supreme Court has held that claims
against state governments for takings may be raised through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (explaining that Due
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment “now protects the right to compensation for
property taken by the State” (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897))).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
51. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 8.4.2.2 (1997) (discussing regulatory takings).
52. Daniel E. Witte, Comment, Getting a Grip on National Service: Key Organiza-
tional Features and Strategic Characteristics of the National Service Corps (Amer-
iCorps), 1998 BYU L. REV. 741, 786 (1998).  In part, this view of the Fifth
Amendment evolved from the courts’ increasingly liberal treatment of rate regulation,
whereby the owners of railroads successfully challenged rates imposed on the basis
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are a number of ways to calculate the fair value of the property that
has been appropriated, many formulae for doing so are tied to the eco-
nomic market.53  Consequently, jurors who prevail in challenging their
compensation on the grounds that it constitutes a taking could theoret-
ically force states to develop a uniform rate.  Yet, the question remains
whether jurors have, in fact, experienced such a prohibited taking.
Prior court decisions at least appear to indicate that the hardships ju-
rors face do not rise to the level of a prohibited taking.
In colonial times, the various colonies required all able-bodied
men to work the roads without compensation.54  When citizens later
challenged such statutes on Fifth Amendment grounds, courts gener-
ally responded that although “[l]abor is also property . . . [g]ood public
roads or streets [are] a sufficient compensation for the labor . . . .”55
Other courts altogether refused to view roadwork requirements in
terms of the Fifth Amendment.56  In 1916, the Supreme Court settled
the issue in Butler v. Perry, holding, “[A] State has inherent power to
require every able-bodied man within its jurisdiction to labor for a
reasonable time on public roads near his residence without direct com-
pensation.  This is a part of the duty which he owes to the public.”57
that “for[cing] an owner to run a business with less return than he would receive
without the regulation . . . seemed to amount to a forced dedication of his business to
the public.”  Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and
Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 616 (1996).  In the years
that followed, even attorneys were among those who used the Fifth Amendment to
challenge pro bono requirements as government takings. See, e.g., State ex rel. Scott
v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 762–63 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (citing cases that “expressly
or impliedly suggest that at some time this growing burden [on lawyers to take on pro
bono cases] may constitute a taking of property”). But see United States v. Dillon,
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965) (rejecting this application of Fifth Amendment due to
lawyer’s unique responsibilities to serve public).
53. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Prop-
erty: The Sovereign’s Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 719–20 (1989) (discussing
property valuation methods and unique circumstances applying to less traditional
types of property appropriated by government).
54. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 331 (1916) (explaining, “From Colonial days
to the present time conscripted labor has been much relied on for the construction and
maintenance of roads”).  For an example from one state’s laws, see Act of Mar. 4,
1881, ch. 34, sec. 1, § 34, 1881 Kan. Sess. Laws 62, 68, which establishes city road
districts and requires twenty-one to forty-five year-olds to “perform two days’ labor of
ten hours each on the streets, alleys or avenues of said city, or in lieu thereof pay the
street commissioner the sum of three dollars.”
55. State ex rel. Curtis v. City of Topeka, 12 P. 310, 315 (Kan. 1886).
56. See, e.g., Short v. State, 31 A. 322 (Md. App. 1895) (refusing to apply protec-
tions of Fifth Amendment to state’s power over its own citizens).
57. 240 U.S. 328, 330 (1916).
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In Hurtado v. United States,58 the Court mirrored Butler’s analy-
sis in its treatment of jailed witnesses.  After receiving only one dollar
per day as a witness in the 1970s, Felipe Hurtado, who had been incar-
cerated to ensure his testimony in a criminal case, advanced a Fifth
Amendment argument that one’s “business, occupation, profession, or
calling is his property and is protected by the Constitution.”59  This
claim hinged on Justice Douglas’s theory, expressed in his concur-
rence in Peters v. Hobby, that “one of man’s most precious liberties is
his right to work.”60  This right had been denied to Hurtado during the
months he awaited trial in his cell, while being compensated only one
dollar per day.  However, the Court rejected Hurtado’s arguments, ex-
plaining that “the Fifth Amendment does not require that the Govern-
ment pay for the performance of a public duty it is already owed.”61
While Hurtado narrowly addressed the “detention of a material wit-
ness,” where “the level of his compensation . . . does not, as such,
present a constitutional question,”62 the Court’s conclusion had a
broader scope.
A witness, observed the Court, is only entitled to the amount of
compensation prescribed by statute, even if the low pay requires the
witness to make a “personal sacrifice.”63  As long as these sacrifices
contributed to the “welfare of the public,” the Court asserted that there
would be no violation of the Fifth Amendment.64  Similar arguments
may hold true with respect to the service provided by jurors.  While
they surely sacrifice time, energy, and money by serving the govern-
ment, jurors in criminal trials, for example, are responsible for remov-
ing dangerous criminals from the streets.  Arguably, these jurors
preserve the public welfare by performing this task.  Therefore, no
violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs under the Court’s analysis in
Hurtado if such jurors are grossly underpaid.  Yet, the constitutional
inquiry does not end with the Fifth Amendment.  If jurors’ financial
sacrifices are so extreme that they are paid below a subsistence level,
jurors may then have Thirteenth Amendment claims that the govern-
ment essentially has enslaved them.
58. 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
59. Brief for Petitioners at 28, Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (No.
71-6742).
60. 349 U.S. 331, 352 (1955) (Douglas, J., concurring).
61. Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 588.
62. Id. at 589.
63. Id. (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919)).
64. Id.
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2. Inadequate Pay as a Violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
Prohibition of Involuntary Servitude
Recently, a commentator suggested, “[F]orcing individuals to ap-
pear for jury duty against their will flies in the face of the spirit of . . .
the prohibition on involuntary servitude.”65  Courts have been reluc-
tant to accept this argument, because a number of traditional ideas
about involuntary servitude effectively have created exceptions to the
Thirteenth Amendment.66  Cases such as United States v. Kozminski67
suggest that the question has been resolved with respect to jurors.  Just
like members of the military and citizens required to work the public
roads, jurors must repay the state for the many rights they enjoy by
providing service.68 Kozminski’s recognition that the government
may demand the performance of civic duties without violating the
Thirteenth Amendment is supported by a number of earlier opinions.69
The bulk of these hold that a host of compelled activities are hardly
“that kind of ‘involuntary servitude’ which is akin to slavery, as the
interdicted involuntary servitude mentioned in the state and federal
constitutions is.”70  Based on analogies to other services, such as pub-
65. Dominick Armentano, Use Market to Select Jurors, DAILY COMMENTARY (Cato
Inst.), Nov. 11, 1999, at http://www.cato.org/dailys/11-11-99.html (on file with the
New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy).
66. See Lauren Kares, Note, The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment
in Search of a Doctrine, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 372, 392–93 (1995) (pointing out, inter
alia, exceptions based on “public need” which serve to “[p]lace entire categories of
conduct beyond” Thirteenth Amendment’s reach).
67. 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (addressing whether farmers’ abuse of mentally disabled
individuals violated Thirteenth Amendment).
68. See id. at 943–44 (citing cases supporting proposition that “the Court has recog-
nized that the prohibition against involuntary servitude does not prevent the State or
Federal Governments from compelling their citizens, by threat of criminal sanction, to
perform certain civic duties”).
69. See, e.g., Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (observing that Thirteenth
Amendment “introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated as
exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties
which individuals owe to the State, such as services in the army, militia, on the jury,
etc.”); Leedy v. Incorporated Town of Bourbon, 40 N.E. 640, 641 (Ind. App. 1895)
(“The work required to be done on the highways is more in the nature of military or
jury service than that of a poll tax.”); State ex rel. Curtis v. City of Topeka, 12 P. 310,
315 (Kan. 1886) (noting that compelled roadwork “is like service or ‘involuntary ser-
vitude’ on juries, or in the militia, or in the army, or in removing snow or ice from
sidewalks, gutters, etc.”); State v. Sharp, 34 S.E. 264, 265 (N.C. 1899) (stating that
road work is “not a tax, but a duty, like service upon a jury, grand jury, special venire,
military service, or as witness which duties formerly were and, to some extent are
still, required to be rendered to the state without compensation”).
70. State ex rel. Curtis v. City of Topeka, 12 P. 310, 315 (Kan. 1886).  However,
the Second Circuit’s holding in Immediato v. Rye Neck School District, 73 F.3d 454
(2d Cir. 1996), may provide an alternative method for analyzing Thirteenth Amend-
ment claims. In its “contextual” test for evaluating whether compelled participation in
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lic roadwork, it is arguable that historically-based exceptions to the
Thirteenth Amendment permit states to compel jury service without
any compensation whatsoever.  A large part of this view relies on the
characterization of the juror as something other than an employee de-
serving of a wage.  However, a number of state supreme courts con-
sider jurors to be public officials entitled to workers’ compensation if
they are injured on the job.71  These contrary interpretations of jury
service as an employment relationship undermine the view that jurors
are mere slaves of the state who can be required to serve without sig-
nificant state support.
B. Statutory Implications
1. The Fair Labor Standards Act and the Internal Revenue Code
Few statutes other than those directly relating to jurors distin-
guish jury duty from more general employment circumstances.  In
1998, the Eleventh Circuit decided Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade
County,72 the first case in which a juror sued a county on the grounds
that jurors were subject to the federal minimum wage under the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA).73  Ms. Brouwer had been summoned,
spent two days waiting, and left the courthouse unpaid as a result of
her not being selected to serve on a trial jury.74
a high school community service program violated the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Immediato court inquired whether the “nature” or “amount” of the work demanded,
the purpose for which the work was required, and the therapeutic value associated
with the program were “‘so ruthless’” and “‘devoid of [benefit to the students]’” as
to violate the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 459 (citing Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d
129, 132 (2d Cir. 1966)).  While the court did not deem the community service re-
quirement to be a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment because of (among other
factors) the measurable opportunity students had to switch schools, id. at 460, jurors
might satisfy the test’s criteria.  Courts in the Third and Fourth Circuits, however,
have used the more traditional Kozminski approach in denying students’ claims that
mandatory service programs violate the Thirteenth Amendment. See Steirer v. Beth-
lehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 999 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Governments may require
individuals to perform certain well-established ‘civic duties,’ such as military service
and jury duty, and impose legal sanctions for the failure to perform.”); Herndon v.
Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 1443, 1447 (M.D.N.C. 1995)
(citing Butler as proof of limited definition of “involuntary servitude”).
71. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing workers’ compensation decisions by various
state supreme courts).
72. 139 F.3d 817 (11th Cir. 1998).
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 201–219 (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (articulating minimum wage
rates).
74. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Initial Brief at 9, Brouwer (No. 97-4802) (on file with the
New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy) (“Elena Brouwer was
summoned to jury duty and appeared for jury duty for the period May 7–8, 1996.  Ms.
Brouwer was paid nothing for her service.”).
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On its face, the FLSA seemed the perfect means through which
to guarantee jurors the federal minimum wage.75  First, the Act ap-
plied to all but certain enumerated employment relationships, and ju-
rors had not explicitly been excluded from its coverage.76  Second, the
Act provided a broad definition of employment and work.77  Third,
Congress’s goals in enacting the provision seemed to address the same
concerns that pertain to inadequately compensated jurors—providing
a “fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”78  Despite the persuasiveness
of a number of Brouwer’s arguments, the court held that jury service
did not constitute employment under the FLSA.79
The Brouwer court’s analysis focused on a number of distinc-
tions in denying the plaintiff’s claim for relief.  First, the court turned
to federal compensation provisions that already covered jurors.  Be-
cause Congress had already specified a federal jury fee, the court as-
sumed that the federal minimum wage was inapplicable to jurors.80
Second, the circuit court used the district court’s language to explain
75. At the time of the case, in 1997, parties interested in the results of the case
potentially could have included all of the states then paying jurors less than the federal
minimum wage.
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (exempting eleven categories of
working relationships, but not exempting jurors).
77. See United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945) (explaining
that “employee” as used in FLSA context “had been given ‘the broadest definition
that has ever been included in any one act’”) (citing 81 CONG. REC. 7,657 (1937)).
78. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (quoting President
Franklin Roosevelt, Message to Congress (May 24, 1934)).  Brouwer championed this
cause in the conclusion of her brief: “This suit is designed to eliminate such working
conditions for the unemployed and underemployed workers who are the potential
plaintiffs of this suit and to secure a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.”  Plaintiff-
Appellant’s Initial Brief at 39, Brouwer (No. 97-4802); see also 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)
(1994) (explaining that Act’s intent was to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standard necessary for health, efficiency, and gen-
eral well-being of workers”).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 80–82 (discussing court’s decision). R
80. Brouwer v. Metro. Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 819 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998).  The
court went on to explore the question of congressional intent further:
Congress’s intent seems to be that jurors would not be considered em-
ployees under the FLSA.  Like state employees, federal employees are
protected by the FLSA.  But a separate statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1871(b)(1),
provides for the compensation of federal jurors; and, more important, the
compensation for federal jurors is less than minimum wage.
Id. The court chose not to entertain the lengthy inquiry that stems naturally the dis-
tinction, which was suggested by Dade County in its brief, of probing the similarity
between the federal minimum wage and juror fees as compared with disparate state
rates. See Brief of Appellee at 19–20 n.5, Brouwer (No. 97-4802) (on file with the
New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy) (“The wide variance
in juror fees among the fifty states demonstrates that the FLSA has never been inter-
preted to impose a uniform standard for juror compensation.”).
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why Ms. Brouwer could not prove the existence of an employment
relationship:
Jurors do not apply for employment, but are randomly selected
from voter registration lists.  Jurors are not interviewed to deter-
mine who is better qualified for a position; the State summons all
available persons who meet the basic requirements. . . . Jurors do
not voluntarily tender their labor to the State, but are compelled to
serve.  Jurors are not paid a salary, rather they receive a statutorily
mandated sum regardless of the number of hours worked.  Jurors
are not eligible for employment benefits, do not accrue vacation
time, annual or sick leave and do not qualify for health or life insur-
ance. The state does not have the power to fire jurors for their per-
formance, but must accept their verdict.81
The court determined that “[n]o employment relationship ex-
isted” and denied Ms. Brouwer the federal minimum wage.82
Brouwer was consistent with the Eighth Circuit’s decision three years
earlier in Evers v. Tart, in which that court found poll workers ineligi-
ble for FLSA coverage for many of the same reasons that the Eleventh
Circuit cited for refusing to cover jurors under the FLSA.83  However,
these cases failed to acknowledge a contrary line of precedent, which
appears vividly in interpretations of jurors’ activities under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and the provisions of many state workers’ compen-
sation statutes.
2. The Intermediate Stance of the Internal Revenue Code
The issue of jury participation as a form of employment has also
been addressed in regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue
Service, which characterize employment relationships as involving the
“right to control and direct the individual,” extending to “not only
what shall be done but how it shall be done.”84  To clarify how the
provisions apply to jurors, another section of the regulations explains,
“Amounts paid to precinct workers for services performed at election
booths in State, county, and municipal elections and fees paid to jurors
and witnesses are in the nature of fees paid to public officials and
therefore are not subject to withholding.”85  Unlike Evers or Brouwer,
which dismissed the notion that jurors are employed in any sense of
81. Brouwer, 139 F.3d at 819 (quoting District Court Order at 7–8).
82. Id.
83. 48 F.3d 319, 321 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Poll workers do not apply for their jobs, nor
do they receive vacation or sick leave benefits, or other benefits normally given to
county employees.”).
84. 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (2001).
85. Id. § 31.3401(a)-2(b)(2).
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the word, the Internal Revenue regulations explicitly liken the fees
paid for jury service to those paid to employed public officials.  In
1999, the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service expanded on
this view in a detailed memorandum.86  The memorandum explained
that jurors are treated as employees under the Internal Revenue Code
even though they may not be “fee-based public officials” and even
though there is a distinction in the common law between “master and
servant” and a citizen “chosen according to law and sworn to make
determinations of fact in a particular case.”87  The view adopted by the
Internal Revenue Service reflects a different interpretation of the ju-
ror’s role than that used by courts in handling FLSA cases.  This inter-
pretation has been espoused and rejected by state supreme courts
confronting the question of whether jurors are covered by state work-
ers’ compensation statutes.
3. Jury Pay and State Workers’ Compensation Statutes
Whether a juror is worthy of workers’ compensation coverage is
a separate issue from whether jurors should be paid.  However, both
issues involve the same fundamental determination—whether a juror
is an employee or not.  As one court commented, “[T]he sum of the
whole matter is that . . . the relation of master and servant, or em-
ployer and employee, or some appointment, must exist, and this is the
initial fact to be established [in order to determine whether workers’
compensation applies].”88  This determination of whether an employ-
ment relationship actually existed is essentially no different from the
one required by the courts in Evers and Brouwer.
A number of claims for workers’ compensation have arisen out
of injuries sustained by jurors while they were serving.  Jurors’ inju-
ries may arise from being trampled by a crowd exiting a courthouse
elevator,89 cascading down courthouse stairwells,90 or slipping and
falling on the marble tile of the courthouse floor while exiting the jury
box.91  Several injured jurors have filed claims under state workers’
compensation statutes.  The various court determinations suggest that
86. I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advice No. 199932004 (Mar. 11, 1999), http://
www.unclefed.com/ForTaxProfs/irs-wd/1999/9932004.pdf (on file with New York
University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy).
87. Id. at 3 n.1, 4.
88. Hicks v. Guilford County, 148 S.E.2d 240, 243 (N.C. 1966) (quoting Hollowell
v. North Carolina Dep’t of Conservation & Dev., 173 S.E. 603, 605 (N.C. 1934)).
89. See Metro. Dade County v. Glassman, 341 So. 2d 995 (Fla. 1977).
90. See Indus. Comm’n of Ohio v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35 (Ohio 1930).
91. See Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
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Brouwer did not consider all of the relevant arguments on the topic of
jury service as employment, and they provide a fuller understanding of
the question of whether jurors can properly be considered
“employees.”
a) Cases Finding that Jurors Are Not Similar to Employees
The prevailing view among state supreme courts is that jurors are
not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.92  While some of the
courts constituting this majority have been criticized for their lack of
analysis or application of the law to the facts,93 those with more
lengthy opinions have focused on many of the same factors considered
by the federal courts with respect to constitutional claims of inade-
quate compensation and the FLSA’s applicability to jurors.  First, the
majority of state supreme courts that find jurors are not employees for
purposes of workers’ compensation turn to the state’s apparent lack of
control over the juror, reasoning that jurors are not directed to decide
cases in a certain way by the state.94  Second, courts denying jurors’
claims that they are employees note the absence of any contractual
employment relationship between the county and the juror.95  Finally,
92. See Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516, 516–17 (Idaho 1990) (observing
nine-to-one “numerical weight” of authority denying jurors workers’ compensation
benefits).
93. See id. at 517–18 (noting that many courts “follow[ed] the aged adage that there
is strength and safety in numbers,” and that “after the first case denying coverage was
followed by a second such holding, there was a readily observable propensity toward
becoming ‘aligned with the great weight of authority’”).
94. See, e.g., O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d 277, 279 (Mass. 1972) (“The county
merely provides the facilities and other personnel for the court and the jurors.  It
exercises no control over the juror’s work.  Any control and direction exercised over
the juror is by order of the court.  The juror cannot refuse service nor can the county
terminate the service.”); Hicks v. Guilford County, 148 S.E.2d 240, 243 (N.C. 1966).
[A] juror is not subject to direction and control of county officials as to
the manner in which the juror discharges his duties . . . [E]ven the trial
judge is expressly forbidden to convey to the jury in any manner at any
stage of the trial his opinion as to how the jury should determine a ques-
tion of fact.
Id.
95. The court in O’Malley’s Case exemplified this reasoning when it stated, “There
is no contract of employment, expressed or implied, between the county and the ju-
ror.” O’Malley’s Case, 281 N.E.2d at 279.  Another court used different language to
express much the same view:
A juror is not appointed by the county commissioners or by any county
official.  His name is drawn from the box without regard to the relative
qualifications of those whose names are rightly in the box. . . . His ser-
vices, if he is accepted and empaneled to try the issues in an action, are
not obtained or defined by a contract of hire between him and the
county . . . express or implied, for those services.  He is not a public
officer, an independent contractor or an employee.  He is a juror.
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and most vehemently, the courts’ claim that the duty of citizens to
serve as jurors when summoned makes the existence of a traditional
employment relationship impossible.96  In the words of one court, it is
“[b]y majesty of the law, therefore, not by contract, [that the citizen]
becomes a juror.”97  These cases are surprising not because they were
decided along the same lines as decisions addressing the arguments
for increased compensation under the Constitution or the FLSA, but
because a growing number of state courts have attacked the grounds
upon which the decisions were based.  The following section investi-
gates their bases for rejecting the majority view and presents reasons
why the juror’s relationship with the county can be reevaluated to ex-
pand the state’s duty to compensate jurors on the basis of their finan-
cial needs.
b) Cases Finding that Jurors Are Similar to Employees
Before 1990, only Ohio considered jury duty to be a form of em-
ployment for the purposes of workers’ compensation.98  In that year,
the number of cases supporting the minority perspective tripled.  The
supreme courts of North Dakota,99 Idaho,100 and Washington101 chal-
lenged the prevailing view and created a force of opposition with
which at least one more state appellate court has aligned.102  The un-
derlying bases for these decisions have varied.  In Holmgren v. North
Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, the North Dakota Supreme
Court focused on the fact that a juror serves the county as long as
required to reach a verdict; thus, jury service resembles the continuity
of an official appointment.103  In Industrial Commission of Ohio v.
Hicks v. Guilford County, 148 S.E.2d 240, 244 (N.C. 1966).
96. See, e.g., Jochen v. County of Saginaw, 110 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Mich. 1961)
(Carr, J., concurring):
The status of the juror is analogous in certain respects to that of one who
is drafted under law into the military service of government. . . . One who
is summoned for such duty has no option other than to comply with the
mandate served on him.  His duties are prescribed by the law of the State,
and he is not subject to direction by the county.
Id.
97. Bd. of Comm’rs of Eagle County v. Evans, 60 P.2d 225, 226 (Colo. 1936).
98. See, e.g., Indus. Comm’n of Ohio v. Rogers, 171 N.E. 35 (Ohio 1930).
99. See Holmgren v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 455 N.W.2d 200 (N.D. 1990).
100. See Yount v. Boundary County, 796 P.2d 516 (Idaho 1999).
101. See Bolin v. Kitsap County, 785 P.2d 805 (Wash. 1990).
102. See Waggener v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
103. 455 N.W.2d at 203.  The court elaborated on this point, saying:
By virtue of the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, the position of
juror can be said to be continuous although the service of an individual
juror may be short-term. . . . By law, an individual juror’s service is re-
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Rogers, the Ohio Supreme Court focused on the similarity in the
source of fees provided to jurors and other types of public officials
who were unquestionably employees of the state.104  And, in Yount v.
Boundary County, one Idaho Supreme Court Justice focused on the
importance of the duties performed by the juror as indistinguishable
from that of any other full-time court employee.105  Regardless of the
differences in the courts’ reasoning, each case provides a reason to
view jury service as an official appointment worthy of the traditional
benefits accorded to part-time or temporary employees.  Moreover,
these cases collectively indicate that jurors fulfill multiple roles simul-
taneously, making the question of whether they are employees under
statutes a more difficult one to answer.  Aside from the juror’s similar-
ities to an employee deserving of a fair wage, the many functions
served by the jury are often cited as a basis for providing compensa-
tion to those who work as jurors.
C. Justifications for Jury Compensation
While many commentators have argued that setting a fair jury fee
applicable in all states’ courts is difficult or impossible,106 neither the
federal government nor any state legislature has entirely eliminated
the juror’s per diem.  To the contrary, every state and the federal gov-
ernment have affirmed the fee’s importance by incrementally increas-
quired until the case in which she serves is completed.  Thus, the continu-
ous nature of a juror’s duties is akin to the tenure and permanence of
duties associated with the public office.
Id.
104. 171 N.E. 35, 36 (Ohio 1930) (“We are unable to draw a distinction between the
selection of such juror by the jury commission and the appointment of such juror by
the jury commission . . . .”).  As the lower court’s ruling in Rogers explained:
A juror is engaged in the service of the state and of the county. . . . His
selection and service are provided for by the Legislature, and the service
is paid for out of the county funds by the county wherein the service is
rendered.  That service is not for contract of hire, but by appointment.
Indus. Comm’n of Ohio v. Rogers, 170 N.E. 600, 600 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929); cf.
Yount, 796 P.2d at 522 (“Because of the unique circumstances that a citizen is thrust
into when called upon to serve as a juror, we deem it improvident to overzealously
adhere to the technical rules . . . .”).
105. 796 P.2d at 527 (Towles, J., concurring) (“The tremendous responsibility thrust
upon jurors as a result of such public service qualifies them as public officials in the
highest order and no less important to the success of the judicial system than the
judges, clerks, bailiffs, court reporters, and other full-time employees of the state or
county.”).
106. See infra notes 308–313 (discussing difficulties in setting uniform fee pointed R
to by American Bar Association).
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ing it over the years.107  Two theories explain why jurors are owed any
modicum of compensation by the government. First, ensuring the par-
ticipation of all economic classes in the justice system was an aim of
the Framers of the constitutional amendments addressing jury trials.
The premium placed on class representation likely promoted provi-
sions for reasonable fees and has become amplified by recent require-
ments for cross-sectionality.108  Second, jury fees signify the value of
the jurors’ contributions to the justice system and to society at large.
1. Compensating Jurors to Ensure Class Representation
It is important to distinguish between the functions of jurors and
the function of their compensation.  Because the two are not synony-
mous, ascertaining the role of jury compensation may help to explain
why jurors are paid at all for performing their various duties.109  His-
torians trace jury compensation to the time of Pericles.110 They note
that the early compensation for jurors existed as a welfare benefit to
subsidize the income of elderly citizens who were no longer eligible
for traditional types of employment but who could continue to serve as
jurors.111  Although not all governments recognized the same role of
jury compensation as did the Athenians, it appears as though the same
type of system prevailed throughout parts of Europe until the era of
Henry V.  In the fifteenth century, the Crown strictly limited jury par-
ticipation to landowners with substantial savings because the existing
system created great turmoil.  The objective was to reduce the inci-
dence of jurors who would serve for payment alone rather than for the
107. See infra Figures 5–8 (depicting fee increases among states and federal govern-
ment since 1870); sources cited infra note 262 (providing federal jury fees since R
1791); Appendix A (providing statutory citations of history of jury pay for each state
in union, including District of Columbia).
108. The Court expressed this desire clearly in Theil v. Southern Pacific Co., 328
U.S. 217 (1946), when it stated that “[t]he American tradition of trial by jury . . .
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the commu-
nity.” Id. at 220.  Subsequently, the cross-sectionality doctrine has been expanded to
forbid discrimination based on gender in jury selection in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975), and racially motivated preemptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
109. See infra Part I.C.2 (exploring numerous jury roles); Figure 1 (outlining the
many functions of the American jury).
110. See MAXIMUS A. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM
24 (photo. reprint 1992) (1894) (“Pericles introduced the custom of paying each [ju-
ror] for his attendance.”).
111. See id. at 22-23 (observing that “[t]he establishment of [paid jurors] . . . helped
to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service”); id. at 24-
25 (explaining that fees were increased to provide citizens means of “livelihood”).
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fulfillment of their duties.112  For those who wish to challenge the
appeals of present-day commentators to raise jury fees, references to
these historical limitations on compensation, or to jurors who served
in the past without any compensation, could very well eliminate the
need to set rates anywhere near levels that would compensate jurors
for lost income.113  These observations, however, fail to recognize the
112.  See Act for the Sufficiency of Jurors, 2 Hen. 5, c. 3 (1414) (Eng.) (restricting
eligibility to freeholders due to “great mischiefs . . . which daily happen through all
the realm of England . . . which be common jurors, and other that have but little to
live upon but by such inquest, and which have nothing to lose because of their false
oaths, whereby they offend their consciences the more largely”). Scholars have placed
this royal edict in its proper context by highlighting the impoverished conditions of
most jurors in that era who were unable to bribe their way out of service and who
were so poor that they served for the pay and cared not for the facts of the case. See 2
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 631 (2d ed. 1899) (describing burdens of
“poorer freeholders” serving on juries of time period); SELECT CASES BEFORE THE
KING’S COUNCIL 1243–1482, at 10 (photo. reprint 1996) (I.S. Leadam & J.F. Baldwin
eds., 1918) (Citizens of London v. The Bishop of Bath (1295)) (describing how poor
jurors who served often “los[t] their work and [became] wholly impoverished” due to
their inability to attain exemptions from service); James C. Oldham, The Origins of
the Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 147 (1983) (explaining how jury panels
were “overloaded with poorer freeholders” who may not have been able to “buy[ ]
their way off the panel”).  For general commentary on the reasoning behind such
requirements, see generally id. at 145, which explains, in pertinent part, “According to
medieval thinking, the likelihood of corruption varied in inverse proportion to wealth,
and so the root cause of perjury in jurors was considered to be the impanelling of men
of insufficient substance.” (quoting 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELLMAN 107 (J. H.
Baker ed., 1978)).
113. In a classic article, Justice Riddell, a Canadian judge, attempted to justify his
admonitions of those attorneys who thanked jurors after trials by saying, “The jurors
are not to be thanked, they have done their duty and nothing more; I shall not permit
that unseemly practice to enter our Courts.”  William Renwick Riddell, Thanking the
Jury—and the Reverse, 14 A.B.A. J. 289, 289 (1928).  After citing a number of iso-
lated instances in England where the courts refused jurors the allowance of food and
often fined them for verdicts favoring suspected criminals, the judge concluded,
“Enough has been said to show that neither of old nor now can it be fairly said that the
Juror’s lot is a happy one.” Id. at 291.  Today, critics of jury fees may use similar
reasoning to justify not paying jurors. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in
Criminal Trials in America, 1796–1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2688–90 (1996)
(providing similar citations of judicial abuse of juries that seemingly support Justice
Riddell’s observations); Michael J. Crowley, Comment, Jury Coercion in Capital
Cases: How Much Risk Are We Willing to Take? 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1073, 1087 n.105
(1989) (citing a number of egregious cases of jury abuse ranging from 1853 to 1959).
However, observers must be careful to take these comments in context.  Note the
following observation regarding the lack of historical data about juries and the impor-
tance of preserving these accounts for future decisions:
[R]esearch into American jury history has been far from adequate, sys-
tematic, or synthetic.  Scholars who have attended to juries, by and large,
have done so incidentally as they pursued other themes.  The result is that
any attempt to survey jury history, especially in brief form . . . is necessa-
rily impressionistic, discursive, and tentative.
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historical development of the jury system in the United States.  In
America, jurors began to be compensated shortly after the nation
claimed its independence.  The first federal jury fee was practically
the equivalent of laborers’ daily wages, an amount that surely limited
financial burdens faced by the less wealthy jurors called to service.114
To a large degree, this initial rate may have been the result of an ongo-
ing debate between the Federalists, who disfavored a constitutional
amendment requiring jury trials because state practices with respect to
jury trials varied substantially, and the Antifederalists, who advocated
the benefits of representing all classes of society during a trial.115  Not
only did the initial provision recognize the fact that jurors had eco-
nomic needs deserving of adequate compensation, but it may also
have represented an effort to empower the common man when he was
seated next to a wealthy aristocrat in the jury box.116  While these
class-based arguments are important to an understanding of jury com-
pensation, equally important is an understanding of the varied ways in
which jurors prove themselves worthy of compensation through their
direct contributions to society.
2. Compensating Jurors to Recognize Their Many Societal
Contributions
In addition to the potential to remedy class imbalances on the
jury, jury fees also exist in order to recognize the jury’s many contri-
butions to society.  The jury benefits the nation in so many ways that it
would be insulting to the state or the federal government—not only to
the juror—to provide jurors with no financial recognition whatsoever.
While many scholars are content to recite a “quick list”117 of four to
Harold M. Hyman & Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History,
in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 23, 24 (Rita James Simon ed., 1975).  No scholar
claims to have compiled enough information to rectify this circumstance, and mis-
treatment of the jury negates neither the existence of compensatory provisions nor the
standards governing them.
114. See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 216, 217 (prescribing fifty cents
jury fee for nation); infra Figure 3 (depicting federal jury compensation in relation to
laborers’ daily earnings during colonial era).
115. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 672–707 (1973) (discussing debates over ratification of
Seventh Amendment).
116. See E-mail from Stephan Landsman, Professor of Law, DePaul University, to
Evan Seamone (May 21, 2001) (on file with the New York University Journal of
Legislation and Public Policy) (noting how Seventh Amendment “began to be treated
more and more as a compromise between warring factions” and speculating that “the
‘care and feeding’ of jurors became part of the political compromise deal”).
117. STARR, supra note 19, at 15. R
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nine functions of the jury,118 legislatures, courts, and scholars have
acknowledged at least two dozen.119 The number of possible functions
is, in fact, nearly infinite.120 Figure 1, below, presents the most promi-
nent functions of the jury set forth in three broadly defined categories.
a) Routine Jury Functions
The first group of jury functions is routine in nature.  Early on, a
distinguished scholar defined this category as involving “more or less
definite administrative functions.”121  Among the most prominent
functions within this grouping is fact-finding in the civil context,
which roughly equates to “determining the guilt or innocence of a
criminal defendant.”122  There is little dispute that the jury’s essential
role involves “truth-determining” in either the civil or criminal court-
room.123  The praise scholars and courts have given to this role may
118. See, e.g., id. at 15–17 (observing six functions); Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s
Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 407, 435–37 (1999) (pointing out nine functions of civil juries); Reid Hastie &
W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as a Risk Man-
ager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 901 (1998) (noting four functions); Christopher E. Smith,
Imagery, Politics, and Jury Reform, 28 AKRON L. REV. 77, 80 (1994) (citing five
functions presented in AM. BAR ASS’N & BROOKINGS INST., CHARTING A FUTURE FOR
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 8–11 (1992) (presenting five functions)); Douglas G. Smith,
Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals
for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 470–89 (1997) [hereinafter Smith, Aspects] (defin-
ing seven functions).
119. See infra text accompanying notes 121–158. While there are obvious differ- R
ences between civil and criminal juries, many functions overlap. See, e.g., Colleen P.
Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 729 (1993) (observing that “the history, text, and structure
of relevant constitutional provisions suggest that the authority of the civil and criminal
juries is more shared than divergent”).
Absent from this analysis, however, is a discussion of the functions served by the
grand jury. For a summary of these roles, see Beth Hornbuckle Fleming, Comment,
First Amendment Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings in Criminal Cases, 32 EM-
ORY L.J. 619, 660 (1983), which comments on the grand jury’s investigative and
screening functions.
120. Professor Robert Schopp has illustrated how any single jury function might be
splintered into several more. For example, serving as the “conscience of the commu-
nity” may mean “exercising personal values” as a juror. Robert F. Schopp, Recon-
ciling “Irreconcilable” Capital Punishment Doctrine as Comparative and
Noncomparative Justice, 53 FLA. L. REV. 475, 509 (2001). Likewise, the same term
may mean that the juror is “expected to be aware of and apply the standards of [an]
informal consensus.” Id. Yet, the term may also mean that the juror applies “moral
standards the citizens of a society have collectively adopted by institutionalizing them
in the law of the community.” Id.
121. Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L.
REV. 386, 386 (1954).
122. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 183 (1986).
123. Brown v. Lousiana, 447 U.S. 323, 334 (1980).
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FIGURE 1





Determining the credibility of witnesses
Providing restitution to victims in
society (making whole)




Signaling the need for societal
change
Providing society with behavioral
guidelines





Routine jury functions are
obvious to the observer of
any given case. Yet,
observers must infer that
the jury has performed a
symbolic function.
Alternatively, the existence
of the jury alone fulfills
extralegal functions and
influences society even





Simplifying the law with infusions
of common sense
Legitimizing the courts’ power
over citizens
Serving as the “conscience of the
community”
Educating citizens about the
law
Deterring crime by sending a
message to criminals
Providing a check on the
bureaucratization of the legal
system
Preventing oppression by the
executive branch
Guarding against oppressive or
mistaken attorneys
Preventing class domination of the
legal system
Helping judges escape criticism
Nullifying the law on moral grounds
Lawmaking
relate to the remarkable staying power of the jury’s factual determina-
tions on appeal, allowing juries to provide a source of finality in
adjudication.124
Just one glance at a set of uniform jury instructions alerts observ-
ers that jurors also apply the law to the facts.125  While distinct rules
124. See Mark Findlay, The Role of the Jury in a Fair Trial, in THE JURY UNDER
ATTACK 161, 165–67 (Mark Findlay & Peter Duff eds., 1988) (noting this strength
particularly during appellate review).
125. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Liti-
gation Process—The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 35 (1990)
(describing how “[u]sing the jury and not the judge as law applier has had momentous
implications for the administration of our civil litigation system”).
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provide jurors with guidelines for performing this task, jurors have
much more freedom to rely on their collective and individual instincts
in weighing the credibility of witnesses presented by opposing liti-
gants.  To this end, credibility assessment, or lie detecting,126 has been
cited consistently as “one of the principal functions of the jury.”127
Another seminal, but often overlooked, routine function of the
jury is calculating damages in civil litigation.  Throughout the centu-
ries in which jurors have performed this duty,128 they have been
thought to provide restitution to victims and society, which often in-
volves more than merely arriving at an appropriate number for dam-
ages determinations.  Instead, as a group of twelve accountants, the
jury provides the aggrieved with enough remuneration to “make the
injured party whole again,” at least in theory.129  In the criminal
courts, while jurors may not determine monetary damages, they enable
judges to sentence the guilty.  Sentencing in capital cases essentially
creates options paralleling the refusal to award monetary damages in a
civil case.  For instance, jurors in a capital case, “[n]ot only can . . .
decline to impose the death sentence, [they] can decline to convict or
choose to convict of a lesser offence.”130  Jurors’ duties are more rigid
in capital cases, however,  because they are defendants’ only avenue
for “maintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values
and the penal system.”131
The final routine function—that of participating in a deliberative
democracy—is supported by the longstanding view that the jury is a
“political institution” that represents the “sovereignty of the peo-
ple.”132  The manner in which this function operates explains why all
126. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON
TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 65 (1988).
127. 2 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 126
(rev. vol. 1985).
128. See, e.g., Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (“[W]here no precise
rule of law fixes the recoverable damages, it is the peculiar function of the jury to
determine the amount by their verdict.”); Paul B. Weiss, Comment, Reforming Tort
Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 737,
746 (1989) (“Assessment of the quantum of damages as a function of the jury in
actions at law was deeply entrenched in the common law of England at the time the
[S]eventh [A]mendment was adopted.”).
129. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 118, at 901.  This role is evident in the many cases R
in which juries reject compensating the plaintiffs monetarily but nevertheless find the
defendant liable for the injury.
130. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987).
131. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
132. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 291 (Henry Reeve, trans.,
Francis Bowen et al. eds., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1840); see also Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1187–89 (1991) (expressing
view that jury is exercise of popular sovereignty).
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routine functions are similar. In the case of this final example, when-
ever members of the jury deliberate to some degree before the fore-
man returns a verdict, they participate in a deliberative democracy.133
Because all jurors participate in certain activities throughout the
course of every case they decide, it is difficult to deny the existence of
the routine jury functions.  Although these routine functions are criti-
cally important if for no other reason than their appearance in almost
every case, other functions of the jury are equally significant to under-
standing why and to what degree jury members should be
compensated.
b) Symbolic Jury Functions
The second group of functions performed by the jury is harder to
detect on a case-by-case basis, because they are symbolic in nature.
The majority of these functions protect the lay public from overbear-
ing legal professionals and make the law fairer by expanding the re-
sponsibility for its enforcement to all citizens.  We know these
symbolic functions exist as a result of cases in the aggregate rather
than their clear presence in any specific case.134
Legal scholars have identified several important symbolic roles
that the jury may play.  The first of these roles is protecting the public
from oppressive judges. Commentators dating back to the eighteenth
century have noted that the jury protects litigants and society from
“the violence and partiality of judges appointed by the Crown.”135
This role may relate to the number of jurors who serve, which would
allow the group to ignore any individual member whose motivation to
vote is based on a detectable bias.  A broader, yet related, function of
the jury is its ability to speak as the conscience of the community.136
Just as groups of individuals can root out biased persons in their midst,
they can broadcast common sentiments among multiple diverse view-
points with unanimous verdicts.
133. See sources cited supra note 132 (exploring this routine function). R
134. Smith, Aspects, supra note 118, at 473. R
135. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349; see also Duncan v. Louisana,
391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (praising jury’s role as “an inestimable safeguard
against . . . the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge”).
136. This function is described in the literature under a variety of different names.
See Schopp, supra note 120, at 508 (“Discussions of community standards sometimes R
employ a variety of similar but different phrases including ‘conscience of the commu-
nity,’ ‘community values,’ ‘social values,’ ‘societal values,’ ‘public attitudes,’ ‘socie-
tal acceptance,’ or ‘standards of our citizens.’” (footnotes omitted)). Any of these
names denote the jury’s ability to “recogn[ize] values which fall outside the official
rules” but which are still prevalent in societal norms. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 495 (1966).
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A testament to the fact that the symbolic power of the jury exists
in its numbers is the reach of the jury beyond mere factual matters to
the law itself.  In this respect, another noted symbolic function of the
jury is its ability to infuse common sense into the law and aid in its
simplification.  Many would agree with Professor Michael Saks, who
has suggested that “[t]he mere existence of the jury keeps the law
comprehensible to the people.”137  Another commentator has argued
that the collective decisions of the jury become “rational” because ju-
ries bring “the common sense, experiences, and training of several
individuals to the fact-finding enterprise.”138
As a representative assembly, the jury likewise justifies the exis-
tence of both the court and its related powers over citizens.139  Be-
cause of its representative nature, citizens who perceive that juries
provide a valid method of dispute resolution “will bring their disputes
to the legal system rather than settle them in the streets,” which also
legitimizes the state’s “monopoly over physical violence.”140  This
function of legitimizing the legal system may also be enhanced by the
jury system’s related role of educating citizens about the law and al-
lowing them to feel empowered by their experiences as jurors.141
Yet another symbolic role that commentators see as served by the
jury is its ability to deter crime by sending a message to criminals that
their conduct is unacceptable in the eyes of members of the commu-
nity.  This function permits prosecutors to encourage juries to use their
verdicts to convey their dissatisfaction with certain behavior as a
means of preventing other individuals from engaging in it.142  Simi-
larly, the jury functions as a democratic institution and, to a large de-
137. Michael J. Saks, Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693, 703 (1986) (book review).
138. Murphy, supra note 119, at 734. R
139. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975), the Supreme Court noted that
jury participation is “critical to [maintaining] public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system.” See also KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 136, at 7–8 (explain- R
ing how jury enhances legitimacy of court decisions).
140. J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme
Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 165 (1990).
141. For more on this role, see, for example, John R. Runyan, Are Some Civil Trials
Too Complex to Be Heard and Decided By a Jury? No!, FED. LAW., Aug. 1998, at 42,
43 for a discussion of de Toqueville’s view that juries “instill some of the habits of the
judicial mind into every citizen and that these habits best prepare people to be free.”
142. See, e.g., United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1151 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Un-
less calculated to incite the passions and prejudices of the jurors, appeals to the jury to
act as the community conscience are not per se impermissible.”); United States v.
Alloway, 397 F.2d 105, 113 (6th Cir. 1968) (refusing to find that argument calling
upon jurors “to be the world conscience of the community” “exceeded permissible
bounds of advocacy”). But see Solivan, 937 F.2d at 1155 (finding misconduct when
prosecutor asked jury to send message to “all of the drug dealers like [defendant]” that
“we don’t want that stuff [illegal narcotics] in Northern Kentucky”).
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gree, provides a check on the bureaucratization of the legal system,
bureaucratic government in general, and the power of the Executive
Branch.143  By preventing such overreaching, the jury additionally
protects the legal system from undue and inappropriate influence by a
privileged social and economic class.144
Of course, there are other, more controversial, symbolic jury
functions. First, one early commentator noted the jury’s ability to de-
crease judges’ burdens and place them in a better light, as “a means by
which judges can avoid deciding complex questions and thus avoid
the criticism which always follows from being forced to decide be-
tween two equally plausible alternatives.”145  A second controversial
symbolic function, that of nullifying the law on moral grounds, has
been championed by certain commentators and popular interest groups
like the Fully Informed Jury Association.146  Those who support jury
nullification assert that jurors should render verdicts according to their
personal inclinations rather than the dictates of the law.147  A function
related to nullification of the law is the jury’s ability to go beyond
applying the already existing, thereby creating new law.  Commenta-
tors have differed as to both the importance and legitimacy of this
function.  Some suggest that juries are making law every time they are
“called upon to decide whether on the facts found to exist a party was
143. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) (noting “the jury’s
historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises
of power by the Executive Branch”).  Another description of this role is “act[ing] as a
buffer between the government and the defendant.” Lisa E. Alexander, Note, Vici-
nage, Venue, and Community Cross-Section: Obstacles to a State Defendant’s Right
to a Trial by a Representative Jury, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261, 261 (1991).
144. See, e.g., Wolfram, supra note 115, at 696 (noting role of jury to “hold the class R
instincts of the judge in check”).
145. Broeder, supra note 121, at 421. However, whether judges would receive the R
same criticism for deciding complex cases in the civil realm were juries abolished is
questionable.
146. See, e.g., Elizabeth I. Haynes, Comment, United States v. Thomas: Pulling the
Jury Apart, 30 CONN. L. REV. 731, 742 (1998) (explaining why “nullification on
moral grounds is a proper function of the jury”); Facts About the Fully Informed Jury
Association, FULLY INFORMED JURY ASSOCIATION, at http://www.fija.org/fijafact.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2002) (“The power of the jury to judge not only the evidence, but
also the merits of the law itself is central to its proper functioning as a judicial and
political institution.”) (on file with the New York University Journal of Legislation
and Public Policy).
147. For a more complete understanding of the history surrounding the debate over
jury nullification, compare Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794), which
permits jury disobedience of the law, with Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S.
51 (1895), which holds that juries must observe the judge’s instructions.
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negligent.”148  Others believe this role is invalid unless judges turn to
jury decisions as precedent for their own decisions.149
On balance, commentators praise jurors for fulfilling the above
symbolic functions, even though they may be difficult to identify in
individual cases.150  Case in point, while the jury is acclaimed for
preventing oppression of the people by judges,151 advocates are hard-
pressed to identify a single case where a jury definitively safeguarded
the public from a biased judge.  Even absent such proof, it is generally
accepted that juries do, in fact, make it more difficult for judges to
commandeer a trial to meet their own objectives.152
c) Extralegal Jury Functions
In addition to its routine and symbolic functions, the jury plays
many roles outside of the court.153  One of the extralegal functions of
the jury is encouraging forms of dispute resolution alternative to liti-
gation.154  Ironically, when the jury as an institution performs this
function effectively, no jury actually hears the case in question.  A
second extralegal function of juries includes providing regulatory
guidelines for societal behavior, especially among corporations deal-
ing with the pressures of multiple, and sometimes conflicting, man-
dates. Jurors in this respect are “risk manager[s] responsible for
promoting an efficient and socially acceptable level of risk-taking be-
havior.”155  A third extralegal function performed by the jury is that of
148. George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 773 (1986).
149. Cf. Broeder, supra note 121 at 402 (discussing Holmes’s reliance on jury ver- R
dict in Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 15 N.E. 491 (Mass. 1888), before he assumed
responsibilities as U.S. Supreme Court Justice).
150. Cf. Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philosopher’s Stone: Dualist Democracy and the
Jury, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 175, 175 (1998) (“Of all our civic institutions, none is as
charged with symbolism as the petit jury.”).
151. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84 (1942) (describing jury as “a
prized shield against oppression”).
152. See id.; see also text accompanying supra note 151 (exploring this function).
153. See Broeder, supra note 121, at 386 (noting that “extra-legal functions are occa- R
sionally urged as the jury’s chief justification”).
154. Disputants trying to settle a case clearly “expect that the prospect of a jury trial
can induce parties to resolve disputes or bargain charges and sentences rather than
going to trial.” Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 118, at 901–02. Consequently, the jury R
has been a “preventer of litigation and the facilitator of compromise.”  Broeder, supra
note 121, at 423. R
155. Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 118, at 902.  For a more detailed explanation of R
this view, see H.R. REP. NO. 100-421, at 19-20 (1987), which notes the role of the
jury in Sherman Antitrust cases to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate bus-
iness practices. See also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:
An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 870 (1998) (discussing how punitive dam-
age awards reflect this function).
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changing citizens’ attitudes about the justice system and promoting
other forms of civic participation in society.  Commentators assert the
importance of this role, noting that service on a jury “provides an im-
portant civic experience for the citizen.”156  A related extralegal func-
tion of the jury involves its ability to signal attitudinal changes about
the acceptability of laws or behaviors in society, which can aid courts
and legislatures in changing the law.157  While these carryover or “in-
cidental”158 functions may originate from the jury box, they operate in
realms outside of the courtroom.  The growth of mediation and arbi-
tration firms in the private sector and the federal government’s nearly
unanimous acceptance of these methods of dispute resolution high-
light the impact of the jury outside of the courtroom and the undenia-
ble influence of the extralegal jury functions.
Ultimately, if jurors simultaneously serve functions in all three
categories—routine, symbolic, and extralegal—and these functions
justify the very existence of the state’s legal authority, it is particularly
unfair that the state should deny jurors compensation for the financial
losses they experience while serving.  The following section explains
how courts and legislators have come to permit such neglect in light of
the crucial roles that jurors play in the American legal system.
D. The Weight of American Custom and the Inadequacy of the
“Civic Duty” Justification for Compelling Jury Service
that Creates Hardship
As it stands, the reasons for compensating jurors clash sharply
with the courts’ justification for compelling jury service in spite of
inadequate levels of compensation.  Alone, the bare notion of a public
duty hardly outweighs the importance of jurors’ many functions.
What is a public duty?  Are there variations of duties that the courts
should treat differently, at least with respect to compensation?  Al-
though Butler and its progeny advise that jury duty may be viewed
similarly to military service or public roadwork, none have explained
why this is the case. The sections below expose the weaknesses of
these analogies—that jury duty, recognized as such, demands more of
156. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 136, at 7.  Another commentator has theorized R
that “weighing impartially the interests of others . . . might result in the jurors’ re-
shaping their own behavior toward their fellow citizens to be more just outside the
courtroom.”  Smith, Aspects, supra note 118, at 480. R
157. See Saks, supra note 137, at 704 (reasoning that juries “allow[ ] the law to track R
change in society with an efficiency that cannot be achieved by asking legislatures to
rewrite laws every few months, or even by judges, who are inclined to give more
deference to the legislature than perhaps they always should”).
158. Broeder, supra note 121, at 424. R
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the citizen than the other duties that courts have allowed without com-
pensation, and that courts should distinguish jury duty as a unique
type of service worthy of at least subsistence compensation.
Professor David Shapiro once noted the courts’ reliance on his-
tory in supporting lawyers’ duties to represent indigents: “Although
frequently urged as [being] rooted in the firmest of traditions, the
‘duty to serve’ in fact has a history shrouded in obscurity, ambiguity,
and qualification.”159  For courts addressing jurors’ obligations, the
problem relates to the “duty” portion of the term “jury duty”—the idea
that the government needs citizens who are willing to participate of
their own will in shared civic responsibilities.  This dependence on
public-spiritedness has existed since the founding of the nation, when
citizens pooled their resources in times of need to meet common de-
mands.160  Early American duties included joining forces to brave the
natural elements on the frontier,161 putting up travelers in one’s
home,162 participating in public works for one’s neighborhood,163 or
serving in the militia or volunteer night patrol to protect the town-
ship.164  Yet, it does not follow from the existence of these duties that
citizens were compelled to fulfill them without any financial or other
consideration for the burdens they endured. Close examination reveals
limitations on the scope of each of these obligations.
1. Civic Duty, Militias, and the Nation’s Armed Services
When courts compare jury participation to early service in mili-
tia, they are at least partially accurate.  From the establishment of the
colonies through the mid-1700s, militiamen, like most jurymen, were
not paid and probably served without demanding compensation; in-
stead, they were motivated by patriotism and loyalty to one another.165
159. David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer’s Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 735, 738 (1980).
160. See CURTIS P. NETTELS, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LIFE 460 (1940) (relating statement by traveler of United
States in 1794: “Every first settler in a new country labors less for the present than for
the future; less for himself than for posterity; and it is this honorable consciousness
that invigorates his toil, cheers his solitude, and alleviates his privations”).
161. See SUSAN J. ELLIS & KATHERINE H. NOYES, BY THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF
AMERICANS AS VOLUNTEERS 19 (rev. ed. 1990) (describing how Americans assisted
each other in building houses).
162. See id. at 30 (explaining how hosts would lodge travelers with hospitality rather
than profit motive as chief concern).
163. See infra Part I.D.2.
164. See infra Parts I.D.1, 3.
165. See CHARLES C. MOSKOS, A CALL TO CIVIC SERVICE: NATIONAL SERVICE FOR
COUNTRY AND COMMUNITY 14 (1988) (noting that for early colonists, “The militia
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Just as jury participation served to legitimize the courts’ and the
states’ exercise of police power, participation in the armed forces
served to protect the physical security of the colonies.  However, mili-
tary historians note how these concepts of volunteerism quickly van-
ished in the wake of the Revolutionary War as Americans began to
recognize their financial needs.166  President Washington recognized
not only the importance of providing pensions to soldiers,167 but also
the value of such economic incentives as a means to lessen military
officers’ “apprehension of personal distress [at] the termination of the
war, from having thrown themselves [out] of professions and employ-
ments they might not have it in [their] power to resume.”168
was not a voluntary force; every able-bodied man was obliged to possess arms and
train periodically, and he was subject to call-up when military needs dictated”).
166. See id. (“Toward the middle of the eighteenth century, the militia system began
to erode, only to be reinvigorated at the start of the War of Independence.”).  Service
had embraced a totally different version of economic reality by the end of the Revolu-
tionary War.  Soldiers had economic needs, which the government could not ignore.
For example, the Continental Congress, “in addition to earlier gifts of land and cloth-
ing, voted a two hundred dollar bounty to those who would enlist or reenlist for the
duration” of the Revolutionary War. EUGENE CONVERSE MURDOCK, PATRIOTISM LIM-
ITED 1862–1865: THE CIVIL WAR DRAFT AND THE BOUNTY SYSTEM 16 (1967). After
the Revolution, from the 1770s on, several states, including Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and New Jersey, offered bounties to militiamen ranging from sixty-six
dollars to “seven hundred and fifty dollars, an annual suit of clothes, and one hundred
acres of land.” Id. at 16–17.  The federal government’s relatively more modest boun-
ties, which ranged from $16 in 1811 to $124 in 1814, in addition to various amounts
of land, in fact, caused many federal soldiers to desert and enlist in state militias to
earn higher fees. Id.
167. In 1776, George Washington offered soldiers a bounty of “twenty dollars and a
suit of clothes” and “all the plunder they shall take from the enemy, to be equally
divided among the officers and men, according to their pay.” THE RECORD OF CON-
NECTICUT MEN IN THE MILITARY AND NAVAL SERVICE DURING THE WAR OF THE
REVOLUTION 1775–1783, at 126 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1889). See also George
Washington, Circular to the States, June 8, 1783, reprinted in 26 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 492 (John Fitzpatrick ed., 1938) (explaining to Congress that
promise of lifetime pension to recruits “was the price of their blood and of your Inde-
pendency”). In accord with these sentiments, in 1778, Congress had promised officers
half of their pay “for the term of seven years if they live so long.”  4 JOURNALS OF
CONG. 288 (1778–79).  Federal legislators later modified the provision to include
“half pay for life to all officers serving until the war’s end.” STANLEY LEBERGOTT,
THE AMERICANS: AN ECONOMIC RECORD 50 (1984). The Congress had also issued a
number of certificates following the Revolutionary War to provide certain funds. See
8 JOURNALS OF CONG. 121 (1782–83) (offering five years pay or securities earning six
percent to officers then in service).
168. Letter from George Washington to a Committee of Congress (Jan. 28, 1778), in
6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 300, 303–04 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 1890).
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By the mid-1800s, the adequacy of government compensation in
some measure determined whether Americans would join the armed
forces.  As one scholar observed:
By the time of the Mexican War in 1846, most of the country’s
fighting forces consisted of volunteers attracted by cash bounties,
the chance for adventure, and promises of land.  From the early
days of our history, then, supporters of a professional army have
acknowledged the role of material incentives in garnering recruits.
Those favoring a citizen army were more inclined to emphasize
civic responsibilities.  By the middle of the nineteenth century, the
citizen school had clearly been eclipsed by the professional one.169
During the Civil War, so few citizens wished to participate in the
militia that persons could charge large sums of money to offer them-
selves as substitutes, often demanding payment in excess of $1,000 for
their services170 which spawned a new profession of “Volunteer Bro-
kers.”171  States also allowed wealthy citizens to avoid military service
in exchange for substantial monetary payments.  Even when Congress
implemented a national draft in 1863, the law permitted draftees to
avoid serving by providing a qualified substitute or by paying $300 to
the federal government.172  Opponents of the commutation fees some-
times rioted in discontent.173
Service in the militia or in the federal forces, at least between
1776 and 1864,174 was not of the purely patriotic sort that courts have
suggested when drawing parallels between military service and jury
compensation.  While cognizant of patriotic motivations of those serv-
ing the nation, state and federal policymakers were hardly ignorant of
the financial needs of military conscripts and volunteers.  They contin-
uously paid soldiers more than their basic living expenses, as they did
with jurors in the early days of the Republic.  Perhaps in part due to
these inconsistencies, courts have pointed to other nonmilitary civic
service requirements as supporting minimal jury compensation.
169. MOSKOS, supra note 165, at 16–17. R
170. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 160 (1978) (noting
rate of $1500 in many areas).
171. See MURDOCK, supra note 166, at 107–31 (exploring brokers’ history). R
172. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 731, 733.
173. See MURDOCK, supra note 166, at 70 (describing New York draft riot). R
174. Among states, it is said that “the militia system, indeed, any concept of the
citizen soldier, atrophied” upon the conclusion of the Civil War, and this problem
continued through the late 1880s. MOSKOS, supra note 165, at 18. R
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2. Civic Duty and Public Roadwork Requirements
One obligation that might be used to support low pay for jurors is
that of under-compensated public service, such as work on the roads
and streets of a locality. In the case of public roadwork, courts unani-
mously upheld statutes requiring such labor on the grounds that citi-
zens had an obligation to the states.175  Even though the service was
not deemed to be an impermissible form of involuntary servitude, pub-
lic opinion compelled legislators to lessen the requirements to the
point that most of the statutes were abolished.  Comments in cases
such as State v. Sharp, which was decided in 1899, evidence how the
tide of confidence had turned away from roadwork:
Because of its inefficiency, and possibly from a growing conviction
of the essential injustice of the system, and the increasing inequal-
ity under present conditions of the burdens laid by working the
roads under that system, there has been a steady growth of legisla-
tion . . . away from the old system, and in the direction of having
[the roads] worked by taxation.176
Even with the Court’s guarantee in Butler that roadwork require-
ments without compensation would be limited to work occurring “for
a reasonable time on public roads near [a citizen’s] residence,”177
American lifestyles had changed dramatically since the advent of the
Industrial Revolution.  Americans could no longer set aside an entire
weekend to perform uncompensated menial labor.  This guarantee in
Butler points to two factors that made roadwork requirements permis-
sible where they might otherwise not have been: (1) temporality—the
minimal duration of the duty; and (2) social vicinage—very close
proximity to the citizen’s residence and social sphere.
While military service might have required an inductee to spend
months or years abroad, a road worker was available to return home if
his family needed him.  He could easily leave duty to attend to per-
sonal matters.  Likewise, the road worker could return to his work-
place easily, as his absence was predictable to employers who would
plan in advance to use a temporary replacement for the brief time that
he was absent.  For these reasons, one can assume that the road worker
had an opportunity to obtain minimal living expenses in other ways
while serving the public.  This sits in sharp contrast to jury service,
which frequently requires an individual to sacrifice a greater amount
of time, and often takes the juror farther away from her social and
175. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing Butler v. Perry and its R
progeny).
176. State v. Sharp, 34 S.E. 264, 265 (N.C. 1899).
177. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 330 (1916).
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employment commitments.  These dissimilarities indicate that courts
should not be so quick to cite prior decisions upholding roadwork re-
quirements as support for minimal jury compensation.
3. Civic Duty and the Night Patrol
Another historical situation that could be cited as analogous to
jury duty is that of the colonial institution of the municipal night pa-
trol.  These patrols attempted to ensure that no crime took place in a
municipal area.178  Local communities eliminated volunteer night pa-
trols in favor of paid constables for much the same reasons they abol-
ished mandatory roadwork requirements.  Yet, the poor quality of
citizens’ participation also played a significant role in the transition.
In the early colonial era, “police protection was a community re-
sponsibility shared by all able bodied men.”179  Until 1751, in Phila-
delphia, “all householders were required to serve in the night
watch.”180  Similar to military and road service, wealthy homeowners
could buy their freedom from their obligation for a sum of six shil-
lings per year.181  After 1751, the situation had drastically changed.
Philadelphia established a paid constabulary to handle the duties that
had formerly been shared by all citizens of the community.182
At the helm of this transformation was Benjamin Franklin, who
had established the first volunteer fire company in America during
that same era.183  In Franklin’s memoirs, he provided reasons for the
government’s decreased reliance on civic obligation:
[T]he constable, for a little drink, often got such ragamuffins about
him as a watch, that respectable housekeepers did not choose to
mix with. Walking the rounds, too, was often neglected, and most
178. See Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography III, in BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S AUTOBIO-
GRAPHICAL WRITINGS 701, 710 (Carl Van Doren ed., 1945) (discussing function of
night patrol).
179. NETTELS, supra note 160, at 457. R
180. Id.  Similar “night watch” practices were evident in other communities, espe-
cially in New England. Id.
181. Benjamin Franklin discussed Philadelphia’s city watch program in his autobiog-
raphy, stating:
The city watch was one of the first things that I conceiv’d to want regula-
tion. It was managed by the constables . . . [who] warned a number of
housekeepers to attend for the night. Those who chose never to attend,
paid him six shillings a year to be excus’d, which was suppos’d to be for
hiring substitutes, but was, in reality, much more than what was necessary
for the purpose and made the constableship a place of profit.
Franklin, supra note 178, at 710. R
182. See NETTELS, supra note 160, at 458. R
183. See Franklin, supra note 178, at 710–11 (discussing establishment of Union R
Fire Company and of paid night watch).
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of the nights spent in tippling. . . . On the whole, I proposed as a
more effectual watch, the hiring of proper men to serve constantly
in that business; and as a more equitable way of supporting the
charge, the levying a tax should be proportion’d to the property.184
Based on the night patrol’s failure to serve effectively as enforcers of
the law, it is clear that important civic duties—ones that require atten-
tion to detail—cannot depend on civic virtue alone.
Communities could have continued to use the night patrol as a
primary law enforcement mechanism in the spirit of volunteerism.
However, Franklin and others quickly realized that governments desir-
ous of quality services needed to provide adequate funding to the indi-
viduals who would perform such duties; otherwise, the duties would
not be performed adequately.  America’s experience with the night
patrol similarly implies that compelling jurors to serve at a financial
loss will result in a lower caliber of service from those who are se-
lected to serve.
E. Crisis-Response and the Courts
Because the courts often rely on history to inform their views of
jury service and its societal importance, it is difficult to believe that
judges would knowingly ignore crucial aspects of America’s past that
support compensating jurors for their economic losses.  Perhaps the
courts’ high demand for jurors to serve in light of exploding summons
non-response rates185 has caused judges to overlook such lessons.  In
this regard, the nature of all duties—including jury service—can be
seen in two respects.  Drawing distinctions between the two views
should be helpful to those who have adopted only one.
1. The Civic Virtue and Economic Models of Jury Service
The term “jury duty” is susceptible to at least two divergent inter-
pretations.  While the phrase clearly indicates that citizens have an
obligation to participate when called to serve on a jury, it fails to dis-
tinguish precisely whose “duty” is characterized.  One scholar has
noted a similar ambiguity in the term “community service”:
184. Id. at 710.
185. See, e.g., David Doege, County Prosecuting Jury Service No-Shows, MILWAU-
KEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 31, 2000, LEXIS, Miljnl File (describing how no-shows have
increased from twenty percent to thirty percent in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin);
“The Dog Ate My Summons,” CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 12, 2001, LEXIS, Chisun File
(describing various measures taken by jurisdictions in effort to decrease no-show
rates).
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Service needs a context which begins to appear in a sentence like “I
serve you,” or “We serve them,” or whatever. This asks for clarifi-
cation of the status of the “doer” as well as of the “done-to” and of
the relationship between them.  When “community” modifies “ser-
vice” further thought is needed about how that changes the service
to be done.186
With respect to the term “jury duty,” it is unclear whether the
state owes a duty to jurors to ensure that they can serve, whether ju-
rors owe a similar duty to the state to provide their service, or whether
both entities owe obligations to one another.
According to one view of jury duty, a selected citizen has an
obligation to participate and deliberate unquestioningly for the dura-
tion of the trial, however long it may last.  After all, jurors receive
court orders compelling their attendance.  Another view of jury duty
places substantial requirements on the administrators of the courts,
such as ensuring that jurors are selected from a representative cross-
section of the community.  However, the “duty” of serving on a jury
cannot rest solely on either the citizens summoned to participate or the
courts that summon them.  Society has been very Solomon-like and
has reached a compromise. The responsibility is a shared one—be-
tween the courts and citizens called to serve.
Just as jury duty can be seen as the responsibility of two com-
pletely different entities, so can jury compensation.  Under one view
of jury compensation, the “civic virtue” perspective, service on a jury
does not require compensation, as jury service is a responsibility re-
quired of all citizens in exchange for the rights that the state guaran-
tees to them.  An alternative perspective would be an economic one,
which would dictate that the state has a responsibility to the jurors to
ensure that they are not harmed financially as a result of their service.
While states can fulfill their obligations under the economic per-
spective with a per diem sufficient to meet jurors’ financial needs,
they might also undertake reforms other than those relating directly to
the provision of funds by the government in an effort to eliminate the
economic losses jurors experience.  For instance, courts could imple-
ment a weekend or evening trial schedule that would allow the jurors
to work for their expected wage and still fulfill their legal obliga-
tions.187  Tax credits or vouchers for the necessities of life could also
186. HOWARD B. RADEST, COMMUNITY SERVICE: ENCOUNTER WITH STRANGERS 2
(1993).
187. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 341, 346 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)
(explaining how, “Finding ways to shorten trials and minimize some of the burdens of
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play a crucial role.  But none of these implementations would exist
without significant restructuring of the courts’ administrative infra-
structure, which could pose exactly the same problem as the one-day/
one-trial did in Los Angeles—prohibitive costs.188
A very distant alternative that still squares with the economic
perspective of jury compensation would be the recommendation of
financial analyst Marvin Oge, who developed a formula that would
provide jurors with enough money each year to cover a two-week
trial.189  However, in such a system, jurors would be required to pro-
vide for their own fees.  Much like unemployment compensation, a
jury duty insurance system of the sort proposed by Oge would deduct
roughly 1.3% of everyone’s monthly income and deposit it into a
fund.  Coupled with the requirement that no juror could serve more
than once in three years, a measurable amount of money would accrue
over this period, guaranteeing that most jurors would be able to sup-
port themselves with the help of the fees paid to them for the duration
of a trial.  However, under this system, the county would bear no re-
sponsibility for guaranteeing funds for jury pay, and jurors could not
look to the county for support.  Even if this system would not require
the creation of an entirely new bureaucracy to administer it, it aban-
dons the state’s responsibility to compensate jurors for their effort and
service.
While many alternatives exist for compensating jurors adequately
under the economic model, states seemingly have adopted the civic
virtue model of juror compensation, as evident in pay rates amounting
to mere pennies on each dollar demanded by the cost of living.190
Testaments to the model also appear in official statements recognizing
the juror’s per diem as no more than a token of appreciation, and the
statements of judges and legislators that jury payment should never
service should enable potential jurors to serve and broaden the spectrum of representa-
tion at the practical as well as the theoretical level”).  He recommends, inter alia,
trials that “begin[ ] at 4:00 p.m. and continue[ ] until 8:00 p.m. for as long as the trial
takes if this will increase the representativeness of the jury pool,” or a “hybrid sched-
ule that allows a case to be tried for a week or two (the presumptive time for jury
service) and finished on [an] evening [‘flex-time’] schedule . . . .” Id. at 351. Like-
wise, videotaping evidence and sending it to the members of the jury would allow
them the opportunity to review materials at their own convenience.  Id.
188. See supra note 33 (describing difficulties in implementing new trial formats). R
189. See Marvin Oge, Editorial, Reader’s Verdict: Current Juror Pay No Incentive
to Serve, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Oct. 23, 1999, LEXIS, Lad File, for a more detailed
explanation by Oge of his system.
190. See infra Figure 6 (comparing average daily state jury compensation to daily
amount mandated by federal poverty threshold).
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equate to the wages provided by employers.191  The civic virtue per-
spective of jury compensation encourages wooden statements dis-
missing inadequate pay on the basis that jury duty is a “civic duty,” a
“moral obligation,” a “community service,” or even a “right.”  Yet,
these terms cannot legitimize the inadequacy of jury fees without fur-
ther reasons supporting the analogies. The use of such terms requires
definitions of words like “duty,” and—due to the rich history of jury
participation in America—it requires an examination of how these
words and concepts have changed over the years, and whether they
have retained their original meanings.
2. The Civic Virtue Model Invites Historical Ambiguity
State legislatures and courts subscribing to the civic virtue model
of jury compensation benefit from portrayals of declining jury partici-
pation as a public epidemic.192  These portrayals permit the govern-
ment to place extraordinary demands on citizens without being held
accountable for justifying its orders on an individual basis.193  On this
view, calling on Americans to participate in aspects of local govern-
ance, such as jury duty, is akin to mobilizing citizens to combat an
enemy in the face of great danger:
As a response to crisis, community service is distorted, its promise
overblown, and its complexities hidden by anxiety and faddism.
Not the least of the consequences of a “crisis mentality” is the sup-
pression of ambiguity and the simplification of reality into exclu-
sive choices.  The dangers of manipulation already present in the
relationship of doer and done-to increase as crisis calls forth a psy-
chology of “crusades” and “wars.”  We must have our enemies.
We find them in those who do not agree that our crisis is every-
one’s crisis. . . . We are convinced that the needs of sociability and
citizenship are not being met as, it is believed, they once upon a
time were.  Our presumed failure transforms an ordinary discussion
into high drama.  We are, if the prevalent rhetoric is to be believed,
living in a country that has lost its way morally, socially, economi-
cally and politically.  Community service, then, finds its place in
191. See infra note 281 and accompanying text (discussing various views of proper R
amount of jury compensation).
192. See sources cited supra note 185 (providing portrayals of epidemic nature of R
decline in jury participation).
193. See RADEST, supra note 186, at 3 (“By interpreting community service as a R
response to crisis, we are able to justify the expenditure of extra-usual energies.”).
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our consciousness, our language and our policies as a response to
crisis and in context of nostalgia for lost connections.194
The operation of the crisis response model with respect to jurors
is clearest in the case of the jury round-ups described in the Introduc-
tion to this Article.  Recall the courts in North Carolina and Maryland,
where judges had become so frustrated with jury-dodging that they
sent bailiffs into the streets to compel random citizens to serve with
little or no notice.  The judges, without fail, justify such orders on the
basis of a crisis in the courts.  Citizens who request extra time to ar-
range their schedules on short notice are consequently denied the op-
portunity on the basis of the courts’ emergency.195
Even if states do not engage in juror round-ups, the crisis re-
sponse model benefits courts by justifying their inattention, and often
rude and abrupt behavior, towards jurors.196  While the process of ju-
ror round-ups may, at least temporarily, ease administrative burdens, it
does not come without costs.  The process ironically may encourage
further noncompliance with summonses,197 and obscures historical
lessons relating to both jury participation and the limits of civic duty.
In other words, to promote an absolute duty to serve on juries, courts
attempt to return us to a nostalgic time when citizens were expected to
make significant sacrifices, even though the present imposes more se-
vere financial burdens on the juror.198  Because the civic virtue per-
spective of jury service blinds courts to its economic counterpart,
which is often more critical to the success of the legal system, the
civic virtue perspective obscures the duty to compensate jurors ade-
quately.  An examination of current and historical practices reveals
that the state and federal governments traditionally have relied upon
the economic perspective of jury compensation.
194. Id. at 4. In a number of decisions, courts have justified selfless jury service in
terms of an “us against them” rationale, with various nostalgic references. See supra
note 12 (describing jury round-ups). R
195. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing juror round-ups). R
196. Cf. RADEST, supra note 186, at 3 (“By interpreting community service as a R
response to crisis . . . [w]e are able to use the language of mobilization.”).
197. For example, the courts might actually increase jury dodging by providing such
thinly-supported justifications.  If citizens cannot explain why they are engaging in an
activity except for the fact that it is required, they will be more likely to weigh and
balance these obligations against other life commitments that they are similarly “re-
quired” to fulfill. See infra text accompanying note 351 (describing “Rachel’s R
dilemma”).
198. Cf. RADEST, supra note 186, at 57–77 (discussing historical foundations sup- R
porting community service programs).
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II
HISTORICAL STANDARDS THAT INFLUENCED JURY COMPENSATION
AND THEIR RELEVANCE IN SETTING FEES IN MODERN TIMES
A. A Snapshot of Current Jury Compensation Methods
and Amounts
In the fifty states and the District of Columbia, jury compensation
systems exist in three forms. Some prescribe fixed rates throughout
the state, others empower counties to set their own rates within certain
ranges, and a number increase the pay jurors receive after they have
served for a fixed number of days.  Figure 2, below, depicts current
national jury compensation systems and includes types of payment






























2001 DAILY JUROR COMPENSATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTIONS199
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X = $23.94 1986 1989X = $19.40 X = $16.50 3.46 Days $39.73 $29.56 1992
199. Daily compensation in this Figure includes all fees paid to petit jurors who serve full days.  Excluded from this analysis are grand jurors, municipal
jurors, coroner’s jurors, jurors attending a “view,” talespersons, or individuals not selected but called to serve.  The term “updated” in this table indicates


































200. The term “fixed payment” denotes those states that pay a single jury fee regardless of the county or jurisdiction in which a juror serves and
regardless of the length of the juror’s service.
201. Data listed under the heading “Payment Varied by County, etc.” depicts those states that require counties to pay a minimum fee, different fees for
types of trials (civil and criminal), or different fixed amounts based on county classifications or population density.  In the case of a minimum fee, that
fee is used as the amount analyzed.  In the case of varied county rates, the highest and lowest rates were averaged to derive a numeric midpoint.
202. “Time-Sensitive Payment” describes states that compensate jurors’ additional fees after a certain period of time has passed.  The “Pre-Shift Rate”
indicates the initial amount of compensation.  “Days” indicates the number of days the juror must wait to become eligible for the higher fee.  “Post-Shift
Rate” indicates the higher fee for which the juror is eligible after those days have passed.
203. In Delaware, jurors are not paid for the first day of service in which they attend court as part of the one-day/one-trial system of selection. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4514(b) (1999).
204. New Mexico has compensated jurors by the hour according to the state minimum wage since 1979. See Act of Apr. 5, 1979, ch. 285, sec. 1, § 38-
3-15, 1979 N.M. Laws 1120, 1120.  Currently, the minimum wage is $4.25 per hour. See Act of Apr. 5, 1993, ch. 217, sec. 1, § 50-4-22(A), 1993 N.M.
Laws 2144, 2144 (making New Mexico one of four states that mandate state minimum wage below federal minimum, $5.15 per hour). See Carol
Wright, Wage Worries, BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 8, 2002, at 1, 2002 WL, Browarddbr (noting four states).
205. While Missouri pays jurors a minimum of $6.00 per day, the state provides an incentive to counties to pay $12.00 per day, after which point the
state will contribute an additional $6.00 to the juror for a total of $18.00 per day. See MO. REV. STAT. § 488.040 (2000) (detailing incentive).
206. South Carolina statutes still indicate that jurors may be compensated as little as $2.00 per day. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1370(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976
& Supp. 2001) (listing thirteen counties in which $2.00 remains the per diem).  However, numerous telephone calls to courts in these counties indicated
that common practice is to pay $12.00 per day or more.  The $2.00 fee is still used in this analysis because it is presumably the intention of the state to
leave the lower fee as stated in the statute.
207. Until 1999, Illinois had limited the jury per diem to $15.50 if counties wanted to pay jurors more than the three-tiered system recommended ($4.00,
$5.00, and $10.00).  As of 1999, the state removed the cap, but did not do away with the recommendation to pay jurors the three amounts indicated. See
55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-11001 (West Supp. 2001).
208. Although the State of Tennessee has also made mention of an $11.00 fee in lieu of a $10.00 minimum fee, the $10.00 minimum is used in this
analysis to avoid confusion. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-4-101 (1994).
209. In Louisiana, civil jurors are paid a different amount than criminal jurors.  To achieve a single rate for computation, the mean of the range of pay
for one rate was averaged with the other fixed rate.
210. Although Texas has included a maximum of $50.00 for jury compensation in its statute, most counties in the state pay closer to the minimum $6.00




























211. Wyoming has left it in the court’s discretion to pay an additional $20.00 above the $30.00 that is required if a juror serves more than five days.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-303 (Lexis 2001).  It is assumed that some, but not all Wyoming jurors receive this extra compensation.
212. The federal jury compensation rate is provided as a standard for comparison based on the discussion infra text accompanying notes 235–237, R
which describes the historical factors that emphasize importance of federal jury fee.
213. It is noteworthy that Florida is the only state in the Time-Sensitive Payment category that has earmarked a specific amount for its unemployed
jurors who serve the first three days.  Other states in this category provide ranges of payment, usually up to the full amount allotted.
214. While Ohio theoretically offers the potential to compensate jurors who serve ten days or more with eighty per day, the assumption underlying the
theory requires a county to pay jurors the highest allotment possible.  Numerous phone calls to courts in Ohio indicate that this is not the case.  The
amount is included in this analysis because of the legislature’s interest in providing an equation that envisions the highest amount.
215. In Massachusetts, the main statute pertains to Middlesex County.  In 1982, that statute was broadened to allow all counties to partake in the system,
which compensates jurors $50.00 per day for service in excess of three days.  Those counties that have not accepted the invitation are presumably setting
fees in accordance with the amounts described in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 262, § 25 (West 1992) (bifurcating compensation based on whether
service is in first degree murder trial and whether juror is held over).  It is presumed that most counties have opted for the Middlesex County system for
purposes of this computation.
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The data examined above derive from multiple sources.216 Unlike
existing compilations of fees, the Figure presents approximate mid-
points of each state’s level of jury compensation to enable compari-
sons among fixed rates and rates varying by either the county in which
the juror is called to serve or the length of the trial in which the juror
is called to serve.217
216. Act of Oct. 10, 1975, No. 1205, § 16-154, 1975 Ala. Acts 2384, 2507–2508;
ALASKA CT. R. ADMIN. 14 (1980), amended by Alaska Sup. Ct. Order No. 479
(1981); Act of May 1, 1970, ch. 124, § 5, 1970 Ariz. Sess. Laws 383, 385; Act of
Mar. 16, 1999, No. 629, § 1, 1999 Ark. Acts 2280, 2280–81; Act of July 8, 2000, ch.
127, sec. 1, § 215(a), 2000 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 127 (Deering); Colorado Uniform
Jury Selection and Service Act, ch. 136, sec. 1, § 13-71-126, 13-71-129, 1989 Colo.
Sess. Laws 765, 770, 771; Act effective Sept. 1, 1991, No. 91-160, § 1(b)(1), 1(b)(3),
1991 Conn. Acts 280, 280–81 (Reg. Sess.); Act of July 8, 1994, ch. 331, § 1, 69 Del.
Laws 781; Juror Fees Act of 1987, D.C. Act 7-116, sec. 2, § 15-718(a), 34 D.C. Reg.
8115, 8115; Act of July 2, 1992, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws ch. 92-297; Act of Apr. 28,
1999, No. 405, § 1, 1999 Ga. Laws 836, 837; Act of May 29, 1986, No. 251, § 1,
1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 456, 456; Act of Mar. 14, 1969, ch. 147, § 1, 1969 Idaho Sess.
Laws 472, 472-73; Act of July 29, 1999, No. 91-321, § 5, 1999 Ill. Laws 321; Act of
May 13, 1997, No. 204, § 1, 1997 Ind. Acts 2918, 2918–19; Act of May 27, 1974, ch.
1261, § 1, 1974 Iowa Acts 967, 967; Act of Apr. 14, 1971, ch. 176, § 20, 1971 Kan.
Sess. Laws 368, 374; Act of Dec. 22, 1976, ch. 22, § 28, 1976 Ky. Acts 202, 208; Act
of July 6, 1984, No. 441, § 1, 1984 La. Acts 1085, 1085–86; Act of July 18, 1979, No.
632, sec. 1, § 3049(B), 1979 La. Acts 1685, 1685–86; Act effective July 17, 1991, ch.
591, § E-13, 1991 Me. Laws 919, 1030; Act of May 18, 2000, ch. 652, § 1, 2000 Md.
Laws 3344, 3345–46; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234A, § 51 (2000); Act of Sept.
16, 1982, No. 226, § 1, 1982 Mich. Pub. Acts 685, 686; Act of May 14, 1993, ch. 192,
§ 104, 1993 Minn. Laws 711, 781–82; Act of Mar. 8, 1996, ch. 312, § 1, 1996 Miss.
Laws 35, 36; Act of July 13, 1999, S.B. 1, § 494.455, 1999 Mo. Laws 827, 860–61;
Act of Mar. 31, 1981, ch. 200, § 1, 1981 Mont. Laws 278, 278–79; Act of Feb. 25,
1991, No. 147, § 1, 1991 Neb. Laws 262, 262; Act of May 1, 1981, ch. 159, § 2, 1981
Nev. Stat. 326, 326–27; Act of July 2, 1991, ch. 355, § 96, 1991 N.H. Laws 577, 599;
Act of May 18, 1949, ch. 127, sec. 1, § 22:1-1, 1949 N.J. Laws 496, 496; Act of Apr.
5, 1993, ch. 217, sec. 1, § 50-4-22(A), 1993 N.M. Laws 2144, 2144 (setting state
minimum wage); Act of June 28, 1995, ch. 85, § 4, 1995 N.Y. Laws 2591, 2592; Act
of July 20, 1983, ch. 881, § 2, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 1080, 1081; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-09.1-14 (Supp. 2001); Act of Jan. 15, 1998, S. B. No. 69, sec. 1, § 2313.34(B),
1998 Ohio Laws 7172, 7174; Act of June 12, 1996, ch. 339, § 7, 1996 Okla. Sess.
Laws 1571, 1581–82; Act of Sept. 1, 1999, ch. 1085, § 3, 1999 Or. Laws 2909, 2909;
Act of June 26, 1980, No. 1980-78, sec. 3, § 4561, 1980 Pa. Laws 266, 273; Act of
May 24, 1967, ch. 150, § 1, 1967 R.I. Pub. Laws 496, 496; S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-
1370 (1976 & Supp. 2001); Act of Feb. 26, 1999, ch. 107, 1999 S.D. Laws 169; Act
of Apr. 23, 1973, ch. 138, § 1, 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts 376, 377; Act of June 17, 1997,
ch. 758, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2469, 2469; Act of Mar. 14, 1998, ch. 74, § 1,
1998 Utah Laws 278, 278; Act of Apr. 12, 1978, No. 222, § 22, 1977 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 331, 345; Act of Mar. 22, 1996, sec. 1, § 14.1-195.1, 1996 Va. Acts ch. 332;
Act of May 7, 1979, ch. 135, § 7, 1979 Wash. Laws 1411, 1414–15; Act of Mar. 7,
1986, ch. 94, § 52-1-173, 1986 W. Va. Acts 684, 698–99; Act of May 18, 1978, ch.
318, § 30, 1977 Wis. Laws 1306, 1312; Act of Mar. 7, 1983, ch. 138, sec. 2, § 1-11-
303, 1983 Wyo. Sess. Laws 402, 405.
217. A researcher with unlimited funding and resources would consider a number of
factors.  Data regarding the length of trials and exact levels of compensation for each
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1. Compensation System Type218
As illustrated in Figure 2, legislatures in twenty-five (49%) of the
states have set jury compensation at a flat rate.  Their average jury per
diem is approximately $23.94 per day (or $2.99 per hour), with a low
of $10.00 per day in Alabama, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, and Maine, and a
high of $50.00 per day in South Dakota.  Alternatively, thirteen states
(25.5% of the nation) compensate jurors based on fees set by local
county boards, typically within a range set by the state legislature.
Somewhat lower than jurisdictions with flat rates (56¢ cents less per
hour on average), these county-based fees range from as low as $2.00
per day in some South Carolina communities to as high as $50.00 per
day in certain Georgia, Texas, and Wyoming locales.  Finally, another
thirteen states (25.5% of the country) use a time-sensitive method, in-
creasing the fees available to jurors after they serve a set number of
days.  The normal waiting period for increased fees is three days, with
a low of one day in California and a high of ten days in Ohio.  It is
particularly noteworthy that every state except California, which re-
quires that jurors serve their first day without any reimbursement for
expenses, in some way provides for the compensation of those se-
lected to serve as jurors.219
county in a state would be essential.  Other steps might include factoring the cost of
living or average income of the juror into the analysis, weighting the fee by the popu-
lation of each county, and discounting for counties that are either unaware of or inten-
tionally disregard statutory increases.  These concerns also exist in the case of each
state’s history of jury compensation.
However, my conversations with a number of court administrators revealed the
difficulty and expense of compiling such data.  Many states have not documented the
jury fees paid by each county, and a number of counties are not aware of recent
statutory modifications. See Telephone Interview with John Lupton, Director, Lin-
coln Legal Papers Project (May 13, 2001) (observing questionable existence and accu-
racy of courthouse record-keeping systems dating back more than few years).  Due to
various research constraints, this study settles for the average of the high and low
amounts that jurors receive in states.  While the final result may not represent the true
average level of compensation that the average juror is paid, these approximations
should suffice for identifying national trends and comparing fees across systems.
218. It is noteworthy that a number of states have implemented payment to cover
jury service lasting less than a full day.  For analysis of these compensation systems,
see Munsterman, supra note 34, at 12, which explains jury compensation rates in R
various compensation systems as of July 26, 2001.  Also absent from this analysis are
jury rates provided to jurors serving in the tribal court systems, some of which have
been rumored to exceed $200 per day. Id. at 13.
219. In Arizona and Delaware, jurors who are called but not selected for service are
not compensated the per diem rate. See Act of May 1, 1970, ch. 124, sec. 1, § 21-
221(B), 1970 Ariz. Sess. Laws 383, 385; Act of July 8, 1994, ch. 331, § 1, 69 Del.
Laws 781, 781.
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Nationally, roughly half of the states in each of the nation’s four
regions220 have retained the fixed jury fee,221 making it the preemi-
nent system for compensating jurors.  In the Northeast, for example,
five states (56% of the region) have retained the fixed fee.  These
fixed fees demonstrate that a number of legislators with constituents
from diverse labor markets in both urban and rural settings could, and
have, agreed on a single monetary cutoff for paying jurors throughout
the state.
Most other states have implemented mixed systems of payment
that either allow local county boards to set fees or that provide for
increased compensation after jurors have served for a set amount of
time.  Approximately 33% of the Midwest (four states), and 41% of
the South (seven states), rely on county boards to set rates.  In con-
trast, only two states in those regions utilize time-sensitive methods of
determining appropriate juror compensation.  In the West, 39% (five
states) use such time-sensitive methods, and 44% of the Northeast
(four states) do so as well.  Comparatively speaking, the northeastern
region has the greatest proportion of states using fixed rates and time-
sensitive compensation methods to pay its jurors, while the southern
region has the greatest proportion of states using rates set by local
county boards.
2. Payment Amount
Based on Appendix A’s estimates of statewide jury compensa-
tion, the average American juror is currently paid $23.85 per day for
her service.222  While we can say a number of things about this fee,
most notably, it falls short of the 2000 poverty threshold by $10.61 per
day.223  This statistic means that current jury compensation does not
220. I have adopted the U.S. Census’s method of dividing states in four regions. See
generally U.S. CENSUS REGIONS AND DIVISIONS, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
reps/maps/us_census.html (last modified on Apr. 17, 2001) (considering the West to
include Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, California, Wyoming, Montana,
Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico; the Midwest to include North
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Mis-
souri, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan; the South to include Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana,
Arkansas, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, Florida, Georgia, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and the District of
Columbia; and the Northeast to include Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Con-
necticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine).
221. In the West, six states (46%) use fixed fees, as do six states in the Midwest
(50%) and eight states in the South (47%).
222. This compensation figure does not, however, take into account the population
densities of the various states.
223. Currently, the poverty threshold amounts to $34.46 per day or $8959 per year
for a single wage earner. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY 2000, at http://
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equate to the minimal income of $33.46 per day deemed necessary for
basic subsistence in the United States.224  When compared with the
current federal minimum wage ($41.20 per day), the gap increases to
$17.35.  But perhaps the most relevant statistic for comparison is
American per capita income.  Assuming that the average American
earned the annual income indicated on the 2000 Census ($114.14 per
day),225 the average juror loses $90.29 per day if not compensated by
an employer.226  Considering that approximately 70% of Americans
live from paycheck to paycheck and have not established sufficient
financial reserves to cover lost wages, an average trial, lasting a week,
could pose significant risks depending on a juror’s existing financial
obligations.227 Even the highest jury per diem (assumedly South Da-
kota’s $50.00 rate), leaves jurors with less than half of their normal
earnings. Although the average federal juror fares a bit better than her
state counterpart, with a compensation rate of $40.00 per day, she
nonetheless will face similar challenges as the amount would still
leave her $71.14 below the average daily income for each day she
serves.
Among the three methods of paying jurors, the time-sensitive ap-
proach typically provides jurors with the most compensation.  After
the waiting period has elapsed, no time-sensitive state pays less than
$15.00 per day.  Seven states and four county board states with fixed
compensation schemes (31% of the category) and five county board
www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh00.html (last revisited Sept. 25, 2001)
(presenting 2000 threshold) (on file with the New York University Journal of Legisla-
tion and Public Policy).  To compute the difference: $8,959/260 = $34.46 - $23.85 =
$10.61. See infra note 288 (explaining calculation of 260 days per year). R
224. These figures assume that Americans will pay certain amounts for food and
other living essentials. For a discussion of the federal standards for calculating the
poverty threshold and related figures, see for example, Daan Braveman & Sarah Ram-
sey, When Welfare Ends: Removing Children From the Home for Poverty Alone, 70
TEMP. L. REV. 447, 460–61 (1997).
225. Average income is generally much higher than per capita income. Although I
was unable to locate sources indicating average income for the present, even the de-
creased per capita rates highlight an enormous disparity between jury pay and Ameri-
cans’ occupational earnings.
226. See U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PER CAPITA
PERSONAL INCOME, PERSONAL INCOME, AND POPULATION BY STATE AND REGION 1999
AND 2000 (Apr. 24, 2001) (reporting 2000 national per capita personal income as
$29,676.00), http://www.ku.edu/pri/ksdata/ksah/income/9inc10.pdf (on file with the
New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy).  Daily compensation
based on this amount is equivalent to $114.14 ($29,676 / 260 = $114.14). See infra
note 288 (explaining use of 260 days figure).  To calculate the differential, subtract R
the average jury compensation from daily compensation.  $114.14 - 23.85 = $90.29.
227. See Andrea Neal, Time Spent Agonizing Over Money, SATURDAY EVENING
POST, Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 16 (“A study in the Wall Street Journal found that 70 per-
cent of the public lives from paycheck to paycheck.”).
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states (39% of the category) offer a per diem rate amounting to less
than this low amount.  Moreover, time-sensitive systems are more
likely than any other to pay $49.00 or more per day after the waiting
period, which is true in six states (46%) that have implemented such a
system.  Only one state (4% of the category) using the fixed-fee sys-
tem and one state in the county-board system (8% of the category,
accounting for Wyoming’s upper limit) offer $49.00 or more a day in
compensation.  From a regional perspective, southern and western
states typically pay their jurors in the range of $21.00 through $30.00
per day, while midwestern states typically pay their jurors $10.00 or
less per day.  Northeastern states, however, are equally likely to com-
pensate jurors with $11.00 through $20.00 per day as they are to offer
them compensation between $31.00 and $40.00 per day.228
B. History as an Interpretive Tool
In isolation, current jury compensation rates explain little about
the purposes of the fees.  Only through the examination of the histori-
cal record can we explain current rates in their functional context.
Analyses of prior fees likewise suggest the standards underlying fee
modifications.  In sociologist Charles Tilly’s noted work Big Struc-
tures Large Processes Huge Comparisons he explains that “re-
main[ing] clear and consistent” about the “criteria for identifying real
populations” is “[t]he trick” to conducting reliable analyses of societal
change.229  Identifying whether state juror fees are too low, too high,
or just about right requires a full understanding of federal and state
payment histories.  The comparison is relevant even though higher pay
in one system or another could be distinguished on a number of
grounds, such as the likelihood that jurors serving in federal courts
would have to travel further distances, explaining their higher levels of
compensation.
The interrelation of jury compensation rates at both state and fed-
eral levels sheds light on the development of both systems. In 1838,
the State of Mississippi urged Congress to raise federal jurors’ fees to
amounts at least equivalent to its own rate.230  Today, the tables have
228. Regarding the most recent updates to jury compensation, the western region has
allowed an average of seventeen years to pass before updating its fees (1985 was the
average year of the latest update in this region), while the Northeast has followed
closely with a sixteen year time lapse (1986).  Contrarily, both the southern and mid-
western regions average out to roughly 1990 since their last fee increases.
229. CHARLES TILLY, BIG STRUCTURES LARGE PROCESSES HUGE COMPARISONS 80
(1984).
230. See MEMORIAL OF THE LEGISLATURE OF MISSISSIPPI, S. REP. NO. 25-252, at 1
(1838) (memorial submitted to United States Congress on behalf of Mississippi Legis-
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turned, as those who advocate fair compensation urge states to raise
compensation levels to the federal jury compensation rate.231 Interest-
ingly, if considered a state, the federal government would rank as the
forty-ninth highest fee, with its payment placing just above Wyo-
ming’s approximate midpoint and below South Dakota’s fixed fee.232
Yet, the only jurisdiction other than the federal courts in which the
federal rates have served as definitive guidance has been the District
of Columbia, where legislators have intermittently relied upon the fed-
eral rate as a basis for setting jury compensation.233  In 1987, how-
ever, D.C. finally charted its own path and currently pays jurors in its
courts $30.00 per day—$10.00 a day less than the federal rate.234
For three reasons, this historical inquiry begins at the federal
level.  First, the federal government has been dictating compensation
amounts in the United States courts consistently since 1791, when the
first Congress set the first jury pay rate at fifty cents per day.235  This
rich history enables us to examine how external societal forces have
had an impact on the jury compensation system.  For instance, how
legislators set jury fees in response to the Panic of 1873 and the Great
Depression of the 1930s may serve to explain the influence of down-
shifts in the American economy on jury compensation rates and may
provide guidance on indexing fees to market-based standards.
Second, the standards that Congress and other organs of the fed-
eral government have developed to deal with income and wealth dis-
tribution in the United States, particularly the federal minimum wage
and poverty threshold, provide insight into the goal of ensuring ade-
quate compensation for jurors.  These national indexes are ideal for
this purpose because of the pressure that exists on the federal govern-
ment to remain consistent in setting standards—a type of consistency
lature, signed by John W. King, Speaker of Mississippi House of Representatives, and
A. L. Bingaman, President of Mississippi Senate, asking that Congress raise fees to at
least $2.00 per day).  At the time, the federal government was paying jurors only
$1.25 per day. See Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 19, § 6, 1 Stat. 624, 626.  Mississippi
was already paying its jurors $2.00 per day. See Act of May 13, 1837, § 1, 1837
Miss. Laws 315, 315.
231. See Dees, supra note 24, at 1761 (“[A]s states consider jury reform, many are R
considering raising the fee paid to jurors in juror compensation statutes to equal the
federal rate.”).
232. See supra Figure 2 (depicting current jury compensation amounts).  This state-
ment uses the midpoint of forty-five for federal jury compensation. See infra note
286 (explaining midpoint calculation and rationale). R
233. See infra Appendix A (depicting that D.C. relied upon federal jury compensa-
tion statute from 1965 to 1987 in setting its pay rate).
234. See Juror Fees Act of 1987, D.C. Act 7-116, sec. 2, § 15-718(a), 34 D.C. Reg.
8115, 8115.
235. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 216, 217.
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that state legislators appear to be searching for to guide them in re-
forming jury compensation.
Third, Congress has set jury fees at least partly in response to
matters affecting the entire nation.  Because the pay rate set by the
federal government applies to all jurors in all federal courts, legislators
wished to avoid purely regional methods of setting fees that would
limit the effectiveness of the uniform fee.  The fact that Congress has
been able to find a national standard should aid state legislators who
are trying to find the appropriate standard for their jury pay.
Given the Supreme Court’s growing reliance on originalist meth-
ods of constitutional interpretation,236 and what some would argue is
the Court’s powerful commitment to interpreting the Constitution in
accord with American legislative tradition,237 the history of jury com-
pensation in the United States should be particularly relevant to the
determination of the current proper standard.  The lack of either analy-
sis of current jury compensation or historical jury compensation in
legislative debates and committee reports results from a confusion in
statutory interpretation where two popular interpretive canons clash.
On the one hand, the principle of in pari materia would require inter-
preters of a statute to “harmonize” differences over time.238 On the
other hand, the conflicting Rule of Mischief239 and the so-called
“Golden” Rule,240 would inquire about the purpose of a provision, re-
236. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L.
REV. 611, 613 (1997) (“Originalism is now the prevailing approach to constitutional
interpretation.”).
237. See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 184–85
(1993) (“The Supreme Court has interpreted evidence that the first Congress either
took, approved, or acquiesced in some action as a virtually irrefutable indication of
the constitutional validity of that action.”).
238. WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 93 (2d ed. 1984).
While there may be differences between the statutes [passed at different
times], courts will attempt to interpret them as consistent with each
other. . . . [This is] based on the common sense assumption that when the
legislature enacted statutes on the same topic, it most likely intended that
they be consistent with each other even though the statutes contain no
reference to each other.
Id. at 93–94.
239. As Karl Llewellyn once remarked: “If a statute is to make sense, it must be read
in light of some assumed purpose.  A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose
or objective, is nonsense.”  Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 395, 400 (1950).  The rule refers to the word “mischief” because it requires
that one “identify the evil or mischief [the statute] was trying to remedy” as the basis
of upholding that same purpose when challenged by subsequent conflicting statutes.
STATSKY, supra note 238, at 78. R
240. The Golden Rule follows from the Mischief Rule by rejecting statutory require-
ments that would “produce[ ] absurd results” if taken literally. STATSKY, supra note
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jecting interpretations that seem to defy the purposes underlying the
statute.  The in pari materia doctrine would require federal legislative
acceptance of jury compensation rates falling below the poverty line
as the standard states have chosen.  The Golden or Mischief Rules
would reject low fees if their initial purpose had been to reduce jurors’
burdens while serving to provide them with an amount to meet their
most basic expenses.241
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hurtado v. United States is the
best indication that the Court would reject statutory modifications sub-
stantially decreasing jury fees.  The case involved a foreign national
who sued the government for incarcerating him in anticipation of his
testimony in federal court and paid him only one dollar per day for the
three months he was held.242  The government provided this meager
allowance in accord with a federal statute that prescribed a signifi-
cantly higher amount to nonincarcerated witnesses.243  Hurtado sup-
ported his claims of constitutional rights violations with an analysis of
the way federal witness fees had changed since their inception.
Drawing on congressional enactments from the “earliest days of
the Nation’s history,”244 Hurtado observed that “[t]he first statute to
distinguish between incarcerated and non-incarcerated witnesses,
passed in 1853, provided full and adequate compensation for incarcer-
ated witnesses . . . .”245  Specifically, he pointed to the fact that later
increases in witness compensation by the legislature served to “mod-
ernize the rates of compensation in order that the statute would prop-
erly accomplish its essential purpose to compensate witnesses and
provide against financial loss as a result of performing this service.”246
Hurtado also pointed out the irony that would exist if the Court con-
cluded that the legislature intended to provide “mere token compensa-
238, at 81 (citing Dist. of Columbia Nat’l Bank v. Dist. of Columbia, 348 F.2d 808, R
810 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
241. See infra text accompanying notes 287–288. R
242. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973).
243. The “dollar-a-day” compensation paid to incarcerated witnesses in 1973 was an
amount that had not been increased since 1853. See Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, § 3,
10 Stat. 161, 167 (1853) (“When a witness is detained in prison for want of security
for his appearance, he shall be entitled to compensation of one dollar per day over and
above his subsistence.”).  Simultaneously, for non-incarcerated witnesses, the pay-
ment had steadily increased from $1.50 per day in 1853 to $20.00 per day in 1973.
See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 102(b), 82 Stat. 53,
62 (prescribing $20.00 per diem).
244. Petitioners’ Brief at 7, Hurtado (No. 71-6742).
245. Id.; see also id. at 18 (discussing value of dollar-a-day provision in 1853).
246. Id. at 18.
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tion,” when history revealed its “careful and deliberate effort to
protect against pecuniary losses to witnesses.”247
Hurtado attempted to rely on the canons of statutory interpreta-
tion, in particular, the Golden Rule and the Rule of Mischief,248 to
show the patent injustice of the one dollar per diem.  In total, Hurtado
presented five arguments to the Court in order to persuade it to inter-
pret the statute in a way that would increase compensation.  The first
reason was that “[w]hen a statute is subject to more than one construc-
tion it should not be given a construction which will prove deeply
harsh and unjust in its consequences, both as it respects public and
individual rights and interests.”249  Second, Hurtado argued that “[i]t
cannot be presumed that the legislature will do acts that inflict hard-
ship and injustice.”250  Third, Hurtado noted the following:
[T]he fact that at one time in history the “dollar-a-day” provision
was intended to provide for the entire compensation to be given to
incarcerated witnesses does not require a different result, insofar as
statutes should not be narrowly construed to permit evasion of their
purpose because of changes in circumstances resulting from the
passage of time.251
Fourth, Hurtado urged the Court to “not be guided by a single
sentence or portion of a sentence, but . . . look to the provisions of the
whole law and to its object and policy.”252  Finally, Hurtado argued
that it would be impermissible for the Court to interpret a statute in a
way that would “produce a consequence directly opposite to the whole
spirit of the statute . . . .”253
Hurtado’s most significant contribution to the analysis of jury
fees is the Court’s position that the manner in which fees progressed
over time is relevant to determining the adequacy of the current
rate.254  In its historical overview, the Court identified statutory rates
247. Id. at 19.
248. See supra notes 239–240 (reviewing essential elements of both rules). R
249. Petitioners’ Brief at 20, Hurtado (No. 71-6742).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 22 (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 391 U.S.
390 (1968)).
252. Id. (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962)).
253. Id. (citing Postmaster Gen. v. Early, 25 U.S. 136 (1827)).
254. Much less important was the Court’s conclusion regarding the actual suffi-
ciency of the fees provided for incarcerated witnesses.  First, Hurtado addressed a
statutory provision that had not developed consistently over the years.  The major
concern had been Congress’s somewhat surprising act of inserting the “dollar-a-day”
provision back into recent legislation after it had remained curiously absent in prior
acts on the same topic. See Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 586 n.11 (questioning why provi-
sion, after its repeal in 1926, would appear again in 1949 “with the explanation by the
House Committee on the Judiciary that it had been ‘inadvertently omitted’” (quoting
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before considering legislative hearings and other documents, high-
lighting past federal rates as being among the most reliable indications
of legislative intent.  The Court’s deference to the statutes suggest that
the Court was concerned about congressional committee testimony
and other statements which might have reflected interests biased
against raising compensation.255  By basing the determination of
whether the current fee was adequate primarily on past fees, the Court
H.R. REP. NO. 81-352, at 16 (1949))).  The Court’s resistance to Hurtado’s argument
stemmed from an unclear statutory history. See id.  (“The legislative history of the
compensation provision is unenlightening.  Though Congress early provided compen-
sation of witnesses attending in the Courts of the United States, no specific provision
was made for incarcerated witnesses.”).  Because jury compensation has been in effect
consistently since the incorporation of almost every state, courts would be compelled
to expand on Hurtado’s methodology and conduct a more detailed analysis, the likes
of which is presented in this Part.
Second, the case may have resulted in increasing compensation if the adequacy
of jury fees had been at issue.  Hurtado exhibited cultural undertones not normally
present in the jury box—the plaintiffs were deportable Mexican citizens who could
not post bail and had been incarcerated pending their testimony against the person
who smuggled them across the border.  My conversations with the attorney who rep-
resented Mr. Hurtado and a review of the dissenting Justices’ reactions to the majority
indicate that the status of the litigants in the case influenced the Court. See Hurtado,
410 U.S. at 604 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“We cannot allow the Government’s insis-
tent reference to these Mexican citizens as ‘deportable aliens’ to obscure the fact that
they come before us as innocent persons who have not been charged with a crime or
incarcerated in anticipation of a criminal prosecution.”); Telephone Interview with
Albert Armendarez, Sr., Retired Judge, Texas Court of Appeals (June 12, 2001) (ex-
ploring probability of favorable verdict had petitioners been of European descent).
Reflective of this influence, the Government’s brief cited various policy arguments
relating to the problem of illegal immigration as a reason for upholding the low fees.
See Respondent’s Brief at 31–33, Hurtado (No. 71-6742) (explaining that $20.00 fee
might encourage more illegal immigration because approximately 77% of Mexican
families earned less than $80.00 per month and could use “windfall”).
255. For example, a number of corporations distrusted jurors and consistently lob-
bied against jury participation by members of the working classes on the grounds that
these citizens were biased against corporate America and would surely seek retribu-
tion for their station in life. See, e.g., EDWIN YOUNG, THE JURY IN MODERN CORPO-
RATE LIFE 5 (1884) (“[A] verdict of no cause of action in favor of a corporation and
against an individual, is not only rare, but almost unknown . . . .”); T.D. Crothers, A
Psychological Study of Jurors, 60 ALB. L.J. 341, 341 (1899).
In a recent noted trial, out of a panel of one hundred jurors, twelve men
were finally selected after a long, searching inquiry.  Five of them were
farmers . . . who were unaccustomed to think or reason, except in a nar-
row way along their surroundings and line of work. . . . They were muscle
workers with but little mental exercise . . . . Every one of this jury was
accustomed to be in the open air . . . . Not one of these men would have
been chosen to take charge of any trust, or to decide on any matter
outside his every-day life—simply because on general principles and
from common-sense observation, he would have been clearly
incompetent.
Id.
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also presented a recipe for analyzing statutes aimed at juror compensa-
tion.  The following sections will investigate the key aspects of the
Court’s inquiry into fee-tracking in Hurtado and will apply these
methods to federal and state jury compensation statutes.
C. Hurtado’s Fee-Tracking Methodology
In analyzing Hurtado’s historical claims, the Court carefully
searched for “hint[s] in any of the reports on the various changes in
compensation level which could justify the conclusion that Congress
intended to provide more than $1 a day to detained witnesses for the
period of their pretrial confinement.”256 The Court balanced this goal
with the goal of applying rather than making law.257 After establishing
these guidelines, the Court adopted a four-step analytical approach for
determining when fees are set at an appropriate level.
First, the Justices analyzed the development of compensation for
incarcerated witnesses after Congress had initially instituted the rates
in 1791.258  The Court’s second step was measuring the frequency of
subsequent increases in the rates prescribed from the founding period
to the present day.259 The third task was searching out legislative mea-
sures that repealed the acts or implemented measures contrary to Con-
gress’s professed objectives.260 Finally, Justice Brennan expanded on
the majority’s approach by explaining the importance of finding spe-
cific limitations that Congress had imposed on fees over the years.261
256. Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 587 n.7.
257. See id. at 591 (“[N]o matter how unwise or unsatisfactory the present rates
might be, the Constitution provides no license to impose the levels of compensation
we might think fair and just. That task belongs to the Congress, not to us.”).
258. See id. at 586 n.7 (“Though Congress early provided compensation of witnesses
attending in the Courts of the United States, no specific provision was made for incar-
cerated witnesses.”).  The fact that the Court would mention these initial enactments,
even when it did not address incarcerated witnesses reveals the importance of this first
methodological step. See id. (citing Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 3, 1 Stat. 275, 277;
Act of June 1, 1796, ch. 48, § 2, 1 Stat. 492, 492; Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 19, § 6, 1
Stat. 624, 626).
259. See Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 587 n.8 (“While the per diem fee, the subsistence, and
the travel allowance have all been increased, the $1 a day for incarcerated witnesses
has remained constant.”).
260. See id. at 587 n.7 (discussing lack of presence of evidence “which would justify
the conclusion that Congress intended to provide more than $1 a day to detained
witnesses”).
261. To Justice Brennan, the Court could not act to impose a ceiling on jury fees if
the legislature had not explicitly set one. He observed the following:
If the statutory scheme is to be upheld, it can only be on the theory that
Congress has made a rational attempt to impose some limits on the
amount which will be paid out to any given witness under the scheme.  I
can assume that the imposition of such a ceiling on expenditures is, in
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Because states have various ways of paying jurors and are often
influenced by regional factors, Hurtado’s guidance is imperfect in de-
termining whether compensation is sufficient.  Yet, Hurtado’s meth-
odology, as applied to jurors, underscores the importance of using
history to determine whether governments have a duty to keep jury
pay at least somewhat in accord with the cost of living and suggests
circumstances when they would.  The federal jury fee demonstrates
that, at least in some respects, the federal government has recognized
this important concern.
Federal jury fee modifications,262 which began with the first Con-
gress, offer insight into the purpose of jury compensation and the stan-
dards influencing it.  Federal modifications are also significant
because often there have been multiple jury fee increases instituted
particularly close together in time, which suggests that at least some
legislators were committed to raising jury compensation in relation to
Americans’ cost of living.
Living conditions in the United States during the era of the
founding also provide insight into the jury fee.  In 1790, a year before
the institution of the first federal jury fee, the United States conducted
its first federal census, which showed that only 4.5 persons occupied
each square mile of land.263  Although they were widely dispersed,
Americans rarely traveled out of their local communities, as even a
itself, a permissible goal.  And since witness fees could, in some in-
stances, reach staggering amounts, I can assume that Congress has the
power to impose an across-the-board cutoff—e.g., $1,000 per witness—
on the fees allowable under the Act.  But these assumptions do not relieve
us of the obligation to determine whether the particular approach Con-
gress has used in imposing a cutoff is sufficiently rational to withstand
constitutional attack.  I conclude that it is not.
Id. at 597–98 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
262. The Figures depict the following statutory fee progression: Act of Mar. 3, 1791,
ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 216, 217; Act of June 1, 1796, ch. 48, § 2, 1 Stat. 492, 492; Act of
Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 19, § 6, 1 Stat. 624, 626; Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161,
168; Act of July 15, 1870, ch. 298, § 1, 16 Stat. 363, 363; Act of June 30, 1879, ch.
52, § 2, 21 Stat. 43, 43; Act of June 21, 1902, ch. 1138, 32 Stat. 396; Act of Apr. 26,
1926, ch. 183, § 2, 44 Stat. 323, 323; Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 323, 47 Stat.
382, 413; Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 652, § 2, 62 Stat. 1016, 1016; Act of July 14,
1949, ch. 333, 63 Stat. 411; Act of Sept. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-165, 79 Stat. 645;
Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 102(a), 82 Stat. 53, 62;
Jury System Improvements Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-572, Sec. 5, § 1871(b), 92
Stat. 2453, 2454; Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 314,
104 Stat. 5089, 5115.
263. LEBERGOTT, supra note 167, at 27 n.13. R
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journey of thirty miles could take more than two days.264  Federal jury
duty would have entailed substantial travel.  It would have required
pulling farmers away from their crops for days or weeks at a time to
attend district courts located in larger communities.  Though wage es-
timates for the late eighteenth century vary, an examination of perti-
nent statistics indicates that the first Congress had set jury fees at
approximately the rate the average laborer was paid in Philadelphia.265
By providing a fee, particularly one that mirrored the cost of labor, the
first Congress took a step that distinguished jury “duty” from the other
types of community-mindedness and goodwill Americans were be-
lieved to have displayed during that same era.266  Compensation for
jury service, in fact, replaced a good portion of the juror’s lost
earnings.
Chief among the historical documents explaining legislative reli-
ance on prevailing wages in setting jury fees is a report prepared by
William Bradford, Attorney General of the United States, in 1795.267
As a result of a resolution passed in 1793, the House of Representa-
tives had directed Attorney General Bradford to develop compensa-
tion standards for all officers of the courts.268  Because Bradford
experienced great difficulty comparing the amounts of compensation
in different regions,269 he approached the challenge of setting a uni-
264. See ELLIS & NOYES, supra note 161, at 30 (stating that later in colonial era, R
“Lengthy travel was still inconvenient and difficult.  Coaches were few, and most
people traveled only when absolutely necessary”); LEBERGOTT, supra note 167, at 28 R
(“It took two days to go a mere 35 miles in rural Ohio ‘in good weather, and a great
deal longer if the roads were bad.’”  (quoting WILLIAM COOPER HOWELLS, LIFE IN
OHIO FROM 1813 TO 1840, at 138 (photo. reprint 1963) (1895))).  Seemingly, any type
of travel during the time of the first Congress and before the automobile was “end-
less.” LEBERGOTT, supra note 167, at 28. R
265. See infra Figure 3 (depicting daily federal jury fees in relation to laborer’s aver-
age daily wages).
266. See supra Part I.D (describing public roadwork and other community
activities).
267. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FEES AND REGULATIONS PROPER
TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 8, 1795), reprinted
in Part II, 25 NATIONAL STATE PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1817, at 214–17
(Eileen Daney Carzo ed., 1985) [hereinafter BRADFORD REPORT].
268. See 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789–1800, at 234 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY] (charting development of Bradford’s duties and efforts to fulfill them).
269. See BRADFORD REPORT, supra note 267, at 215. R
[T]he comparative view, which I have taken, of the tables [of prevailing
fees], transferred to me by the clerks of the District Courts, did not, in
general, furnish a standard to ascertain the amount of the fees proper to be
reported. . . . [I]n most instances, the tables transmitted differ so widely
from each other, that no common measure could be collected from them.
Id.
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form fee for federal jury compensation with a multifaceted methodol-
ogy.  Bradford averaged the compensation in various regions when
possible, or he considered fees in relation to the compensation citizens
expected from the labor market.270  Congress’s later fee-setting prac-
tices suggest that the labor market continued to play a measurable
influence.271
In the founding period, Congress not only provided substantial
compensation to jurors, but also, more importantly, increased it as pre-
vailing wage levels rose.272  Legislative materials accompanying gen-
erous fee hikes reveal a great deal about the purpose of the federal per
diem.  Commentary in the Annals of Congress for 1796 illustrates
congressional concern for jurors’ well-being.  In the entry for May,
Congress first remarked on the recent Whiskey Insurrection occurring
in Pennsylvania and Kentucky:
The House went into a Committee of the Whole on the bill making
additional compensation to Marshals, Jurors, Witnesses, &c., in the
trials of persons concerned in the late insurrection.  After some ob-
servation on the subject—in which it was allowed the pay now
given to such persons was far too low . . . .  By this bill, an addi-
tional allowance of . . . one-and-a-half dollar to Grand and Petit
Jurors, who had before only fifty cents . . . .273
While the Senate rejected the House’s recommendation to raise
fees by $1.50 per day, it doubled the jurors’ per diem to one dollar,
conceding the importance of providing payment to jurors, especially
given the Senate’s total elimination of provisions for marshals.274
Why did the Whiskey Rebellion, of all events, trigger a doubling
of federal jury compensation?  The answer was apparently the hard-
ship faced by jurors who had been called to hear cases against the
insurgents who had refused to pay the whiskey tax.  Many trials lasted
for long periods of time, which prompted Congress to consider the
financial conditions of the jurors who had been called away to
serve.275  A number of letters to congressmen detailed the conditions
270. See id. at 215–16 (explaining how Bradford relied upon factors such as “a mean
sum, between the highest and lowest of the state fees” and recommended that fees be
set “proportioned to the nature and extent of [the officer’s] duties, and the price of
labor in the district”) (emphasis added).
271. See infra Figure 3 (depicting daily federal jury compensation rates in compari-
son with laborers’ average daily wages).
272. See infra Figure 3 (depicting congressional increases of jury compensation as
laborers’ average wages rose).
273. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1460–61 (1796).
274. See 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 268, at 217 (evaluating impact of R
these trials on juror compensation).
275. Id.
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federal jurors faced.  Forced to wait for the marshal to pay their fees,
jurors often sold their vouchers for pennies on the dollar: “[P]oor men
called from Home to do the Business of others as Witnesses & Jury-
men without any Thing to bear their Expences [sic] with, and put to
the Necessity to sell their Certificates to Speculators for half the
Amount, as has repeatedly been the Case, is dishonorable . . . .”276
While methods of compensating jurors were distinct from the
amounts they were paid, other correspondence highlights particular
concern over the financial losses jurors incurred from their service.
For example, grand jurors in Georgia in 1793 complained that “the
compensation allowed to jurors attending Court . . . is not adequate to
their necessary expences [sic].”277  Figure 3, below, compares the pro-
gression of Philadelphia laborers’ wages and the compensation pro-
vided to federal jurors during the founding period.
FIGURE 3
DAILY FEDERAL JURY COMPENSATION COMPARED WITH





These fee increases signify Congress’s response to jurors’ finan-
cial concerns.  Although not perfectly correlated, the relationship of
276. Letter from Henry Marchant, to Theodore Foster (Nov. 12, 1791), in 4 DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 268, at 563, 563–64. R
277. Minutes of the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Georgia 1790–1842, and
Index to Plaintiffs and Defendants in the Circuit Court, 1790–1860, vol. 2, at 22 (Na-
tional Archives Microfilm Publication M1184, roll 1); Records of District Courts of
the United States, Record Group 21; National Archives and Records Administration—
Southeast Region (Atlanta).  Comments directed toward the juror’s need for immedi-
ate payment also indicated public recognition that the purpose of the fee was to do
more than merely cover incidental or minimal losses: “Jurors . . . attend [court] with
great punctuality when required, and they expect that after the Court adjourns, they
shall have their fees[.]  This not being the case, great uneasiness ensues, and if they be
drawn again to serve as Jurors, they may not attend, and a Citation issues against them
for their delinquency . . . .”  Letter from Edmund T. Ellery, Clerk of the Rhode Island
Court, to Charles Lee (Mar. 21, 1796), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 268, R
at 600, 601.  If jurors could not or would not attend court because they were unable to
recover substantial financial losses, compensation’s role cannot be so easily brushed
aside.
278. THOMAS L. PURVIS, ALMANACS OF AMERICAN LIFE: REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA
1763 TO 1800, at 97 tbl.4.183 (1995) (citing DONALD R. ADAMS, JR., WAGE RATES IN
PHILADELPHIA, 1790–1830, at 202–04, 213 (1975)).
279. See sources cited supra note 262 (reviewing federal jury compensation R
standards).
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federal jury compensation with the compensation of the average
worker strongly supports the idea that federal jury pay was initially
designed, and subsequently updated, to replace the juror’s expected
earnings from labor.  Given this history, it is useful to examine how
state legislatures have responded differently to issues relating to jury
compensation.
D. Historical Methodology for Comparing State and Federal
Jury Compensation
Americans are concerned about how much of their regular in-
come they may lose as a result of serving on a jury.280  Today, and for
the last few generations, legislators have apparently decided that ju-
rors should not expect compensation that provides anything approach-
ing a total replacement of their lost employment income.  Yet, most
have been unable to explain just how much compensation jurors are
due, prompting inquiry into whether jurors should expect enough
compensation to meet their living costs (e.g., rent or utility expenses)
certain types of incidental costs only (e.g., travel to the courthouse or
lunch), or an amount that provides mere nominal consideration.281  All
of these standards suggest that researchers should compare jury fees
with the income earned by citizens to determine how much of a finan-
cial burden jury service has caused.  Such comparisons are relatively
easy to perform because income rates have been recorded over the
years and are readily accessible.  Additionally, researchers can com-
pare this income data with thresholds that account for the costs of
living, such as the minimum wage or the poverty threshold, to deter-
mine the economic significance of the jury fees in their respective
times.  From a methodological perspective, two key issues are: (1) de-
fining a starting point for the analysis and (2) selecting a method to
observe national trends in jury compensation across fifty-one jurisdic-
tions.  The following analysis begins with the year 1870, and depicts
the progression of daily jury fees in relation to average daily national
income with an annual time plot.282  Many historians have hailed the
280. See, e.g., Sobol, supra note 4, at 171–72 (discussing how low jury pay impacts
hardship excuses); Amy Pyle, Jurors May Get 1st Pay Raise Since 1957, L.A. TIMES,
May 15, 2000, at A3 (recounting California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald
George’s view that low jury pay generates low response rates).
281. See STANLEY F. BREWSTER, TWELVE MEN IN A BOX 21–22 (1934) (suggesting
that per diem is akin to few cents to pay for “good cigar or two to be smoked while
deliberating on a verdict”).
282. My comparison of state and federal jury fees commences in the year 1870 for
three reasons.  First, jury fees were uniform beginning at about this period.  Using the
average prevailing wage as a benchmark, the great majority of jurisdictions reporting
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time plot as an ideal form of analysis for comprehensive national
data.283  While these graphic representations sometimes fail to account
for intervening variables,284 the focus of this Article on income in re-
lation to jury compensation limits the need for inquiry into tangential
matters.  It is assumed that factors related to Americans’ average in-
come over the years are more relevant to the analysis than other forces
that may have contributed to changes in jury fees, such as American
popular sentiment about the importance of civic participation.285  To
at this time compensated jurors equivalent to or just above it. See infra Figure 4 and
Appendix A.
Second, this period marks a high point in the “gradual equalization of wages
throughout the nation,” which fluctuated to a great degree across regions in the de-
cades before 1870. LEBERGOTT, supra note 167, at 89.  Professor Lebergott explains, R
“In 1840 common labor earned $16 a day in California and 50¢ in Kentucky.  By
1860 California workers earned only 2.5 times as much; by 1890 only 1.5 times as
much.” Id.  Another commentator points out that “[h]istory has not been kind to eco-
nomic historians interested in the course of wages before the Civil War.” ROBERT A.
MARGO, WAGES AND LABOR MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1820–1860, at 6
(2000).  Professor Margo cites the California gold rush as only one of many examples
where migration patterns created fluctuating economic standards. See id. at 100–01,
120–36. See also Leo Wolman, Foreword to CLARENCE D. LONG, WAGES AND EARN-
INGS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1860–1890, at vii, vii (1960) (explaining “difficulties
encountered in arriving at any single, most acceptable measure of money, prices, and
real wages for a remote historical period in which available data were sparse and of
doubtful quality”); LONG, supra, at 110–11 (arguing that money wages lagged behind
living costs during Civil War due to absence of price controls, low unionization, and
because much of able-bodied work force was diverted to armed forces).  Others com-
pare these years with periods after 1870 when wage levels seemed generally more
consistent. See, e.g., PAUL H. DOUGLAS, REAL WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES
1890–1926, at 584 (1966) (“The average annual money earnings of workers in urban
industries employing 15 million workers in 1920, did not advance appreciably during
the fifteen years from 1900 to 1914, being only 4 percent higher than in 1890–99.”).
The consistency in wage levels after 1870 more accurately depicts the meaning of jury
compensation for that same time frame.
Third, from the perspective of national solidarity, in this period following the
Civil War, states began to recognize and internalize national monetary standards. See
LONG, supra, at 4 (discussing how labor unions “no doubt exercised marked influ-
ence” in developing national wage standards).  The similarity of payment amounts
among states early on and today suggests that state legislatures modified, and continue
to modify, jury fee-setting practices as a matter of assimilation to interstate norms.
283. See, e.g., CHARLES M. DOLLAR & RICHARD J. JENSEN, HISTORIAN’S GUIDE TO
STATISTICS 3 (1971) (commenting on “useful[ness] [of] plot[ting] time series on a
graph” in case of data spanning “consecutive years or decades”).
284. See HANS ZEISEL & DAVID KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES: EMPIRICAL METH-
ODS IN LAW AND LITIGATION 36 (1997) (commenting that with observational studies
and nonrandomized control groups there exists “[t]he danger that a difference in the
outcome in two groups is either a common response or the result of a confounding
factor”).
285. For an exhaustive study of American civic participation, see generally ROBERT
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
(2000).
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simplify the following analysis, the Figure below represents variable
ranges in rates by their approximate midpoints.286
While some commentators have mentioned the similarity be-
tween prevailing wages and jury compensation in states in the mid and
late nineteenth century,287 Figure 4 shows that the average American
juror serving in the state courts received at least the prevailing wage of
the time period from 1870 until roughly 1918.288 After 1918, fees de-
286. For purposes of the calculations, I have used the term “midpoint” to explain a
rough average or mean amount (in case of variable ranges of pay) that attempts to
accommodate for discrepancies in jury pay amounts.  For example, in depicting fed-
eral jury pay, because jurors who serve less than thirty days receive $40.00 per day
and jurors who serve beyond thirty days receive an extra $10.00 per day, I averaged
this amount as (($40.00+$50.00)/2 = $45.00).  Therefore, I have used $45.00 as the
midpoint representing ordinary federal jury compensation.  Inherently, this method
does, in some small sense, skew the analysis.  Very few jurors serve more than thirty
days, but that situation is contemplated in order to take into consideration Congress’s
intention to raise the fee for those who serve longer.
The way I have calculated jury pay in the jurisdictions for each year since 1870
will no doubt raise serious concerns among social scientists.  Averaging the approxi-
mate midpoints of pay ranges (in the case of counties) and pre and post waiting peri-
ods in compensation amounts (for time-sensitive jurisdictions) does not account for
the discrete differences between each of the counties or the average length of a trial in
each of the courthouses that increase fees after jurors’ extended service.  Conse-
quently, the study is not totally accurate.  At the same time, the rough estimates that I
provide for each year are probably among the more reliable approximations one could
hope for given, limited funds and the normal constraints on collecting extremely de-
tailed data of this sort. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing diffi- R
culties in performing this sort of research).  The data presented below is offered as a
first attempt in estimating historical jury compensation.  Social scientists with the
time, resources, and inclination to improve and update the data set should do so
should the need arise.
287. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Extra Money Helps El Paso Lure More Prospective
Jurors, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 24, 2000, at 8A [hereinafter Curriden, County
Success] (“Before 1866, Texas didn’t pay [jurors] anything.  That year, lawmakers
agreed to $2 a day—then the prevailing average wage.”); Mark Curriden, To Get
More Jurors, Pay Raise Proposed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 26, 2001, at 1A
[hereinafter Curriden, Pay Raise] (noting how Texas lawmakers in 1866 set jury pay
rate “intended to match the daily wage of that time”).
288. Charts depicting average American income over the years combine a number of
data sets.  For the years 1870–90, see STANLEY LEBERGOTT, MANPOWER IN ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE AMERICAN RECORD SINCE 1800, at 528 tbl.A-19 (1964).  Based on data
regarding the wage difference between all employees including farm labor, I calcu-
lated 1870–90 data by subtracting 10.75% of the nonfarm amount—the average dif-
ference consistently between 1890 and 1900.  For data for 1890–1910, see THE
STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRE-
SENT 91–92 tbl.D 603–17 (1965).  For the period from 1910–54, see LEBERGOTT,
supra, at 523 tbl.A-16.  For 1955–96 (excluding 1965–74), see THE VALUE OF A DOL-
LAR: PRICES AND INCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES 1860–1999, at 299–460 (Scott
Derks ed., 2d ed. 1999).  For 1965–74, see id. at 345–46, 369–70 (manually averag-
ing data listed for twenty-five occupational categories).  From 1975–96, I averaged
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creased gradually, to only a minimal amount below the prevailing
wage, until the early to mid forties, when states began paying jurors
significantly less.  By 1943, state jurors received less than half their
average daily income for jury service.  By 1950, the average state’s
jury pay dropped below the federal minimum wage.  By 1980, average
state jury pay fell below the federal poverty threshold.  Today, the
decline seems to be continuing.  Figures 5 and 6, below, depict that,
on average, state rates have declined to the point where they currently
amount to only 57.89% of the daily federal minimum wage and
69.23% of the 2000 federal poverty threshold.
In contrast to the large gap between state jury pay and these
thresholds, today’s federal jury compensation differs from the federal
minimum wage by only 3%, assuming that most jurors do not serve
over thirty days, which would qualify them for increased pay.289
Aside from today, periods in which both the minimum wage and fed-
eral jury compensation have been closest have occurred between
1945–47 and 1956–60.  However, a comparison between changes in
the federal jury fee and the minimum wage in Figure 7, below, reflects
that fluctuations in both amounts occurred almost simultaneously,
reinforcing the assumption that the same economic factors influenced
both fees.
Part of the reason for states’ lower jury compensation rates may
relate to the fact that few states have regularly updated fees. On aver-
age, states have modified their jury fees seven times since 1870 or
since their incorporation as a state if their incorporation occurred after
1870. An examination of the frequency of fee modifications occurring
Farm Labor.” Id. at 387, 408, 424, 440, 460.  For 1997–2000, I took the average of
the difference between the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) per capita annual
income and mean income from 1990–96 in THE VALUE OF A DOLLAR, supra, (18.75%
difference), and added this amount to the per capita income reported in BUREAU OF
ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT AC-
COUNTS TABLES, TABLE 8.7: SELECTED PER CAPITA PRODUCT AND INCOME SERIES IN
CURRENT AND CHAINED DOLLARS, at http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableView
Fixed.asp?SelectedTable=170&FirstYear=2000&LastYear=2001&Freq=Ann (last
modified Mar. 28, 2002) (on file with the New York Journal of Legislation and Public
Policy).
For any year after 2000, I added the average of the per capita increase from
1999–2000 ($1,059) with the 18.75% figure to achieve an estimate.  To calculate
daily pay based on annual figures for weekly hours, see EMMA S. WOYTINSKY, PRO-
FILE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY: A SURVEY OF GROWTH AND CHANGE  460 tbl.XV.7
(1967) (1870–1909 = 10 hours per day, 6 days per week (312 days per year); 1909–31
= 8 hours per day, 6 days per week (312 days per year); 1932–present = 8 hours per
day, 5 days per week (260 days per year)).
289. This appears to be a safe assumption. See Longan, supra note 4, at 936 (esti- R
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among states over time reveals more activity by states between 1940
and 2000 than between 1870 and 1930.  Along the time continuum,
the decades in which all states modified fees the most were the 1940s
(with forty-four alterations of fees in that decade) and the 1970s (with
forty-one fee alterations).  Even upon consideration of these more re-
cent fee modifications, the amounts of those changes still left jurors in
a financial position that was worse than the prior time frame.  Albeit
there were fewer modifications of jury compensation between 1870
and 1930; in those years, the few changes that occurred better re-
flected alterations in living costs.  Approximately fourteen years have
elapsed since jurisdictions last modified their juror compensation.
Figure 8, below, compares average state jury compensation with aver-
age daily income.
FIGURE 8
TRENDS IN DAILY AVERAGE INCOME (INCLUDING FARM LABOR) AND
THE AVERAGE STATE JULY PER DIEM FROM 1870-2002





















Average Daily American Income (Including Farm Labor)
In the figure above, Line A estimates the relationship of these
variables if states had continued to pay jurors relative to their income
consistent with years prior to the 1940s.  That time frame, however,
marks the point at which the relationship changed.  The increased
horizontality of the relationship from that period (depicted with less
concentrated dots on Line B), represents fewer jury fee increases oc-
curring simultaneously with income changes over the years.  The hori-
zontal tapering of the line indicates that jurors are now earning less
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jury compensation in relation to average wages than they had been in
prior years when the two rates were equivalent.  In sum, it is clear that
the federal jury compensation amounts continued to account for the
jurors’ minimal financial needs while most states neglected this con-
sideration.  The following Part will propose a method by which states
can determine the minimal jury compensation they should provide in
order to avoid inflicting economic harm on those who serve.
E. A Proposed Jury Compensation Index
Part II.D raised a number of questions about current jury com-
pensation rates, especially among the majority of states, which provide
pay well below the minimum wage and poverty threshold.  Are states
obligated to consider prevailing costs of living, to pay jurors the fed-
eral jury rate, to pay a standard minimum amount, or to structure their
payment systems by some other standard?  Trends in federal jury com-
pensation provide strong support for paying jurors at approximately
the federal minimum wage.  After all, the federal government has been
setting jury fees since 1790, a practice that provides Congress with
more reason to remain true to the intentions of the framers of the jury
compensation system.290  However, until states either are compelled
by law or willingly adopt a national jury compensation standard, they
are free to institute any reform of jury fees or no reform whatsoever.
Assuming that state legislators are sensitive to the needs of their con-
stituents, and that they have been searching for standards for jury
compensation in earnest, the data presented above clarifies a great deal
about the historic purpose of jury compensation and how, somewhere
along the time line, that purpose was lost by many states.291
The obligation of a state to relieve a juror’s financial hardship is
difficult to grasp because it may exist in a moral sense or in a legal
sense, a distinction that the federal jury compensation statutes do not
address on their face.292  In fact, even the federal jury compensation
290. See supra notes 267–270 and accompanying text (discussing early efforts to set R
federal jury compensation).
291. Based on the various figures presented above, it appears that a majority of states
completely lost sight of their duties to ease jurors’ financial hardship beginning in
approximately 1980.  After this year, instead of reflecting the minimum wage, most
state fees plummeted far below the federal poverty threshold, see supra Figure 6,
which compares state jury compensation to the federal poverty threshold, whereas
federal jury compensation has dropped below the minimum wage only once and re-
mains above the minimum wage in the present. See supra Figure 7 (comparing fed-
eral jury compensation with federal minimum wage).
292. The key issue is how to classify the government’s obligation—essentially, the
distinction is between positive and negative rights. See Penney Lewis, Rights Dis-
course and Assisted Suicide, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 50 (2001) (explaining that nega-
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provisions indicate limits on jurors’ rights to financial relief.  There is
absolutely no statutory support for a duty on the part of a state to
replace jurors’ actual lost income.  Jurors were never paid wages com-
parable to those earned by plantation owners or wealthy businessmen
in the 1700s, 1800s, or at any time in the history of the nation.293  In
general, jury compensation statutes have attempted to protect the in-
terests of those who would suffer the greatest financial burdens due to
their lack of financial reserves.294  In response, the statutes have iden-
tified a ceiling on how much jurors should be paid, which falls below
the average American’s actual income loss.  The historical record
alerts us that a floor as well as a ceiling should exist on jury
compensation.
To fulfill the duty to compensate jurors adequately, it is essential
to determine the minimal compensation that any state owes to its ju-
rors.  Determining where this floor lies involves more than merely
adopting the prevailing federal minimum wage.  Although this option
may be appealing, Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County alerts us
that the federal minimum wage was not intended to determine the
compensation of jurors.295  Adhering to the intentions of the framers
of the jury compensation system, the formula proposed by this Article
includes the federal minimum wage as one of the numerous factors
Congress considered when implementing its jury compensation rates
after shifting from using the prevailing wages earned by Americans in
making its determination.296
Regression analysis seemed to be the appropriate method of un-
derstanding the components of federal jury compensation because it
appeared that the same influences on the federal minimum wage over
the years influenced federal jury compensation rates.  The analysis be-
tive right is “a right to non-interference” in which “others have a duty not to interfere
with the individual[ ],” while “positive or welfare right” means that “others have a
duty to assist the individual”).  If jurors are owed only a right of non-interference by
the government with their right to serve as jurors, the adequacy of compensation is no
longer a relevant inquiry.  However, if jury service is viewed as a positive right, then
the same inquiry is hugely relevant.  These two perspectives raise concerns similar to
those raised in supra Part I.E with respect to distinguishing between the civic virtue
and economic perspectives of jury duty.
293. See supra Figure 3 (demonstrating that jury fees were comparable to average
daily wages of ordinary laborers).
294. Id.
295. See Brouwer v. Metro. Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 819 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998)
(citing federal jury compensation statute as proof that Congress did not intend that
jurors be covered by minimum wage).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 288–289 (describing significant changes in R
compensation trends beginning in 1940s).
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low focuses on daily federal jury compensation297 and its relation to
the amount Congress has prescribed as the minimum wage.  This rela-
tionship was hypothesized to be a linear one, meaning that an increase
in one variable would result in a proportional increase in the other.  In
deciding which model to use, quadratic, linear, and cubic terms were
analyzed with an intercept.  All were significant except the intercept
term (p = .7887).  The best equation was a cubic model with no inter-
cept.  Data for the period inclusive of 1938–2002 revealed the follow-
ing formula as the best match for the data set:298
JP=1.1499(MW)+0.0239(MW)2-0.0006(MW)3
In the equation above, JP represents the appropriate daily mini-
mum rate states should pay to jurors and MW represents the daily
equivalent of the prevailing federal minimum wage at any given point
in time.  The federal minimum wage was used as the independent vari-
able and federal jury compensation was used as the dependent varia-
ble.  The whole equation presents a method to determine minimum
jury compensation based on the minimum wage at the time of its cal-
culation.  If the federal minimum wage equated to $48.00 dollars per
day, the daily jury compensation equation would indicate a corre-
sponding rate of $43.91 per day, only $4.09 below the minimum
wage.299
Using this equation at the state level would enable legislators to
increase jury pay automatically every time the federal minimum wage
increases.  This should remedy the problem of inadequate compensa-
tion leaving jurors unable to sustain themselves.  The equation also
provides Congress guidance on when to increase federal jury fees, if
Congress fails to increase jury fees along with the federal minimum
wage.  Most importantly, states with fees falling short of the poverty
line should adopt the equation as a guideline to determine the minimal
rate of compensation to which jurors are entitled.  By no means is this
equation intended to indicate amounts to which higher paying states
should reduce their fees.  The following Part explores the ways that
the proposed jury compensation standard will assist legislators who
297. The amounts representing daily federal jury compensation were the approxi-
mate midpoints between rates paid to jurors serving less than thirty days and those
serving beyond the thirty day threshold. For example, the midpoint for federal jury
compensation since 1990 was ($40.00 + $50.00)/2 = $45.00.
298. Adjusted R2 = .9856; F = 1,481 on 3 and 62 degrees of freedom; Residual
standard error = 3.188 on 62 degrees of freedom; p < .0001.
299. In computing the equation: 1.1499 ($48.00) + 0.0239 ($2,304.00) - (0.0006)
($110,592.00) = $43.90.
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currently have no means to determine or justify the need for jury fee
increases.
F. Relieving the Burdens of Legislators
“Whereas it has been ascertained by the Arkansas General As-
sembly that the rate per day being paid for jury service is wholly inad-
equate thereby forcing jurors to serve at a financial loss, and there is
urgent need for remedying this inequity . . . an emergency is hereby
declared to exist.”300  With this statement, the Arkansas legislature
raised jury pay from $3.00 to $7.50 per day in 1953.301  The fee hike
followed the pattern of prior acts in other jurisdictions, in which a
state of emergency had likewise been declared so that the act could
take effect immediately.302  In practically every state’s history, fee in-
creases have often occurred on this “emergency” basis.  Although
states today do not resort to the emergency language as often, the great
majority of states continue to lack any standard indicating when or by
what amount they should increase jury fees.303
California’s experience with jury compensation is perhaps the
most telling.  In 1957 California began to pay its jurors $5 per day.304
By 1998, the fee was still at this low level.  Even after New York had
increased its jury fee to $40.00 per day, legislative efforts to raise jury
compensation in California continued to fail.305  In 2000, after years
of struggle, the state legislature finally agreed to raise compensation to
$15.00 a day, after the juror has served their first day without pay.306
300. Act of Feb. 9, 1953, No. 46, § 5, 1953 Ark. Acts 169, 170.
301. See Act of Mar. 28, 1917, No. 452, §§ 5, 23, 1917 Ark. Acts 2042, 2045, 2050
(establishing one dollar rate and declaring emergency).
302. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 15, 1881, ch. 40, § 3, art. 1081, 1881 Tex. Gen. Laws 31,
32 (“Whereas, the present law entails upon citizens of the State services burdensome,
and in many instances unremunerated, and thereby creates an imperative public neces-
sity and an emergency for the immediate passage of this act, it should therefore take
effect and be in force after its passage.”); cf. Act of Apr. 11, 1949, ch. 129, sec. 2,
§ 10042, Tenn. Pub. Acts 413, 413 (raising jury fees because “the public welfare
require[ed] it”).
303. See supra text accompanying note 43 (explaining that only New Mexico and
Oregon have indexed jury fees to minimum wage).
304. See Act of July 4, 1957, ch. 1406, § 1, 1957 Cal. Stat. 2740, 2740.
305. See Editorial, No Way to Treat a Juror, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 22,
2000, at B6 (exploring California’s legislative history of jury compensation and Gov-
ernor Pete Wilson’s veto of proposed fee increase).
306. See Act of July 8, 2000, ch. 127, sec. 1, § 215(a), 2000 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv.
127 (Deering).
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However, even this new rate still leaves many jurors exposed to sub-
stantial financial loss.307
The tough question is why states have not adopted fee increases
as part of their comprehensive efforts to encourage juror participation.
The answer appeared most vividly in the 1993 American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) publication Standards Relating to Juror Use and Manage-
ment.308  After making several attempts to articulate a standard for
adequately compensating the nation’s jurors, the ABA’s Committee
on Jury Standards admitted defeat.309  Although they were concerned
with the implications of undercompensation—foremost, the lingering
threat of jury no-shows as a result of low pay—committee members
found themselves unable to define a monetary cutoff.
The comments of the committee, though inconclusive, hinted at
the concept of using costs of living and income levels to determine an
appropriate standardized rate.310  That the committee could not recom-
mend a uniform standard for setting fees was predictable.  Fifty years
before, members of a congressional committee that pondered the same
question publicly admitted that the fees they had set were “more or
less arbitrary.”311  Congress’s reasons for settling for imprecision in
1949 were practically identical to the ABA’s reasons for doing so in
1993.  Both groups commented on the difficulty of creating a sliding
scale that would alleviate jurors’ hardships at all income levels.312
Both observed the tremendous difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
treating economic conditions in different regions similarly when many
states are diverse enough to resemble miniature nations, complete with
their own particularized customs, cultures, and ways of survival.313
307. See LAO REPORT, supra note 41, at D-90 to D-91 (explaining inadequacy of R
jury fees as compared to parking and eating costs).
308. COMM. ON JURY STANDARDS, AM. BAR ASS’N., STANDARDS RELATING TO JU-
ROR USE AND MANAGEMENT (1993) [hereinafter COMM. ON JURY STANDARDS].
309. See id. at 135 (“No specific amount is included in the standard [suggested by
the ABA] because of the variation in juror fees and economic conditions around the
country.”) (footnote omitted).
310. See id. (“[F]ee that is reasonable in one state or local jurisdiction may be far too
low in another because of differing wage scales and living costs.”).
311. S. REP. NO. 81-187, at 2 (1949).
312. Compare COMM. ON JURY STANDARDS, supra note 308, at 135 (discussing R
ABA’s concerns with establishment of standard), with S. REP. NO. 81-187, at 2 (“[I]t
is recognized that certain [individuals summoned by the court] will not, under the
proposed rates, be adequately compensated.  In order to fairly compensate everyone
appearing . . . it would be necessary to have either a graduated scale of fees, or, leave
the amount of such fees in the discretion of the judge.  Neither was considered
feasible . . . .”).
313. In fact, in the 1790s, when developing the national scales for congressional
juror compensation, the Attorney General reportedly experienced a similar difficulty.
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Since the ABA’s 1993 report, other groups of scholars have re-
visited the issue.  The National Center for State Courts’s examination
of jury trial innovations explored various methods to make jurors’ ex-
periences more pleasurable.314  Some might consider these innova-
tions to be a sort of psychological compensation or intrinsic reward
that serves as the equivalent of cash payment, but none will ever be
sufficient to ensure that jurors are able to sustain themselves.  And
while a great many states are at least considering jury reform, most
sidestep the issue of increasing fees for the same reason as the ABA
and the Congress, imagining the task to be overly difficult and
confusing.
Compensating jurors to meet their basic financial needs is not as
difficult as legislators might suggest. Although state legislatures pro-
vide various justifications for retaining minimal levels of jury com-
pensation, their swift response to the financial needs of citizens
serving as poll workers casts serious doubt on their assertions about
the performance of public duties.  In the State of Kansas, for example,
while jurors in Kansas City receive a per diem of $10.00, election
workers are paid $80.00 per day.315  A number of persons supporting
jury fee increases have expended a great deal of effort to highlight the
apparent inequity of paying jurors less when they do so much more
than poll workers who are basically paid to sit passively throughout
the day.316  Most counties have indexed poll worker pay to either the
Unlike modern policymakers, however, he set a national standard that prevailed for
some time. See supra notes 267–270 and accompanying text. R
314. See, e.g., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 14, at §§ II-1, II-8, IV-5 (re- R
viewing jury education campaigns that provide video introductions to jury service,
legislative designations of “Jury Service Appreciation Week[s],” jury orientation via
cable television, and providing jury tutorials to further explain jurors’ roles and clarify
complex information).  These considerations also include procedures allowing jurors
to take notes during trial, providing a greater number of computer simulations to pre-
sent difficult information, “reordering the sequence of expert testimony” for better
factual analysis by the jury, summarizing depositions, allowing jurors to question wit-
nesses, encouraging lawyers to present short summaries to update juries during the
trial, and requiring attorneys to use plain English. See id. §§ IV-3, IV-7, IV-9, IV-10,
V-7, V-10, V-11.  Although favoring systems that pay jurors more money after a
certain number of days, as evident in the title of § II-3, “A More Sensible Way of
Paying Jurors,” the editors neglect to recommend any specific amount of compensa-
tion, and note the “[d]isadvantage” of higher implementation costs for these time-
sensitive approaches. Id. at 32–33.
315. Compare KANSAS CITY BD. OF ELECTION COMM’RS, ELECTION JUDGES
NEEDED, at http://www.kceb.org/ejudge.pdf (last visited April 6, 2002) (reporting fee)
(on file with the New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy), with
supra Figure 2 (depicting current Kansas jury pay structure).
316. For example, former Judge William Pfeuffer of the 207th District in Texas suc-
ceeded in persuading the County of Comal to pay jurors the prevailing poll worker
rate. His tactic was simple: “I asked the commissioners, ‘Don’t you think the jurors
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state or federal minimum wage.317  In light of jurors’ heightened sacri-
fices of time and energy, it makes little sense that only New Mexico
and Oregon have indexed their jury fees in any way to the minimum
wage.318
Claiming that they are unable to set a uniform national standard
for jury compensation, legislators are not suggesting that standards do
not exist.  Nor are they indicating that such standards have not existed
in the past.  What they are really saying is that their research has failed
to identify the factors that explain jury fee modifications.  This result
is hardly surprising given most legislators’ reliance on the functions of
the jury in describing why fees should or should not be raised.319  But
explanations for a failure to increase compensation based on the jury’s
functions, although projecting the appearance of justification, are still
arbitrary.  Given at least two dozen purposes for which the jury has
been noted, prioritization of any one function over another demands
exactly the type of standardization that legislators doubt is possible in
are at least worth as much as election clerks?’ and they couldn’t really argue with
that.”  Todd, supra note 31, at 19. R
317. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 50-409 (Michie 2000) (“Compensation for the election
judges and clerks . . . shall be not less than the minimum wage as prescribed by
federal law.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-05-05 (1997) (prescribing that “poll
clerks . . . must be paid at least the state minimum wage”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-
116 (Lexis 2001) (“If a flat rate is paid [to poll workers], said sum shall not be less
than the state hourly minimum wage multiplied by the number of hours polls are open
plus one (1) hour.”); NEW YORK CITY VOTER ASSISTANCE COMM’N, BECOME AN
ELECTION DAY WORKER, at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/vac/html/news_worker.
html (last visited Mar. 3, 2002) (reporting uniform rate in New York City for poll
worker pay of “$200.00 per day (from 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.)”) (on file with the New
York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy); SCOTT COUNTY AUDITOR,
SCOTT COUNTY POLL WORKERS, at http://www.co.scott.ia.us/auditor/pollworkers.html
(last visited Mar. 3, 2002) (reporting poll worker compensation rate of $5.65 per hour
and $6.00 per hour for chairpersons) (on file with the New York University Journal of
Legislation and Public Policy); COLLIN COUNTY, COLLIN COUNTY ELECTIONS: ELEC-
TION WORKER RECRUITMENT, at http://www.co.collin.tx.us/elections/election_infor-
mation/election_worker_recruitment.jsp (last visited Mar. 3, 2002) (noting that most
election workers in Collin County, Texas are paid $6.00 per hour) (on file with the
New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy).  This contrasts
sharply with the jury pay available in many of these jurisdictions. See supra Figure 2
(listing current jury compensation in various jurisdictions).  For those concerned with
the fact that a poll worker voluntarily associates with the county and receives pay, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected the view that poll workers were
employees. See Evers v. Tart, 48 F.3d 319 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim on practi-
cally same grounds used to reject jurors as employees in context of Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act).
318. See sources cited in supra note 39 (setting out unique jury compensation stan- R
dards in both states).
319. See supra Part I.C.2 (exploring many functions of jury); Figure 1.
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the case of fixing a single rate.320  Professor Dale Broeder, who
worked on the Chicago Jury Project in the 1950s, admitted just as
much in his seminal article on the functions of the jury.  He explained,
“The striking fact . . . is that no one knows how well these supposed
[symbolic or extralegal] functions of the jury are performed.  Prevail-
ing knowledge of the juror’s ability to perform the strictly legal tasks
assigned to it is almost equally lacking.”321  Broeder went on to de-
scribe a “universal public ignorance of the jury’s abilities”322 that
seems equally applicable today in current debates on the utility of the
jury in society.  From these difficulties, it is clear that a new paradigm
is needed to resolve the dilemma of those legislators who are search-
ing for a method to update jury fees.  The proposed jury compensation
index presents such an alternative.
III
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES CONSIDERING A
JURY COLA
Even where the law has not directly announced a duty to com-
pensate jurors based on their financial hardships, public policy sup-
ports such a duty.  As one scholar has noted, “Imposition of a duty by
the state, whatever its support in history and tradition, raises substan-
tial constitutional issues and is perhaps even more vulnerable on eco-
nomic and other policy grounds.”323  This Part considers the non-legal
reasons supporting and militating against the implementation of a na-
tionwide jury COLA.
A. Reasons Favoring Adoption of New Jury
Compensation Standards
1. The Potential for Increasing Summons-Response Rates
Although researchers can only speculate as to the causes of social
phenomena, recent events in El Paso County, Texas, reveal that the
number of jurors who appeared in response to summonses more than
doubled after the county raised trial jurors’ fees from $6.00 to $40.00
per day.324  It took only three months for court administrators to note
this remarkable difference.  The El Paso experiment illustrates merely
320. See supra Part I.C.2 (exploring many functions of jury); Figure 1.
321. Broeder, supra note 121, at 386. R
322. Id.
323. Shapiro, supra note 159, at 738–39. R
324. Todd, supra note 31, at 18.  Individuals summoned but not selected are still R
paid $6.00 a day. Id.
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one of a number of jurisdictions where jurors began to respond to
summonses in significantly greater numbers after courts substantially
raised fees.325
Summons-response rates directly relate to the cross-sectionality
requirement, especially given the problem of ensuring minority partic-
ipation on juries.  In this respect, many studies indicate the fact that
people of color earn substantially less than Caucasians, which creates
burdens for them when they must miss work.326  From these statistics,
it seems clear that minorities will likely evade jury duty more often
than any other group in an effort to maintain their income.327  Put
differently, minority groups evade jury service because they are more
likely to have jobs that will not pay them a decent wage while they
serve.328  Also affected are minority defendants in criminal cases who
325. See, e.g., Curriden, supra note 11 (describing how after New York raised jury R
pay “five-fold,” “[i]n New York City, which represents half of the state’s population
and where the problem [of juror non-response] was most acute, 37 percent of people
summoned now reported as ordered, up from 12 percent five years ago”).
326. See, e.g., HEINTZ ET AL., supra note 25, at 76 fig.4.9 (observing that “[b]etween
1979 and 1998, most men and women of color lost ground relative to whites of the
same gender. . . . Increased racial inequality reflects the growing pay gap between less
educated and more educated workers.  Cutbacks in government jobs and a weakened
commitment to fighting racial discrimination have also played parts”).
327. This result may also arise because minorities are paid so little that they lack
enough savings to see themselves through jury service. See, e.g., Pusey & Curriden,
supra note 11 (“Lower-income brackets are hit the hardest.  Whether they showed or R
not, 40 percent of those surveyed with family incomes of less than $35,000 said their
employers cut or withhold pay during jury service.  Only 14 percent of those with
incomes above $35,000 said they would lose money by serving.”).
328. The appellant in People v. Stansbury, 846 P.2d 756 (Cal. 1993) (en banc),
pointed to a significant statistical disparity between Hispanic jurors excused on the
basis of severe economic hardship and Caucasians.  While acknowledging the nexus
of hardship underlying these excuses, the court still rejected the claim on the grounds
that other reasons also accounted for excuses and that statistics alone do not prove
systematic defects. See id. at 782–83. But see Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury
and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and a
Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 800 (1994) (“Minorities are dispropor-
tionately represented in low-skill, blue-collar jobs, and are disproportionately excused
because of the economic hardship that jury service would present.  As a result, minori-
ties are almost always underrepresented in the jury venire.”  (citing Nancy J. King,
Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative Ac-
tion in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 716–17 & nn.27–28 (1993))).
Although most of the former comments relate to hardship excuses rather than
summons responses, consider the pervasiveness of the latter problem. See Sympo-
sium, The Selection and Function of the Modern Jury (panel 2), 40 AM. U. L. REV.
573, 579 (1991) (recording comments of Ronald Olson, of Munger, Tolles & Olson,
on danger of jurors “who self-select out[,] [who] are those who do not want to bother
with jury service [or] who feel that their time is too important to waste in the court-
house” and further alluding to fact that such individuals have number of resources
with which to escape jury duty).  Self-selection out of jury service, or “ducking jury
duty,” is so prevalent among minorities that it has been compared with “the peacetime
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may be denied the opportunity to have a true jury of their similarly-
situated peers deciding their fate because the only people serving are
those who can afford to do so.329
The courts have responded to challenges from defendants in a
routine way when the issues of inadequate compensation and cross-
sectionality arise in the same argument.  Although aware of the poten-
tial that overrepresentation of only one race or ethnicity on the jury
can bias jurors’ verdicts, the courts have asked whether the govern-
ment is responsible for systematically preventing a cognizable class of
citizens from serving as jurors.  Because such proof is difficult to ob-
tain, this high standard has prevented the courts from paying minority
jurors higher fees to increase their ability to participate by reducing
their financial hardships.  First, the courts explain that financially-
strapped jurors, rather than the government, self-select out of jury duty
by not appearing or by lying to get out of service.330  Second, in order
to demonstrate the absence of a cognizable class of jurors who face
financial hardship, the courts point out many differences between
those jurors who would face significant economic burdens if com-
pelled to serve.331
equivalent of draft-dodging.”  Deroy Murdock, Are America’s Juries Race-Ob-
sessed?, in BLACK AND RIGHT: THE BOLD NEW VOICE OF BLACK CONSERVATIVES IN
AMERICA 87, 88 (Stan Faryna et al. eds., 1997).  The point is simply that economic
considerations are among the most significant motivators of such behaviors.
329. It is the exception rather than the rule that judges would cease trial proceedings
on the grounds that minority representation is lacking on the jury.  Yet, some judges
have taken this defiant step to signify the importance of a fair trial. See David Zizzo,
Verdict Is in: Jury of Peers Hard to Find, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 11, 2000, at 1A
(explaining how Oklahoma District Judge Susan Bragg “dismissed [a] group of 35
potential jurors because only one was black” and accepted defendant’s assertion that
he would not be able to have jury of his peers as African-American).  Litigation spe-
cialists responded that such judicial intervention “has hardly happened anywhere” and
is “highly unusual.” Id.
330. See State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210, 221 (Minn. 1995) (holding that loss of
“[p]otential jurors ‘self-selected’ to be non-participants in the jury process, either by
simply ignoring the summons to jury duty or by requesting to be excused for reasons
of financial hardship,” in case at bar and to criminal justice system at large, “was not
the product of a systematic exclusion created by unfair or inadequate selection proce-
dures, but rather occurred because of individual decisions made by potential jurors”).
331. See People v. DeSantis, 831 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting
viability of an appellant’s request for California jurors to be paid more than statutorily
required $5.00 per diem: “The only factor common to the excused venirepersons was
the financial difficulty that participating in a protracted trial would cause.  That is not
enough of a common interest to form a cognizable excluded class”); see also People
v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1052 (Cal. 1989) (“[P]ersons with low incomes do not
constitute a cognizable class”); People v. Milan, 507 P.2d 956, 962 (Cal. 1973) (re-
jecting claim that $5.00 per diem created pool of jurors “composed of the wealthy, the
retired, housewives, and those covered by contracts providing for payment during jury
service”).
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Public policy reasons to increase jurors’ compensation as a
means to make their decisions fairer abound.  It seems likely that in-
creasing the per diem in accordance with costs of living at least pro-
vides the potential for the creation of a more representative jury pool.
Even the chance for increasing the representativeness of the average
jury panel by ten percent seems like a sufficient justification for up-
holding a duty to pay jurors adequately.  Based on the data from El
Paso County, the results of a substantial pay increase might exceed
this estimate.332
2. Psychological Fulfillment and Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy
While it is true that most jurors enjoy the experience of serv-
ing,333 satisfaction has little relevance to overcoming financial bur-
dens.  Surely the jurors’ smiles will become frowns when, after a
month of considering even intriguing testimony, they must find a way
to pay credit card bills, rent, and other living expenses.334  Many ju-
rors will resent jury service because it is not their choice whether or
not to serve,335 and, in combination with their feelings of underap-
preciation,336 such circumstances pose a substantial risk that jurors
will lash out against the legal system to even the score.337  Perhaps a
332. See Todd, supra note 31, at 18 (explaining El Paso County’s increase in sum- R
mons-response following County’s increase in its jury compensation).
333. See MUNSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 28–37 (describing many jurors’ posi-
tive reactions to their service on juries).
334. As with many jurors serving in protracted trials, David Oleson experienced the
horror on a personal level.  While he had notified the court that he had to support two
teenage girls and that the contracting company for which he worked would not pay
him while serving, Oleson’s request to be excused had been denied.  Bob Van Voris,
In St. Paul, Everybody Won But the Jurors, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 1998, at A1.  Not
only did he have to sell his recreational vehicles to pay the bills, but he also ran
several credit cards beyond their limits and ultimately refinanced the mortgage on his
home to survive the ordeal. Id.  As Oleson explained, “I can’t make a $1,300
[monthly] house payment on $30 a day . . . .” Id. (alteration in original).  As Figure 2,
supra, demonstrates, $30.00 is well above the average state’s compensation.
335. See Mark S. Sobus, Mandating Community Service: Psychological Implications
of Requiring Prosocial Behavior, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 164 (1995) (ex-
plaining number of theories that lead to following conclusion: “[W]here people do not
see their acts as self-determined there is a risk that internal motivation to do the acts
will be diminished”).
336. See DAVID A. STATT, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE WORLD OF WORK 287 (1994)
(explaining equity theory, which recognizes that “we are pushed psychologically to
equalise” the way that we are treated in comparison with others, as such comparisons
are “the way we make sense of our lives.” (emphasis in original)).
337. Cf. RICHARD C. HOLLINGER & JOHN P. CLARK, THEFT BY EMPLOYEES 142
(1983) (“When employees felt exploited by the company . . . these workers were more
involved in acts against the organization as a mechanism to correct perceptions of
inequity or injustice.”).  A judge, testifying about the potential for a jury pay increase
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more substantial threat than retaliation is that jurors will not be able to
participate to their fullest, which places in question their ability to
serve any of the acclaimed jury functions noted earlier in Part I.C.2.
Psychological theory about how humans are motivated helps to
shed light on why an increase in jury compensation could lead to ju-
ries that take their jobs more seriously and perform them more effec-
tively.  Psychologist Abraham H. Maslow’s hierarchy of human
needs, which describes the sources of human motivation, has often
been used as a basis for such analysis.338  The model appears as a
triangle or pyramid with a number of levels representing certain types
of objectives.339  In order to set and achieve goals at the top of the
triangle, one must satisfy the objectives of the levels below.340  Mas-
low’s model dictates that humans must first satisfy their needs for
food, shelter, and water before they can recognize the intrinsic bene-
fits of participating in an activity.341
before the House Judiciary Committee, and later cited by Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent in Theil, made clear how this point relates to the jury:
[I]t is easy to say that jury duty should be regarded as a patriotic service,
and that all public-spirited persons should willingly sacrifice pecuniary
rewards in the performance of an obligation of citizenship.  With that
statement I am in full accord, but it does not solve the difficulty.  Ade-
quate provision for one’s family is the first consideration of most men.
And if, with this thought predominant in a man’s mind, he is required to
perform a public service that means default of an insurance premium, the
sacrifice of a suit of clothes, or the loss of this [his] job, he will entertain
feelings of resentment that will be anything but conducive to the rendition
of justice.  In other words, persons with a grievance against the Govern-
ment or who serve under conditions that expose them to self-denial are
not likely to have the spiritual contentment and mental detachment that
good jurors require.
Improvement of the Jury System in the Federal Courts: Hearings on H.R. 3379, H.R.
3380, and H.R. 3381 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong. 8 (1945)
(statement of Hon. John C. Knox, United States District Judge for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York), quoted in Theil v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 231–32 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
338. See, e.g., Symposium, Is There a Need to Amend the National Labor Relations
Act?, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1984) (using Maslow’s theory of motivation
to determine whether it is necessary to amend National Labor Relations Act).
339. See STEPHEN E.G. LEA ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE ECONOMY: A TEXTBOOK
OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY 31 (1987) (describing five levels of Maslow’s pyramid).
340. See Betty D. Meador & Carl R. Rogers, Person-Centered Therapy, in CURRENT
PSYCHOTHERAPIES 142, 156 (Raymond J. Corsini & Danny Wedding eds., 3d ed.
1984) (explaining Maslow’s theory).
341. See generally Abraham H. Maslow, Management as a Psychological Experi-
ment, in CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSY IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 60 (Walter R.
Nord ed., 1972) (applying theory to employment motivation context); Abraham H.
Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (1943) (introducing
theory).
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The dilemma for undercompensated jurors with no alternative
source of income is that they may find themselves unable attain these
most basic necessities.  Their desires to serve the community and
make a difference will be less relevant than their quest for subsis-
tence.342  The literature surveying industrial psychology explains that
this sort of strain can influence people to conserve their energy and
devote the most minimal efforts to labor-related tasks.343  A number of
courts have observed the potential for this reaction among underpaid
jurors.344  The threat that jurors will be prevented from contributing
342. Consider the great many jurors who are forced to work the graveyard shift in
addition to their jury service for fear of destitution.  A number of commentators have
noted this booming trend. See Van Voris, supra note 334 (describing “financially R
pressed juror [who] would go to work at four in the morning and work until he had to
report to the courthouse at 9:15 a.m.”); Paula McMahon, Ex-Juror Claims Service on
Panel Cost Him His Job: Lawsuit Is Filed Against Company, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 9, 2000, LEXIS, Sunsen File (explaining how juror who
served on six-month trial was fired, “even [though he] went into the office at night to
do his work after hearing testimony during the day”).  Washington State Superior
Court Judge Robert Harris notes: “We’ve had people pull a night shift and come in the
next day for jury duty.  They’re sleepy.”  Stephanie Thompson, New Jury Rules Could
Make Duty Less of a Chore, THE COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), Feb. 11, 2001,
LEXIS, Colmbn File.
343. The following exchange between Judge Crosier and a perspective juror, Ms.
Kathleen DeCarlucci, which ultimately led to her excuse from the venire, best illus-
trates this point:
THE COURT: Your situation is such that [your employer doesn’t] honor
jury service by paying you while you are here?  Are you just on a
commission?
JUROR NO. 8: It’s counted against my time off.  And if I don’t have
enough days to compensate that, then I don’t get paid.
THE COURT: By days, you mean such as in lieu of vacation?
JUROR NO. 8: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Well, is that going to impair your ability to sit here patiently
and listen to this case and be fair and impartial to both sides?
JUROR NO. 8: I am concerned that I would be preoccupied with the fact
that I am missing work.
THE COURT: Of course, you understand everybody here had probably
rather be somewhere else.
JUROR NO. 8: Oh, I understand that. It’s the potential I will lose pay.
Butler v. State of Texas, 830 S.W.2d 125, 127–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).  In this
case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that limiting the trial judge’s discre-
tion to excuse venirepeople for inability to render a fair decision “would unnecessarily
hamstring trial judges in the exercise of their duties.” Id. at 131.
344. For example, in State v. McKenzie, 532 N.W.2d 210 (Minn. 1995), the Minne-
sota Supreme Court  remarked that the legislature should expect jurors to evade their
duty if not paid reasonable fees, even in light of its recent introduction of  noncash
accommodations:
Although the jury selection process [of self-selection and excuse of finan-
cially burdened jurors from the pool] in this case violated no state consti-
tutional limits, these facts illustrate the need for improvement in jury
compensation.  The legislature has made an effort to eliminate some of
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their best efforts to the courts by their fears of financial loss echoes
Benjamin Franklin’s concerns about the volunteer night patrol.345
While the courts need not eliminate the jury in favor of a corps of
trained professionals as the colonies did with professional peace of-
ficers, providing for jurors’ minimal financial needs is essential to en-
suring that they can do their job effectively.  The proposed index
resolves these concerns.
3. Shortcomings of the Survey Research Results
A significant consideration thought to downplay the importance
of jurors’ financial burdens is their own level of motivation.  Accord-
ing to this view, although some jurors may be experiencing severe
financial hardships, the empowering nature of jury service justifies
their hardship, giving them reasons to ignore their suffering and per-
form diligently nonetheless.  The theory is based on juror satisfaction
surveys.  Yet, the most telling thing about these surveys can be
gleaned from their name—the question of satisfaction sheds little or
no light on the question of whether jurors are suffering from signifi-
cant financial hardships.  A recent study of Kansas jurors confirmed
this important observation when researchers realized that their inquir-
ies about satisfaction gave them a misleading impression that jurors’
pleasure from serving on the jury was sufficient to overcome their
financial burdens.346  This distinction raises the important considera-
tion of how such jurors dealt with financial hardship and how they
balanced their duties as jurors with the duties required by survival.  Of
concern, the researchers commented:
We believe that the data . . . should signal some cause for concern.
If you were about to constitute a petit jury from a pool of 50 citi-
zens, for 17 out of the 50 jury experience will constitute an eco-
the financial burdens of serving on a jury by statutorily providing for
daily compensation for jury duty and reimbursement for round-trip travel,
day care and parking expenses.  Nonetheless, the financial hardship of
serving on a jury is not equal: small businesses can’t afford to pay em-
ployees indefinitely, self-employed people often can’t be away for several
weeks and low income people (particularly single women with children)
need every dollar of their paychecks.  If the state expects citizens to will-
ingly meet their civic obligation to serve on a jury, some further effort to
alleviate this concern may be necessary.  However, such innovation can-
not come on a case-by-case basis by requiring financially distressed or
otherwise unwilling jurors to serve.
Id. at 221 n.11 (citation omitted).
345. See supra Part I.D.3 (explaining that volunteers often shirked their duties be-
cause they served without compensation).
346. Cann & Kaye, supra note 6, at 15. R
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nomic loss and for half of them (8 people) the loss would work a
hardship. . . . Obviously, the question[s] of economic loss and hard-
ship are related to income level. . . . Given that jurors need to
devote their full attention to what is transpiring at trial, it is proba-
bly unfair to one or both adversaries to have jurors who are worried
about the costs of being there.347
Given the law’s treatment of jury service as a duty of citizen-
ship,348 one would expect jurors to give an enthusiastic answer to the
question of whether they enjoyed their service for the simple reason of
avoiding the perception that they are un-American.  In the alternative,
the psychological literature tells us that it is almost instinctual for peo-
ple who have undergone emotionally trying experiences to cast them
in the most positive light as a means of achieving a degree of inner
peace.349  Perhaps yet another reason why a default answer to the
surveys appears as praise relates to how little people participating in
community service of any type truly know about their own
motivations.
In this regard, Professor Howard Radest explains that terms like
“civic duty” or “community service” become elusive because justifi-
cations lack particularized support:
[T]he justification for being a doer of service is often put in terms
of some larger goal—ideological, religious, political, moral—as in
“I serve you by doing this because it is commanded of me” or “be-
cause it is the right thing to do,” or “because it is expected of a
citizen.”350
At the end of the day, those who perform such services are left
with insufficient explanations for why they actually engaged in the
activity.  As Rachel, a community service worker, notes:
After I realized how elusive the concept of community service was,
I sat down for a long time to try to reason out these ideas for my-
self.  I discovered that although I could come up with one concrete
benefit of my own experience, a deeper valuing of education and
more distinct sense of purpose, I still felt as though the question
remained unanswered. . . . Even more surprising was the realization
that . . . people felt that there was no need to question their commu-
nity service; service was simply to be done and not examined. . . .
347. Id.
348. See supra Part II.D (explaining “civic duty” justification for compelling jury
service without compensating jurors for their financial burdens).
349. Regarding the justification of past behavior, Professor Aronson and his col-
leagues explain: “[I]t is often possible for normal people . . . to put a slightly different
spin on the existing facts, one that puts [them] in the best possible light.”  ELLIOT
ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE HEART AND THE MIND 20 (1994).
350. RADEST, supra note 186, at 3. R
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For most people community service is a feeling. . . . It is simply a
part of them and the benefits, which not one person with whom I
spoke questioned . . . just melt into the fabric of the personality.351
Radest appropriately defines Rachel’s dilemma as that of public
service: “She knows she is doing a good thing but she cannot say what
it is that she is really doing—and she is not alone.”352  Jurors face a
similar confusion in figuring out exactly what the purpose of their
duty is.
Even if current surveys indicate that jurors are satisfied with jury
duty, this does not make consideration of jurors’ financial compensa-
tion insignificant.  Explaining that jurors are satisfied with their posi-
tions does not mean that they are unworthy of financial remuneration.
That jurors are optimists should not prevent them from making ends
meet.  In this regard, the words of Maine Chief Justice Daniel E.
Walthen drive home the main point: “It is one thing not to pay jurors a
reasonable wage, it is quite another to make them pay for the privilege
of serving.”353  In combination with the other concerns explored
above, the benefits of adopting a new jury compensation standard that
is based on satisfaction of jurors’ most basic needs surely outweighs
the associated costs.
B. Reasons Disfavoring Adoption of New Jury
Compensation Standards
1. The Potential for Encouraging Professional Jurors Who Would
Transform the Meaning of Jury Service to Mere
Employment
In generations past, the term “professional juror” was widely
used.354  Practically every court had one.  Usually, he was an elderly
351. Id. at 31 (citing Rachel Hochauser, Untitled (May 1991) (unpublished essay))
(omission in original).
352. Id. at ix.
353. Chief Justice Daniel E. Wathen, The State of the Judiciary: We All Must Do
Something About Justice, A Report to the Joint Convention of the 119th Legislature,
Maine (Feb. 15, 2000), at http://www.courts.state.me.us/statjud00.htm (on file with
the New York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy).
354. See, e.g., H.B. WILSON, THE AMERICAN JUROR 30 (1868) (regarding profes-
sional jurors as “most contemptible class of hangers-on about courts of justice”); G.
Carlton Jackson, Jurors by Occupation, VA. L. J. reprinted in 39 ALB. L.J. 77, 77–78
(1889) (explaining common characteristics of “professional jurors”).  Some say the
professional juror still exists today. See Williams, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that R
Arkansas is still home to “same few jurors [who] end up serving on case after case
after case” and that “[t]he verdicts by these ‘professional’ jurors are unfair, unrepre-
sentative and constitute a denial of true justice”).  Others claim that the professional
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man who had once occupied a respectable station in life but who had
since lost his job or fallen on bad fortune.355  Faced with inadequate
sources of sustenance, he would turn to the local courthouse and be-
friend the bailiffs and other staff members.356  Often, he would ask to
be added to a list of locals who sought the opportunity to serve as
jurors for the compensation they received.  It was observed by many
that these “professional jurors” had employment daily and often
agreed with the majority position during deliberations so as not to gain
a reputation for causing trouble, as their reputation for being good
jurors encouraged court personnel to select them.357
While the legal system has evolved and most courts now prohibit
jurors from serving repeatedly, concerns that financial gain will some-
how taint the jury system persist to this day.358  Today, however, that
concern might take the form of jurors intentionally prolonging their
service, especially during deliberations, in order to be paid more, or
that they might be overly sympathetic to the state, which provides
them with compensation for their time, in a criminal case.  For legisla-
tors, there is practically no way to prevent either of these situations,
making them both valid considerations for the committees currently
wrestling with proposals for fee increases.
juror has received a bad rap and have recommended moving to a volunteer jury sys-
tem that values the professional juror’s enthusiasm. See Gary M. Galles, Editorial,
Time to Pay Jurors What They Are Worth, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 29, 2000, at
B-9 (“It is time to consider replacing our system of ‘drafting’ jurors with a system of
‘professional’ jurors paid for the value of their services.”).
355. See HENRY S. WILCOX, FRAILTIES OF THE JURY 89–90 (1907) (observing how
professional juror “had passed his prime, and was no longer fitted for the little tasks
which he once did . . . . He drew no pension[, and] as a last resort to drive away the
wolves of want, he hung about the court and sought a place as talesman on the jury.”).
356. See id. at 90 (“The sheriff was his friend, and wished to favor him in every way
he could, so when talesman were needed to fill up the box, this needy gentleman was
chosen.  He always testified that he was qualified.”).
357. Wilcox, a practicing attorney in Chicago at the time, noted, about the profes-
sional juror:
He kept with the majority and signed the verdict that they wished. . . . His
poverty made him as yielding here as he had ever been through life.  He
did not dare to hang the jury or refuse to take the way the largest number
went, lest he might lose his chance to sit again.
Id.
358. See Editorial, supra note 189 (“The federal jury was an excellent example of R
the cross section of participants.  Young, old, black and white were anxious to serve
because they were rewarded with good compensation.  In fact, many expressed their
hopes that it would be a long trial, because $40 a day was nothing to sneeze at.”).
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2. Studies Showing That Jurors of Low Incomes Are Still Satisfied
With Jury Duty and Their Resulting Psychological
Compensation
Court administrators have long been students of intrinsic motiva-
tion—the notion that people participate in an activity not for financial
gain, but rather to serve an idealistic purpose, do some good, or make
a difference.359  Jury commissioners often explain that it is not money
that makes jurors appreciate their service but the enormous responsi-
bility they have when they are sitting in the jury box.  Many jurors
respond the same way.360  Among those jurors who are motivated by
the sense of fulfilling a civic obligation rather than compensation,
many may feel insulted by more than token compensation.  To such
people, substantial compensation detracts from the significance of
their role as jurors and removes them from their temporary station of
magistracy.361
359. See S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL
IDENTITY APPROACH 97 (2001) (“An activity that is intrinsically motivated is one that
is engaged in for its own sake because it is enjoyable or interesting, rather than be-
cause it is associated with an extrinsic factor like monetary reward.” (citations
omitted)).
Professor Lepper’s research experiment with children and their drawings is often
noted in the psychology literature as the prototype for intrinsic motivation. See gener-
ally Mark R. Lepper et al., Undermining Children’s Intrinsic Interest with Extrinsic
Reward: A Test of the “Overjustification” Hypothesis, 28 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. 129 (1973) (reporting results of study).  This study, conducted with mere
toddlers, was consistent with the findings of Professor Deci, who observed that pay-
ment diminished the interest of college students in an activity they would otherwise
have enjoyed.  Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic
Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 105 (1971).  To show that mate-
rial gain does not always explain people’s engagement in tasks, Professor Lepper and
his colleagues selected a group of children who enjoyed drawing.  During regularly
scheduled drawing time, the aspiring artists were told that they would be rewarded for
each completed drawing.  When the students began treating this pleasurable act as a
job, their production levels decreased substantially as they had lost the intrinsic incen-
tive formerly associated with the activity. See Lepper et al., supra, at 135 (“In the
expected-award condition, children showed decreased interest in the drawing activity
after having undertaken it in order to obtain a goal which was extrinsic to the
pleasures of drawing in its own right.”).  Through blind review, the researchers also
noted that the quality of the drawings was significantly worse in the reward-oriented
group. Id.
360. See Van Voris, supra note 334 (“Despite the financial problems of some of the R
jurors, they say they were able to stay focused on [four-month long tobacco trial].”);
sources cited supra note 6 (discussing studies).
361. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 334-37 (Westvaco
Corp. 1999) (1840) (“[The jury] invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it
makes them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge towards society and
the part which they take in its government.”).
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Jurors may also be motivated to do their job effectively because
of the potential consequences of not doing so.  Many jurors will resist
the temptation to evade service out of fear of fines or jail time.362
Likewise, peer pressure may provide a powerful source of motivation
in the jury room, leading many persons to expect that jurors will keep
their peers participating in earnest throughout the process and will not
tolerate those they know to be taking jury duty lightly.363  Given the
responsibilities and the penalties associated with jury service, it is per-
haps the combination of guilt over not fulfilling their civic responsibil-
ity and fear of the potential punishment if they do not do so that
legislators believe motivates jurors.  Raising fees would do nothing to
increase these types of motivation.
3. The Impossibility of Proving a Causal Link Between Increased
Jury Compensation and Increased Summons-Response
Rates
Many state legislators are reluctant to increase jury compensation
because they lack evidence that it will improve jury summons-re-
sponse rates.364  Existing data from counties that have experimented
with fee hikes are still questionable based on regional differences and
varied living conditions.365  Correlation hardly proves causation, and
while research methods have improved measurably in the social sci-
ences, simply observing how attendance and jury fees have correlated
over time can never account for all of the factors that explain the ju-
ror’s decision to appear.
Perhaps the real concern relates to economic principles of cost
avoidance.  More than likely, economists observe, rational workers
will not remove themselves from their source of employment to accept
362. Cf. Jeffrey A. Miles & Jerald Greenberg, Using Punishment Threats to Attenu-
ate Social Loafing Effects Among Swimmers, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 246 (1993) (discussing research results exploring effectiveness of threats
in reducing group members’ loafing behavior).
363. Cf. Kenneth H. Price, Decision Responsibility, Task Responsibility, Iden-
tifiability, and Social Loafing, 40 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 330,
331 (1987) (“[I]ncreasing individual identifiability, when task responsibility is shared,
appears to reduce social loafing.”).
364. See Todd, supra note 31, at 19 (noting realistic conclusions of committee mem- R
ber proposing fee increase: “Davis said she does not expect the committee’s recom-
mendation to include changing the current [jury] pay range because there isn’t enough
data available to back it up. ‘You have to show (raising juror pay) has a direct correla-
tion to (juror) participation and there isn’t enough data,’ she said”).
365. Cf. supra notes 308–313 and accompanying text (describing how these factors R
make setting uniform jury pay standard more difficult).
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lower pay.366  It stands to reason that unless all jurors are paid the
same rate provided by their employers, a certain number will always
attempt to evade service.367  For these inevitable jury shirkers, the bet-
ter solution may be more heavily enforcing fines or other penalties for
noncompliance with jury summonses.  The proposed jury compensa-
tion index would be unlikely to remedy this problem because it would
not replace perspective jurors’ total loss of income.
CONCLUSION
It seems clear that the state and federal governments have an ob-
ligation to compensate jurors as a means to relieve their financial bur-
dens. The issue is an important one because most current state juror
compensation rates are so low that they fail to sustain jurors who are
uncompensated by their employers during their service, are self-em-
ployed, or who must provide for dependents while they serve.368
These low fees are even more troublesome because courts and com-
mentators continue to praise jurors for their many contributions to so-
ciety, seemingly ignoring jurors’ financial needs and the potential
repercussions of leaving them unfulfilled.369  In light of this praise,
lawmakers can reject fulfilling the government’s duty to compensate
jurors adequately on the basis that citizens owe the government a duty
to serve on juries.370  This public duty justification is terribly weak
because the courts’ analogies to other forms of public service ignore
elements of those services intended to ensure against undue hardship,
and that differentiate them from jury service.371  Furthermore, a grow-
366. See Donald L. Martin, The Economics of Jury Conscription, 80 J. POL. ECON.
680, 688 (1972) (“Juror fees that fall considerably below the opportunity costs of
draftees encourage these individuals to seek excuses, exemptions, and deferments.
For any desired number of jurors, this raises the number of persons who must be
initially called and examined before that demand can be satisfied.”).
367. When people invest great effort into evading summonses, their actions can be
seen as efforts to maximize wealth and minimize opportunity costs.  Economists also
liken these efforts to social welfare costs.  On this view, perspective jurors who devote
time and energy to evasion divert the same resources away from their jobs and cause
societal losses in the long run. See id. at 683 (explaining how jurors’ “foregone in-
come, associated with the number of days spent on . . . jury duty, would . . . represent
an opportunity cost to society”).
368. See supra Introduction (characterizing many jurors’ financial burdens); Figure
2 (depicting current rates).
369. See supra Part I.C.2 (describing many functions for which jury service has been
celebrated); Figure 1.
370. See supra Part I.D (describing public duty justification for compelling jury ser-
vice without financial consideration).
371. See id. (pointing out several flaws in courts’ analogies of jury service to other
forms of public service).
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ing number of state supreme court interpretations of workers’ compen-
sation statutes have challenged the prevailing view by holding that
jurors occupy the status of official appointees deserving of employ-
ment benefits rather than persons fulfilling a “civic duty” who are en-
titled to no such benefits.372
Notwithstanding several reasons to increase jury compensation,
even those legislators who are in favor of amending the existing stat-
utes are hard pressed to justify why fee increases are necessary from a
statutory perspective or how much fees should be increased.  Legisla-
tors lack support because there are no indexes providing direction.373
To provide necessary guidance, this Article proposes a mathematical
formula to aid legislators and courts in determining when to increase
jury fees.374  This proposed jury compensation index can be estab-
lished by tracing federal jury compensation since 1790 and state jury
compensation since 1870, and by focusing on the relationship of these
jury fees with American’s income rates during the same time
periods.375
The proposed jury compensation index specifically accounts for
the relationship between federal jury compensation and the federal
minimum wage, given that Congress has often increased the minimum
wage and federal jury compensation at much the same time.376  States
with jury fees falling below the minimum wage or the poverty thresh-
old are therefore encouraged to adopt the jury compensation index as a
method to remedy their neglect of this crucial standard.  Although
adoption of this jury compensation index would be costly, it seems the
benefits of its adoption would far outweigh its costs—jurors would be
more likely to serve and would be able to devote more energy to their
obligations while serving.377
A final objection that could be raised to the adoption of the jury
compensation index is that it would require states to spend money that
they do not have on the compensation of jurors.  In short, while it is
possible that certain benefits, such as instituting a weekend or evening
372. See supra Part I.B.2 (reviewing holdings of six courts finding jurors eligible for
workers’ compensation benefits on basis of their status as employees).
373. See supra Part II.F (highlighting drawbacks in legislators’ approaches to
amending jury compensation).
374. See supra Part II.E (presenting, explaining, and applying jury compensation
equation).
375. See supra Parts II.B–D (investigating history of state and federal jury fee
increases).
376. See supra Part II.D (expanding on Congress’s reliance on federal minimum
wage in setting federal jury compensation rates to meet jurors’ financial needs).
377. See supra Part III.A (discussing benefits of instituting proposed compensation
formula to determine minimal jury compensation levels).
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trial to allow jurors the benefits of their regular work schedules, could
substitute for low fees in relieving financial hardship, the importance
of a fair fee cannot be underestimated.378  My interviews with several
jury consulting firms revealed that levels of compensation, while vari-
able, signify researchers’ expectations that jurors will commit signifi-
cant energy to their jobs and take their duties seriously.  As one
consultant reported, “If it is an intellectual property matter, where you
are paying people to sit through really boring stuff, then you have to
pay them more. Then, you can insist that they pay attention and don’t
fall asleep.”379 Whatever fee the legislature chooses to implement, it
should be high enough that the juror arrives at court with the under-
standing that their pay recognizes the importance of the service.  Set-
ting a low fee may send jurors the message that they will not be taken
seriously when they put forth their best efforts.  Put differently, ade-
quate wages convey the message that with recognition comes
responsibility.380
If state legislators are concerned about funding the necessary fee
increase, perhaps they should ask themselves how much justice is
worth in their courts.  When police arrest suspected criminals, do they
open the jailhouse doors because funds are lacking?  Of course not.
Counties find a way to pay the associated costs, just as they have
developed ways to meet poll workers’ financial burdens—even in the
face of tight budgets.381  Perhaps it is time to answer Judge Pfeuffer’s
question: “Don’t you think the jurors are at least worth as much as
election clerks?”382  Or, better yet, Ms. Brouwer’s: Isn’t a juror wor-
378. See supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text (describing alternatives under R
economic perspective of jury compensation that would assist jurors in meeting finan-
cial demands).
379. E-mail from David Island, President, Island Trial Consulting, to Evan R.
Seamone (May 16, 2001) (on file with the New York University Journal of Legislation
and Public Policy).
380. I should at least acknowledge the view that states might lose out whether they
increase or maintain current rates.  As Professor Martin explained, there are always
two concerns regarding jury pay.  On the one hand, the threat exists that jury pay is so
low that a dearth of jurors will curtail the number of trials, shrinking the size of the
jury, substituting forms of alternative dispute resolution, and causing delays in the
judicial process where juries are required by law.  On the other hand, raising compen-
sation levels on par with what jurors “could earn elsewhere would make the jury trial
prohibitively costly.”  Martin, supra note 366, at 698.  The result would largely be the R
same—a possible reduction in the use of juries.  This perspective is unpersuasive be-
cause it negates jury compensation increases and presents no feasible alternative.
381. See supra note 317 and accompanying text (exploring statutes providing for R
election workers’ financial needs).
382. Todd, supra note 31, at 19; see also supra text accompanying note 316 R
(describing context of this inquiry).
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thy of “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work?”383  Can our responses
be anything but “yes”?  Should we reserve the question until we sit
before twelve faces during the course of litigation to which we are
parties, it may be too late to reap the jury’s many benefits.
383. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Initial Brief at 39, Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County,





























HISTORY OF JURY COMPENSATION
In developing this Appendix, the author was mainly concerned with consecutive statutes from 1870 to the present for
the reason addressed in Part II of the Article.  Information in this Appendix dating before 1870 into territorial and colonial
laws was developed based on a convenience sample of statutes available in the University of Iowa Law Library or ones that
were sent by a particular state’s law library to the author.  Such statutes are intended to be a baseline for analysis, but this
Appendix is by no means completely inclusive.  The history of compensation recounted here is only that of compensation
paid directly to petit jurors.  It does not include fees paid to talesmen, jurors attending various other court proceedings, or
jurors not actually selected to serve.
Before After Time
State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
AL 1975 $10.00 Act of Oct. 10, 1975, No. 1205, § 16-154, 1975 Ala. Acts
2384, 2507–08
AL 1951 $6.00 Act of Sept. 4, 1951, No. 625, § 3, 1951 Ala. Acts 1079,
1080
AL 1947 $4.00 Act of Aug. 7, 1947, No. 297, § 1, 1947 Ala. Acts 148,
148
AL 1919 $3.00 Act of Feb. 11, 1919, No. 35, 1919 Ala. Acts 39
AL 1876 $2.00 Act of Mar. 7, 1876, No. 55, § 1, 1876 Ala. Acts 174, 175
AL 1852 $1.50 ALA. CODE § 3481 (1852)
AK 1981 $25.00 ALASKA CT. R. ADMIN. 14(a) (1980) (on file with the New
York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy)
AK 1977 $20.00 Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 283 (effective July 1,
1977) (amending ALASKA CT. R. ADMIN. 17(a)) (on file




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
AK 1971 $15.00 Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 130 (effective June 4,
1971) (amending ALASKA CT. R. ADMIN. 17(a)) (on file
with the New York University Journal of Legislation and
Public Policy)
AK 1960 $10.00 ALASKA CT. R. ADMIN. 17(a) (1960) (on file with the New
York University Journal of Legislation and Public Policy)
AZ 1970 $12.00 Act of May 1, 1970, ch. 124, sec. 5, § 21-221(A)(1), 1970
Ariz. Sess. Laws 383, 385
AZ 1956 $8.00 Act of Apr. 9, 1956, ch. 91, sec. 1, § 21-221(A)(1), 1956
Ariz. Sess. Laws 142, 143
AZ 1949 $6.00 Act of Mar. 5, 1949, ch. 17, sec. 1, § 34-130(a), 1949
Ariz. Sess. Laws 26, 26
AZ 1921 $4.50 Act of Feb. 9, 1921, ch. 5, § 1, 1921 Ariz. Sess. Laws 4, 4
AZ 1913 $3.00 ARIZ. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 3207 (1913)
AZ 1887 $2.00 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1981 (1887)
AZ 1865 $1.00 $1.00 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ch. 57, § 14 (1865) paying $1 per day for civil
trial or $0 per day for
criminal trial
AR 1999 $35.00 Act of Mar. 16, 1999, No. 629, sec. 1, § 16-34-103(3), paying at least $35 per day
1999 Ark. Acts 2280, 2281
AR 1987 $20.00 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-34-103 (Michie 1987) paying no more than $20 per
day
AR 1953 $7.50 Act of Feb. 9, 1953, No. 46, § 2(c), 1953 Ark. Acts 169,
170
AR 1947 $5.00 Act of Feb. 7, 1947, No. 48, § 1, 1947 Ark. Acts 91, 92
AR 1909 $3.00 Act of May 31, 1909, No. 314, § 1, 1909 Ark. Acts 932,
933
AR 1875 $2.00 Act of Feb. 25, 1875, § 38, 1875 Ark. Acts 167, 185
CA 2000 $15.00 Act of July 8, 2000, sec. 1, § 215(a), 2000 Cal. Adv. paying $15 after the first day





























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
CA 1999 $10.00 Act of Sept. 28, 1998, § 54.5, 1998 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. raising fee to $10 per day
931 (Deering) effective January 1, 1999
CA 1998 $5.00 Act of Sept. 28, 1998, § 54, 1998 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv.
931 (Deering)
CA 1987 $5.00 $10.00 Act of July 7, 1987, ch. 134, sec. 1, § 196, 1987 Cal. Stat. paying between $5 and $10
436, 437 per day
CA 1984 $10.00 $25.00 Act of Sept. 29, 1984, ch. 1640, sec. 1, § 196, 1984 Cal. paying between $10 and $25
Stat 5915, 5915 per day
CA 1957 $5.00 Act of July 4, 1957, ch. 1406, sec. 1, § 1143, sec. 3, separate civil and criminal
§ 196, 1957 Cal. Stat. 2740, 2740 provisions with same rate
CA 1923 $3.00 Act of May 29, 1923, ch. 242, sec. 1, § 1143, 1923 Cal. paying $3 per day in
Stat. 490, 490 criminal cases
CA 1868 $2.00 Act of Mar. 28, 1868, ch. 366, § 17, 1868 Cal. Stat. 436,
443
CA 1855 $3.00 Act of Apr. 10, 1855, ch. 74, § 14, 1855 Cal. Stat. 81, 86
CA 1851 $2.00 Act of Mar. 11, 1851, ch. 2, § 20, 1851 Cal. Stat. 31, 39
CO 1989 $0.00– $50.00 3 Colorado Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, ch. 136, paying employees nothing,
$50.00 sec. 1, § 13-71-126, 1989 Colo. Sess. Laws 765, 770 and reimbursing unemployed
jurors up to $50 per day for
the first three days, and
paying $50 per day to all
thereafter
CO 1955 $6.00 Act of Mar. 21, 1955, ch. 150, sec. 1, § 56-6-1, 1955
Colo. Sess. Laws 395, 395
CO 1933 $3.00 $4.50 14 Act of Mar. 16, 1933, ch. 118, sec. 1, § 7905, 1933 Colo. paying $3 per for the first 2
Sess. Laws 653, 653 weeks, then $4.50 per day
thereafter in counties of the




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
CO 1929 $4.50 $6.00 14 Act of Apr. 5, 1929, ch. 119, sec. 1, § 7905, 1929 Colo. paying $3 per day for the
Sess. Laws 425, 425 first 2 weeks, then $4.50 per
day thereafter in counties of
the first class, and paying
$4.50 for the first two weeks,
then $6 per day thereafter, in
all other counties
CO 1891 $1.50 $2.50 Act of Apr. 6, 1891, § 10, 1891 Colo. Sess. Laws 200, paying $1.50 per day in
214 counties of the first class, $2
per day in counties of the
second class, and $2.50 per
day in all other counties
CO 1877 $2.50 Act of Feb. 11, 1876, § 4, 1876 Colo. Sess. Laws 72, 74
CT 1991 $20.00– $50.00 5 Act effective Sept. 1, 1991, No. 91-160, § 1(b)(1), 1(b)(3), paying employees nothing
$50.00 1991 Conn. Acts 280, 281 (Reg. Sess.) and unemployed from
$20–50 per day for 5 days
then $50 per day to all
CT 1987 $20.00– $50.00 3 Act effective Sept. 1, 1988, No. 87-385, § 1(b)(1)–(2), paying employees nothing
$50.00 1987 Conn Acts. 676, 677 (Reg. Sess.) and unemployed from
$20–50 per day for 3 days
then $50 per day to all
CT 1967 $10.00 Act Raising the Salary of Jurors, No. 703, 1967 Conn.
Pub. Acts 1149, 1150.
CT 1955 $8.00 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1974d (Supp. 1955)
CT 1941 $5.00 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 389f (Supp. 1941)
CT 1930 $4.00 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2262 (1930)
CT 1918 $3.00 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2231 (1918)
CT 1875 $2.50 CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 13, ch. 9 (1875)
CT 1866 $1.50 CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 53, § 8 (1866)
CT 1849 $1.25 CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 56, § 10 (1849)





























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
DE 1994 $20.00 1 Act of July 8, 1994, ch. 331, § 1, 69 Del. Laws 781, 781 paying nothing the first day
to jurors who serve one day
or one trial then $20 per day
DE 1975 $15.00 Act of July 9, 1975, ch. 225, sec. 1, § 4511, 60 Del. Laws
695, 708
DE 1970 $20.00 Act of Apr. 9, 1970, ch. 358, sec. 1, § 8901, 57 Del. Laws
1084, 1084
DE 1949 $10.00 Act of May 5, 1949, ch. 43, sec. 1, § 5364, 47 Del. Laws
81, 81
DE 1927 $5.00 Act of Feb. 2, 1927, ch. 234, sec. 1, 4868, § 21, 35 Del.
Laws 635, 635
DE 1919 $3.00 Act of Apr. 10, 1919, ch. 245, sec. 1, 4868 § 21, 30 Del.
Laws 657, 657
DE 1865 $2.00 Act of Mar. 14, 1865, ch. 536, § 1, Del. Laws 605, 605
DE 1805 $1.00 Act of Jan. 23, 1805, ch. 173, 3 Del. Laws 385, 386
DE 1797 $0.80 Act of June 15, 1793, ch. 27, § 28, 2 Del. Laws 1100,
1120
DC 1987 $30.00 Juror Fees Act of 1987, D.C. Act 7-116, sec. 2, § 15-
718(a), 34 D.C. Reg. 8115, 8115
DC 1978 $30.00 $25.00 44 28 U.S.C. § 1871, amended by Pub. L. No. 95-572 (1978) paying $30 per day for the
first 44 days and $25 per day
thereafter
DC 1968 $20.00 $25.00 29 28 U.S.C. § 1871, amended by Pub. L. No. 90-274 (1968) paying $20 per day for the
first 29 days and $25 per day
thereafter
DC 1965 $10.00 $14.00 29 Act of Sept. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-165, 79 Stat. 645 paying $10 per day for the
first 29 days and $14 per day
thereafter
DC 1949 $7.00 D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1513 (1949) tying pay to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1821, 62 Stat. 992



































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
DC 1902 $3.00 Act of June 21, 1902, ch. 1138, 32 Stat. 396
DC 1857 $2.00 D.C. REV. CODE ch. 9, § 11 (1857)
FL 1992 $15.00 $30.00 3 Act of July 2, 1992, sec. 2, § 40.24(3)–(4), 1992 Fla. Laws paying nothing to employees
ch. 92-297 and $15 per day to
unemployed for three days
then $30 per day to all
FL 1972 $10.00 Act of Apr. 24, 1972, sec. 1, § 40.24, 1972 Fla. Laws ch.
72-308
FL 1951 $5.00 Act of June 11, 1951, No. 389, sec. 1, § 40.24, 1951 Fla.
Laws ch. 26868
FL 1911 $3.00 Act of May 26, 1911, No. 100, sec. 1, § 1586, 1911 Fla.
Laws ch. 6219
FL 1889 $2.00 Act of June 8, 1889, No. 7, § 1, 1889 Fla. Laws ch. 3853
FL 1879 $1.25 Act of Mar. 7, 1879, No. 8, § 5, 1879 Fla. Laws ch. 3106
FL 1828 $0.37 Act of Jan. 19, 1828, § 3, 1828 Fla. Acts 90, 91 paying $0.37 per verdict in
criminal cases
FL 1825 $0.25 Act of Dec. 8, 1825, 1825 Fla. Acts 29, 29 paying $0.25 per verdict in
civil cases
GA 1999 $5.00 $50.00 Act of Apr. 28, 1999, No. 405, sec. 1, §15-12-17(a)(2), paying $5–$50 to petit jurors
1999 Ga. Laws 836, 837
GA 1989 $5.00 $35.00 Act of Mar. 30, 1989, No. 348, sec. 1, § 15-12-17(a)(2), paying between $5 and $35
1989 Ga. Laws 242, 242 per day
GA 1972 $5.00 $25.00 Act of Apr. 6, 1972, No. 1509, § 1, 1972 Ga. Laws 1132, paying between $5 and $25
1133 per day
GA 1957 $2.00 $10.00 Act of Feb. 15, 1957, No. 59, § 1, 1957 Ga. Laws 43, 44 paying between $2 and $10
per day
GA 1946 $2.00 $6.00 Act of Jan. 31, 1946, No. 606, § 1, 1946 Ga. Laws 72, paying between $2 and $6
72–73 per day






























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
GA 1872 $2.00 Act of Dec. 11, 1871, No. 51, § 4, 1871 Ga. Laws 47, 48 paying no more than $2 per
day; law took effect in 1872
GA 1835 $1.00 Act of Dec. 21, 1835, § 1, 1835 Ga. Acts 138, 138
HI 1986 $30.00 Act of May 29, 1986, No. 251, sec. 1, § 612-8(a), 1986
Haw. Sess. Laws 456, 456
HI 1974 $20.00 Act of June 4, 1974, No. 147, sec. 1, § 612-8, 1974 Haw.
Sess. Laws 266, 266
HI 1965 $10.00 Act of June 24, 1965, No. 187, sec. 1, § 221-7, 1965 Haw.
Sess. Laws 264, 264
HI 1955 $4.00 HAW. REV. LAWS § 221-7 (1955)
ID 1969 $10.00 Act of Mar. 14, 1969, ch. 147, sec. 1, § 2-601, 1969 Idaho
Sess. Laws 472, 472–73
ID 1957 $8.00 Act of Mar. 7, 1957, ch. 144, sec. 1, § 2-601, 1957 Idaho
Sess. Laws 244, 245
ID 1953 $6.00 Act of Mar. 2, 1953, ch. 88, sec. 1, § 2-601, 1953 Idaho
Sess. Laws 118, 119
ID 1927 $4.00 Act of Feb. 24, 1927, ch. 62, sec. 1, § 6553, 1927 Idaho
Sess. Laws 78, 78
ID 1893 $2.00 Act of Feb. 27, 1893, sec. 1, § 6138, 1893 Idaho Sess.
Laws 65, 65
IL 1999 $4.00 $10.00 Act of July 29, 1999, No. 91-0321, sec. 5, § 4-11001, removing $15.50 cap for
1999 Ill. Laws 3436, 3436 counties effective 2000
IL 1965 $4.00 $15.50 Act of Aug. 2, 1965, sec. 1, § 44, 1965 Ill. Laws 2241, paying $4 per day in
2242 counties of the first class, $5
per day in counties of the
second class, and $10 per
day in counties of the third
class, or other amount fixed




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
IL 1947 $4.00 $7.50 Act of Aug. 7, 1947, sec. 1, § 44, 1947 Ill. Laws 987, 987 paying $4 per day in counties
of the first class, $5 per day in
all other counties or other
amount fixed by county no
more than $7.50 per day
IL 1931 $4.00 Act of July 3, 1931, sec. 1, §44, 1931 Ill. Laws 598, 598 paying $4 per day in counties
of the first class and $5 per
day in all other counties
IL 1925 $5.00 Act of June 30, 1925, sec. 1, §44, 1925 Ill. Laws 399, 399
IL 1911 $3.00 Act of June 5, 1911, sec. 1, § 44, 1911 Ill. Laws 346, 346
IL 1885 $2.00 Act of June 27, 1885, sec. 1, § 44, 1885 Ill. Laws 198,
199
IL 1879 $1.50 Act of May 31, 1879, sec. 1, § 44, 1879 Ill. Laws 163,
164
IL 1847 $1.00 Act of Feb. 4, 1847, § 1, 1847 Ill. Laws 49, 49
IL 1819 $0.25 Act of Mar. 29, 1819, § 1, 1819 Ill. Laws 329, 329
IN 1997 $40.00 Act of May 13, 1997, Pub. L. No. 204-1997, sec. 1,
§ 4(a)(2)(B), 1997 Ind. Acts 2918, 2918
IN 1988 $17.50 $35.00 Act of Mar. 3, 1988, Pub. L. No. 59-1988, sec. 2, paying at least $17.50 but
§ 4(a)(2)(B), 1988 Ind. Acts 1095, 1096 allowing counties to double
that amount
IN 1975 $17.50 Act of Apr. 29, 1975, No. 306, sec. 1, § 8, 1975 Ind. Acts
1704, 1704
IN 1959 $7.50 Act of Mar. 12, 1959, ch. 238, sec. 1, § 10, 1959 Ind. Acts
545, 546
IN 1947 $5.00 Act of Mar. 14, 1947, ch. 322, sec. 1, § 10, 1947 Ind. Acts
1287, 1287
IN 1933 $2.50 Act of Feb. 17, 1933, ch. 23, sec. 1, § 10, 1933 Ind. Acts
115, 115






























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
IN 1913 $2.50 Act of Mar. 3, 1913, ch. 57, sec. 1, § 10, 1913 Ind. Acts
114, 114
IN 1881 $2.00 Act of Apr. 14, 1881, ch. 49, sec. 1, § 34, 1881 Ind. Acts
503, 504
IN 1879 $1.60 Act of Mar. 31, 1879, ch. 51, § 34, 1879 Ind. Acts 130,
142
IN 1871 $2.50 Act of Feb. 21, 1871, ch. 17, § 9, 1871 Ind. Acts 25, 28
IN 1869 $2.00 Act of Apr. 20, 1869, ch. 37, sec. 1, § 16, 1869 Ind. Acts
81, 82
IN 1853 $1.25 Act of Mar. 2, 1853, ch. 44, § 1, 1853 Ind. Acts 61, 70
IA 1974 $10.00 Act of May 27, 1974, ch. 1261, sec. 1, § 607.5, 1974 Iowa
Acts 967, 967
IA 1953 $5.00 Act of Mar. 12, 1953, ch. 248, sec. 1, § 607.5, 1953 Iowa
Acts 330, 330
IA 1917 $3.00 Act of Mar. 23, 1917, ch. 59, sec. 1, § 354, 1917 Iowa
Acts 77, 77
IA 1909 $2.50 Act of Feb. 23, 1909, ch. 23, sec. 1, § 354, 1909 Iowa
Acts 23, 23
IA 1864 $2.00 Act of Mar. 28, 1864, ch. 92, § 1, 1864 Iowa Acts 105,
105
IA 1862 $1.50 Act of Feb. 17, 1862, ch. 15, § 2, 1862 Iowa Acts 13, 13
KS 1971 $10.00 Act of Apr. 14, 1971, ch. 176, § 20, 1971 Kan. Sess. Laws
368, 374
KS 1949 $5.00 Act of Mar. 30, 1949, ch. 262, sec. 1, § 28-122, 1949 Kan.
Sess. Laws 441, 441
KS 1921 $3.00 Act of Mar. 12, 1921, ch. 195, sec. 1, § 4725, 1921 Kan.
Sess. Laws 290, 290
KS 1913 $2.50 Act of Mar. 17, 1913, ch. 197, § 20, 1913 Kan. Sess.
Laws 314, 329




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
KS 1862 $1.50 Act of Mar. 6, 1862, ch. 99, § 20, 1862 Kan. Sess. Laws
558, 564
KS 1859 $1.00 Act of Feb. 9, 1859, ch. 36, § 59, 1859 Kan. Sess. Laws
305, 324
KS 1858 $0.50 Act of Feb. 12, 1858, ch. 42, § 92, 1858 Kan. Sess. Laws paying 50 cents per verdict
273, 29192
KS 1855 $1.00 Act Concerning Jurors, ch. 92, §18, 1855 Kan. Sess. Laws
444, 446
KY 1978 $12.50 Act of Dec. 22, 1976, ch. 22, § 28, 1976 Ky. Acts law took effect in 1978
(Extraordinary Session) 202, 208
KY 1950 $5.00 Act of Mar. 24, 1950, ch. 123, § 20, 1950 Ky. Acts 526,
533
KY 1944 $3.00 Act of Mar. 20, 1944, ch. 47, 1944 Ky. Acts 94
KY 1926 $3.00 $4.00 1 Act neither approved nor disapproved, ch. 49, sec. 1, paying $3 per day and $4 per
day § 2260, 1926 Ky. Acts 164, 164 (relating to compensation day if kept overnight
of petit jurors)
KY 1887 $2.00 $3.00 1 KY. GEN. STAT. ch. 62, art. 5, § 11 (1887) paying $2 per day and $3 per
day day if kept overnight
KY 1880 $1.50 Act of. Jan. 24, 1880, ch. 73, § 1, 1880 Ky. Acts 13, 13
KY 1873 $2.00 KY. GEN. STAT. ch. 62, art. 5, § 11 (1873)
KY 1860 $1.50 Act of Mar. 3, 1860, sec. 1, § 11, 1860 Ky. Acts 755, 755
KY 1817 $1.00 Act of Jan. 3, 1817, ch. 12, § 1, 1816 Ky. Acts 23, 23
LA 1984 $12.00 $25.00 Act of July 6, 1984, No. 441, sec. 1, § 3049(B), 1984 La. paying between $12 and $25
Acts 1085, 1086 per day for criminal cases
LA 1979 $12.00 Act of July 18, 1979, No. 632, sec. 1, § 3049(B), 1979 La. paying $12 per day for civil
Acts 1685, 1685–86 cases
LA 1956 $8.00 Act of June 28, 1956, No. 97, sec. 1, § 3049, 1956 La.
Acts 277, 277






























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
LA 1912 $2.50 Act of July 8, 1912, No. 113, sec. 1, § 12, 1912 La. Acts
134, 135
LA 1847 $1.00 Act of May 4, 1847, No. 258, § 3, 1847 La. Acts 214 ,
214
LA 1823 $1.50 Act of Mar. 24, 1823, § 1, 1823 La. Acts 58, 58
ME 1991 $10.00 Act of July 17, 1991, ch. 591, sec. E-13, § 1215, 1991 Me.
Acts 1030, 1030
ME 1971 $20.00 Act effective Jan. 1, 1973, ch. 316, 1971 Me. Laws 557
ME 1961 $12.00 Act of Sept. 16, 1961, ch. 232, 1961 Me. Laws 279,
279–80
ME 1956 $10.00 Act of June 1, 1956, ch. 412, sec. 1, § 8, 1955 Me. Laws
425, 425
ME 1953 $8.00 Act of Aug. 8, 1953, ch. 148, 1953 Me. Laws 133, 133
ME 1945 $6.00 Act of July 21, 1945, ch. 193, 1945 Me. Laws 221, 221
ME 1933 $4.00 Act of Mar. 10, 1933, ch. 56, 1933 Me. Laws 197, 197
ME 1927 $5.00 Act of Apr. 15, 1927, ch. 163, 1927 Me. Laws 150, 150
ME 1921 $4.00 Act of Mar. 17, 1921, ch. 36, 1921 Me. Laws 37, 38
ME 1907 $3.00 Act of Feb. 13, 1907, ch. 8, 1907 Me. Acts 8, 8
ME 1866 $2.00 Act of Feb. 23, 1866, ch. 54, § 1, 1866 Me. Laws 32, 32
ME 1850 $1.50 Act of July 29, 1850, ch. 165, 1850 Me. Laws 146, 146
MD 2001 $15.00 Act of May 18, 2000, ch. 652, § 1, 2000 Md. Laws 3344, paying $15 per day but may
3346 (effective July 1, 2001) be supplemented by local
ordinance
MD 1998 $5.00 Act of May 21, 1998, ch. 771, § 1, 1998 Md. Laws 3572, removing, “expense money”
3574–75 as a description of what
counties paid the jurors, and
specific county amounts were
removed— now the
minimum amount can be




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
MD 1988 $10.00 $40.00 Act of Apr. 12, 1988, ch. 84, sec. 1, § 8-106, 1988 Md. paying $20 per day plus $20
Laws 1891, 1892 more if jury kept past 6 p.m.
in Cecil Co.
MD 1975 $10.00 $30.00 Act of Mar. 4, 1975, ch. 16, sec. 1, §8-1061975 Md. Laws paying $15 per day plus $15
26, 27 more if jury kept past 6 p.m.
in Queen Anne’s Co., $10
per day in Baltimore City
MD 1973 $10.00 $20.00 Act of Aug. 22, 1973, ch. 2, § 8-106, 1973 Md. Laws 4, paying $20 per day in
260–63 Calvert Co., $10 per day in
Baltimore City
MD 1957 $5.00 $10.00 Act of Apr. 10, 1957, ch. 451, sec. 1, § 22, 1957 Md.
Laws 674, 674
MD 1955 $5.00 $7.50 Act of Apr. 11, 1955, ch. 402. sec. 1, § 22, 1955 Md.
Laws 672, 672
MD 1949 $5.00 $6.00 Act of Apr. 22, 1949, ch. 250, sec. 1, § 20, 1949 Md. paying $6 in Anne Arundel
Laws 645, 645 county, $5 in all others
MD 1945 $3.50 $5.00 Act of Apr. 27, 1945, ch. 885, sec. 1, § 20, 1945 Md. variable by County
Laws 1124, 1124–25
MD 1943 $3.00 $6.00 Act of Apr. 30, 1943, ch. 369, sec. 1, § 20, 1943 Md. variable by County
Laws 407, 408
MD 1914 $3.00 Act of Apr. 10, 1914, ch. 709, sec. 1, § 20, 1914 Md.
Laws 1212, 1212
MD 1865 $2.50 Act of Mar. 22, 1865, ch. 78, sec. 1, § 16, 1865 Md. Laws
121, 121
MD 1860 $1.50 MD. CODE art. 50, § 16 (1860)
MD 1833 $1.00 Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 121, 1832 Md. Laws
MD 1830 $1.50 Act of Jan. 27, 1830, ch. 69, § 1, 1830 Md. Laws 67, 67 paying $1.50 per day when





























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
MD 1827 $1.25 Act of Jan. 10, 1829, ch. 7, § 1, 1827 Md. Laws; Act of paying $1.25 per day when
Feb. 29, 1828, ch. 80, § 3, 1827 Md. Laws trial is held in Dorchester
County, $1 per day in
Baltimore County
MD 1818 $2.00 Act of Dec. 23, 1818, ch. 31, 1818 Md. Laws paying $2 per day when trial
is held in Baltimore County
MA 1982 $0.00– $50.00 3 Act of July 9, 1982,  ch. 298, § 49–51, 1982 Mass. Acts allowing multiple counties to
$50.00 774, 791–92 pay unemployed jurors up to
$50 per day for three days
then all jurors $50 per day
MA 1978 $16/$22 Act of July 18, 1978, ch. 478, § 25, 1978 Mass. Acts. 586, paying murder jurors $16 or
or 707 $22 per day if held over and
$14/$20 others $14 or $20 if held
over
MA 1977 $0.00 $40.00 3 Act of July 13, 1977, ch. 415, § 37, 1977 Mass. Acts 528, paying $0 for the first 3 days
543 and $40 per day thereafter in
Middlesex County only
MA 1967 $16/$22 Act of Oct. 13, 1967, ch. 678, 1967 Mass. Acts 570, 570 paying first degree murder
or jurors $16 or $22 per day if
$14/$20 held over and others $14 or
$20 if held over
MA 1966 $14.00 $16.00 Act of Sept. 2, 1966, ch. 613, § 25, 1966 Mass. Acts 576, paying $14 per day, $16 per
576 day for first degree murder
trial
MA 1955 $10.00 $12.00 Act of May 2, 1955, ch. 328, § 25, 1955 Mass. Acts 192, paying $10 per day , $12 per
192–93 day for first degree murder
trial
MA 1949 $8.00 $10.00 Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 335, § 25, 1949 Mass. Acts 298, paying $8 per day, $10 per




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
MA 1945 $6.00 $8.00 Act of Apr. 24, 1945, ch. 236, sec. 1, § 25, 1945 Mass. paying $6 per day, $8 per
Acts 173, 173 day for first degree murder
trial
MA 1933 $5.00 $6.00 Act of May 5, 1933, ch. 162, § 25, 1933 Mass. Acts 237, paying $5 per day, $6 per
237 day for first degree murder
trial
MA 1924 $6.00 $7.00 Act of Mar. 15, 1924, ch. 111, § 25, 1924 Mass. Acts 75, paying $6 per day, $7 per
75 day for first degree murder
trial
MA 1919 $4.00 $5.00 Act of Apr. 18, 1919, ch. 112, § 1, 1919 Mass. Acts 83, paying $4 per day, $5 per
83 day for first degree murder
trial
MA 1879 $3.00 Act of Apr. 1, 1879, ch. 182, 1879 Mass. Acts 527, 527
MA 1869 $3.50 Act of Mar. 17, 1869, ch. 73, § 1, 1869 Mass. Acts 454,
454
MA 1866 $2.50 Act of Apr. 7, 1866, ch. 121, § 1, 1866 Mass. Acts 80, 80
MA 1855 $2.00 Act of Mar. 31, 1855, ch. 120, § 1, 1855 Mass. Acts 567,
567
MA 1836 $1.75 MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10 (1836)
MA 1806 $1.25 Act of Mar. 7, 1806, ch. 63, § 1, 1806 Mass. Acts 472,
472
MA 1795 $0.90 Act of Feb. 13, 1796, ch. 41, § 1, 1795 Mass. Laws 391,
404
MA 1787 3 Act of Mar. 1, 1787, ch. 27, 1787 Mass. Laws 602, 610
shillings
MI 1982 $15.00 Act of Sept. 16, 1982, No. 226, sec. 1, § 600.1344(1), paying not less than $15 per
1982 Mich. Pub. Acts 685, 686 day
MI 1966 $15.00 Act of Apr. 13, 1966, No. 20, sec. 1, § 600.1231, 1966
Mich. Pub. Acts 37, 37
MI 1954 $8.00 Act of Apr. 5, 1954, No. 57, sec. 1, § 602.147, 1954 Mich.





























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
MI 1949 $6.00 Act of May 11, 1949, ch. 80, sec. 1, § 602.147, 1949
Mich. Pub. Acts 89, 89
MI 1931 $4.00 Act of May 29, 1931, No. 224, 1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 391,
392
MI 1907 $3.00 Act of June 27, 1907, No. 236, sec. 1, § 18, 1907 Mich.
Pub. Acts 305, 305
MI 1893 $2.50 Act of June 1, 1893, No. 204, § 23, 1893 Mich. Pub. Acts
337, 343
MI 1869 $2.00 Act of Mar. 17, 1869, No. 40, sec. 1, § 18, 1869 Mich.
Pub. Acts 66, 66–67
MI 1857 $1.50 Act of Feb. 16, 1857, No. 138, sec. 1, § 18, 1857 Mich.
Pub. Acts 383, 383
MN 1993 $30.00 Act of May 14, 1993, ch. 192, sec. 104, § 593.48, 1993 paying at a rate to be
Minn. Laws 711, 782 determined by the Minn.
S.C., currently $30 per day
MN 1975 $15.00 Act of June 5, 1975, ch. 318, sec. 1, § 357.26, 1975 Minn.
Laws 920, 920
MN 1969 $10.00 Act of Apr. 1969, ch. 135, sec. 1, § 357.26, 1969 Minn.
Laws 211, 211
MN 1953 $6.00 Act of Apr. 21, 1953, ch. 478, sec. 1, § 357.26, 1953
Minn. Laws 561, 562
MN 1949 $3.00 $5.00 Act of Mar. 8, 1949, ch. 101, sec. 1, § 357.26, 1949 Minn. paying $5 per day in
Laws 129, 129 counties with populations
<220,000 and $3 for counties
with populations >250,000
MN 1943 $3.00 $4.00 Act of Apr. 17, 1943, ch. 484, sec. 1, § 7010, 1943 Minn. paying $4 per day in
Laws 653, 653–54 counties with populations




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
MN 1937 $4.00 Act of Apr. 12, 1937, ch. 192, § 1, 1937 Minn. Laws 254, paying $4 per day when trial
254 is held in city with
population of over 200,000
MN 1933 $2.00 $3.00 Act of Mar. 28, 1933, ch. 123, sec. 1, § 7010, 1933 Minn. paying $3 per day for
Laws 133, 133–34 counties with populations
<225,000 or >350,000, and
$2 per day for counties with
populations >225,000 but
less than 350,000
MN 1921 $2.00 $4.00 Act of Mar. 16, 1921, ch. 95, sec. 1, § 5778, 1921 Minn. paying $4 for counties with
Laws 147, 147 populations <225,000, $3 for
counties with populations
>350,000, and $2 for
counties with populations
>225,000 but <350,000
MN 1919 $2.00 $3.00 Act of Mar. 18, 1919, ch. 73, sec. 1, § 5778, 1919 Minn. paying $3 for counties with
Laws 71, 71 populations <200,000 or
>350,000, and $2 for
counties with populations
>200,000 or <350,000
MN 1870 $2.00 Act of Mar. 3, 1870, ch. 80, sec. 1, § 27, 1870 Minn.
Laws 148, 148
MS 1996 $25.00 $40.00 Act of Mar. 8, 1996, ch. 312, sec. 1, § 25-7-61, 1996 paying between $25 and $40
Miss. Laws 35, 36 per day
MS 1989 $15.00 $40.00 Act of Mar. 14, 1989, ch. 395, sec. 2, § 25-7-61(a), 1989 paying between $15 and $40
Miss. Laws 144, 145 per day
MS 1989 $15.00 Act of Mar. 12, 1989, ch. 345, sec. 1, § 25-7-61(a), 1989
Miss. Laws 56, 56
MS 1974 $15.00 Act of Mar. 25, 1974, ch. 420, sec. 1, § 25-7-61(a), 1974





























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
MS 1962 $8.00 Act of May 4, 1962, ch. 383, sec. 1, § 3959(a), 1962 Miss.
Laws 666, 666
MS 1946 $5.00 Act of Feb. 7, 1946, ch. 180, sec. 1, § 1811(a), 1946 Miss.
Laws 135, 135
MS 1936 $3.00 Act of Mar. 26, 1936, ch. 248, sec. 1, § 1811(a), 1936
Miss. Laws 490, 490
MS 1932 $2.50 Act of Apr. 9, 1932, ch. 192, sec. 1, § 1811(a), 1932 Miss.
Laws 488, 488
MS 1920 $4.00 Act of Mar. 27, 1920, ch. 143, § 1(a), 1920 Miss. Laws
198, 198
MS 1908 $3.00 Act of Feb. 26, 1908, ch. 178, sec. 1, § 2207(a), 1908
Miss. Laws 191, 191
MS 1906 $2.50 MISS. CODE §  2027 (1906)
MS 1892 $2.00 MISS. CODE ANN. § 2028 (1892)
MS 1842 $1.50 Act of Feb. 14, 1842, ch. 61, art. 15, 1848 Miss. Laws
891, 891
MS 1837 $2.00 Act of May 13, 1837, § 1, 1837 Miss. Laws 315, 315
MS 1825 $1.50 Act of Feb. 4, 1825, ch. 56, § 5, 1825 Miss. Laws 118,
119
MS 1822 $1.00 Circuit Court Act of June 28, 1822, ch. 61, art. 1, § 143,
1822 Miss. Laws 873, 880
MS 1820 $2.00 Act of Feb. 10, 1820, ch. 33, 1820 Miss. Laws 46, 47
MO 1999 At least Act of July 13, 1999, S.B. 1, § 494.455, 1999 Mo. Laws
$6.00 827, 860–61
MO 1957 $6.00 Act of Mar. 22, 1957, sec. 1, § 494.100, 1957 Mo. Laws
509, 510




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
MO 1889 $1.00 $2.00 MO. REV. STAT. §§ 6076, 6082 (1889) paying $2 per day day to
those on the “regular panel”
and $1 per day to certain
criminal juror
MO 1887 $1.00 Act of Mar. 31, 1887, § 1, 1887 Mo. Laws 189, 189
MO 1874 $1.50 Act of Mar. 28, 1874, § 5, 1874 Mo. Laws 96, 98
MO 1870 $1.00 MO. STAT. vol. 1, ch. 80, §26, at 789, 800–01 (Wagner
1872) (enacted 1870)
MO 1860 $1.50 Act of Jan. 6, 1860, § 1, 1860 Mo. Laws 63, 63
MO 1855 $0.50 $1.00 1 MO. REV. STAT. ch. 88, § 28 (1856) paying $0.50 for the first day
and $1 per day thereafter
MO 1838 $1.00 Act of Feb. 13, 1839, sec. 1, § 25, 1838 Mo. Laws 76, 76
MO 1827 $0.25 Act of Dec. 28, 1826, ch. 21, § 3, 1827 Mo. Laws 31, 32
MT 1981 $25.00 Act of Mar. 31, 1981, ch. 200, sec. 1, § 3-15-201, Mont.
Laws 278, 278–79
MT 1971 $12.00 Act of Mar. 15, 1971, ch. 332, sec. 1, § 25-401, 1971
Mont. Laws 1316, 1316
MT 1963 $10.00 Act of Mar. 1, 1963, ch. 117, sec. 1, § 25-401, 1963 Mont.
Laws 225, 225
MT 1945 $6.00 Act of Feb. 5, 1945, ch. 9, sec. 1, § 4933, 1945 Mont.
Laws 11, 11
MT 1917 $4.00 Act of Feb. 6, 1917, ch. 6, sec. 1, § 3178, 1917 Mont.
Laws 4, 4
MT 1873 $3.00 Act of Apr. 29, 1873, § 1, 1873 Mont. Laws, 53, 53
MT 1864 $4.00 Act of Feb. 9, 1865, 1864 Mont. Laws 470, 473
NE 1994 $35.00 Act of Feb. 25, 1991, No. 147, sec. 1, § 33-138(1), 1991 increasing pay to $35
Neb. Laws 262, 262 effective Jan. 1, 1994
NE 1991 $30.00 Act of Feb. 25, 1991, No. 147, sec. 1, § 33-138(1), 1991
Neb. Laws 262, 262
NE 1974 $20.00 Act of Mar. 13, 1974, No. 736, sec. 1, § 33-138(1), 1974





























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
NE 1965 $10.00 Act of May 12, 1965, ch. 187, sec. 1, § 33-138(1), 1965
Neb. Laws 578, 578
NE 1957 $6.00 Act of Feb. 28, 1957, ch. 134, sec. 1, § 33-138(1), 1957
Neb. Laws 450, 450
NE 1947 $4.00 Act of Apr. 3, 1947, ch. 125, sec. 1, § 33-138, 1947 Neb.
Laws 364, 364
NE 1933 $3.00 Act of Mar. 1, 1933, ch. 62, sec. 1, § 33-143, 1933 Neb.
Laws 296, 296–97
NE 1929 $4.00 Act of Feb. 2, 1929, ch. 105, sec. 1, § 2404, 1929 Neb.
Laws 395, 395
NE 1911 $3.00 Act of Mar. 29, 1911, ch. 51, sec. 1, § 9473, 1911 Neb.
Laws 234, 234
NE 1865 $2.00 Act of Feb. 13, 1865, § 15, 1865 Neb. Laws 20, 27
NV 1981 $15.00 $30.00 5 Act of May 1, 1981, ch. 159, sec. 2, § 6.150, 1981 Nev.
Stat. 326, 327
NV 1967 $15.00 Act of Mar 22, 1967, ch. 151, sec. 1, § 6.150, 1967 Nev.
Stat. 277, 277
NV 1965 $10.00 Act of Mar. 19, 1965, ch. 168, sec. 1, § 6.150, 1965 Nev.
Stat. 311, 311
NV 1949 $6.00 Act of Feb. 11, 1949, ch. 8, sec. 1, § 2, 1949 Nev. Stat. paying $6.00 for jurors
10, 10 serving
NV 1933 $4.00 Act of Mar. 10, 1933, ch. 60, sec. 1, § 1, 1933 Nev. Stat.
68, 68
NV 1862 $3.00 Act of Dec. 23, 1862, ch. 136, § 9, 1862 Nev. Stat. 182,
187
NV 1861 $2.00 Act of Nov. 29, 1861, ch. 57, § 9, 1861 Nev. Stat. 244,
251
NH 1991 $20.00 Act of July 2, 1991, ch. 355, sec. 1, § 500-A:15(I), 1991 paying $10 for each “half
N.H. Laws 577, 599 day’s attendance”
NH 1983 $30.00 Act of June 22, 1983, ch. 383, sec. 75, § 500-A:15, 1983 paying $15 for each “half



































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
NH 1981 $30.00 Act of June 29, 1981, ch. 527, sec. 2, § 500-A:15, 1981 paying “the same fees as
N.H. Laws 783, 787 paid to witnesses”
NH 1979 $30.00 Act of June 20, 1979, ch. 259, sec. 1, § 500-A:16, 1979 paying $30 for “each day or
N.H. Laws 226, 226 part of a day”
NH 1968 $15.00 Act of Apr. 19, 1968, ch. 62, sec. 1, § 26, 1967 N.H. paying $15 for “each day or
Laws 56, 56 part of a day” effective 1968
NH 1960 $10.00 Act of May 29, 1959, ch. 129, sec. 1, § 26, 1959 N.H. paying $10 for each day or
Laws 140, 140 part of a day“ effective 1960
NH 1953 $7.00 Act of Feb. 26, 1953, ch. 18, sec. 1, § 26, 1953 N.H. paying $6 per day ”for each
Laws 23, 23 day or part of a day“, plus
$1 per day ”for expenses“
NH 1947 $6.00 Act of June 17, 1947, ch. 200, sec. 1, § 26, 1947 N.H. paying $5 per day ”for each
Laws 284, 284 day or part of a day“ plus $1
per day ”for expenses“
NH 1947 $5.75 Act of Apr. 30, 1947, ch. 117, sec. 1, § 26, 1947 N.H. paying $5 per day ”for each
Laws 127, 127–28 day or part of a day“ plus
$.75 per day ”for expenses“
NH 1933 $4.75 Act of Mar. 15, 1933, ch. 39, sec. 1, § 26, 1933 N.H. paying $4 per day ”for each
Laws 44, 44 day or part of a day“ plus
$.75 per day ”for expenses“
NH 1923 $4.00 $7.00 Act of Apr. 5, 1923, ch. 31, sec. 1, § 21, 1923 N.H. Laws paying $4 per day ”for each
44, 44 day or part of a day“ plus up
to $3 per day for ”reasonable
expenses“
NH 1919 $4.00 Act of Mar. 28, 1919, ch. 136, sec. 1, § 21, 1919 N.H.
Laws 200, 200
NH 1907 $3.00 Act of Mar. 22, 1907, ch.78, sec. 1, § 21, 1907 N.H. Laws
78, 78
NH 1866 $2.00 Act of July 7, 1866, ch. 4248, § 1, 1866 N.H. Laws 3267
NH 1806 $1.25 Act of June 19, 1806, ch. 36, 1801–1811 N.H. Laws 536





























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
NH 1796 $0.40 Act of Dec. 16, 1796, 1796 N.H. Laws 9, 14
NH 1791 Act of Feb. 9, 1791, ch. 47, 1791 N.H. Laws 613, 619 paying 2 shillings per trial
NH 1768 Act of Mar. 12, 1768, ch. 15, 1768 N.H. Laws 486, 495 paying 1 shilling per trial
NH 1693 Act of Mar. 2, 1692–93, ch.1, 1693 N.H Laws 552, 553 paying 4 shillings per trial
NJ 2001 $5.00 $40.00 3 Act of Mar. 23, 2001, ch. 38, sec. 1, § C.22A:1-1.1, http:// paying $5 for three days then
www.njleg.state.nj.us/2000/Bills/PL01/38_.PDF $40 per day
NJ 1949 $5.00 Act of May 18, 1949, ch. 127, sec. 1, § 22:1-1, 1949 N.J.
Laws 496, 496
NJ 1933 $3.00 Act of Feb. 4, 1933, ch. 21, sec. 1, § 3, 1933 N.J. Laws
36, 36
NJ 1929 $5.00 Act of May 6, 1929, ch. 316, sec. 1, § 3, 1929 N.J. Laws
729, 729
NJ 1920 $3.00 Act of Apr. 15, 1920, ch. 181, sec. 1, § 3, 1920 N.J. Laws
367, 367
NJ 1915 $2.50 Act of Mar. 30, 1915, ch. 99, sec. 1, § 3, 1915 N.J. Laws
154, 154
NJ 1867 $2.00 Act of Apr. 9, 1867, ch. 370, § 1, 1867 N.J. Laws 833,
833
NM 1993 $34.00 Act of Apr. 5, 1993, ch. 217, sec. 1, § 50-4-22(A), 1993 setting $4.25 hourly wage
N.M. Laws 2144, 2144
NM 1981 $26.80 Act of Mar. 31, 1983, ch. 59, sec. 1, § 50-4-22(A), 1983 setting $3.35 hourly wage
N.M. Laws 343, 343 effective July 1, 1981
NM 1980 $23.20 Act of Mar. 31, 1983, ch. 59, sec. 1, § 50-4-22(A), 1983 setting $2.90 hourly wage
N.M. Laws 343, 343 effective July 1, 1980
NM 1979 $21.20 Act of Mar. 31, 1983, ch. 59, sec. 1, § 50-4-22(A), 1983 setting $2.65 hourly wage
N.M. Laws 343, 343 effective July 1, 1979
NM 1979 Act of Apr. 5, 1979, ch. 285, sec. 1, § 38-5-15, 1979 N.M. paying the highest prevailing
Laws 1120, 1120 state minimum wage
NM 1976 $18.40 Act of Mar. 4, 1976, ch. 16, sec. 1, § 19-1-15, 1976 N.M. paying $2.30 per hour, 8



































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
NM 1970 $12.80 Act of Feb. 25, 1970, ch. 40, sec. 3, § 19-1-15, 1970 N.M. paying $1.60 per hour, 8
Laws 123, 125 hour day
NM 1949 $5.00 Act of Feb. 15, 1949, ch. 7, sec. 1, § 30-137, 1949 N.M.
Laws 43, 43
NM 1915 $3.00 Act of Mar. 6, 1915, ch. 24, § 1, 1915 N.M. Laws 37, 37
NM 1878 $2.00 Act of Feb. 9, 1878, ch.12, § 2, 1878 N.M. Laws 61, 62
NM 1859 $1.00 Act of Feb. 2, 1859, art. 30, ch. 68, § 14, 1865 N.M. Laws
492, 496
NY 1995 $40.00 Act of June 28, 1995, ch. 85, sec. 4, § 521(a), 1995 N.Y. took effect Feb. 15, 1998
Laws 2591, 2592
NY 1995 $27.50 Act of June 28, 1995, ch. 85, sec. 1, § 519, sec. 2, § 521, took effect Feb. 15, 1997
1995 N.Y. Laws 2591, 2591
NY 1988 $15.00 $21.00 30 Act of Aug. 1, 1988, ch. 473, secs. 2–3, §§ 521–521-a, paying $15 for the first 30
1988 N.Y. Laws 2669, 2669 days and an additional $6 per
day thereafter
NY 1964 $12.00 Act of Apr. 10, 1964, ch. 469, sec. 1, § 749-a, 1964 N.Y. paying no more than $12 per
Laws 1375, 1375 day
NY 1959 $8.00 Act of Apr. 22, 1959, ch. 693, sec. 1, § 749-a, 1959 N.Y. paying no more than $8 per
Laws 1642, 1642 day
NY 1950 $6.00 Act of Mar. 27, 1950, ch. 187, sec. 1, § 1, 1950 N.Y. paying no more than $6 per
Laws 706, 706–07 day
NY 1928 $4.00 $6.00 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 749-h (West 1928) paying no more than $4 per
day within New York City
and no more than $6 per day
outside of New York City
NY 1924 $4.00 Act of Mar. 24, 1924, ch. 62, sec. 1, § 1, 1924 N.Y. Laws
98, 98
NY 1918 $3.00 $4.00 Act of May 13, 1918, ch. 638, sec. 1, § 1, 1918 N.Y. paying no more than $3 per
Laws 2025, 2025 day within New York City
and no more than $4 per day





























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
NY 1907 $3.00 Act of Apr. 11, 1907, ch. 148, sec. 1, § 3314, 1907 N.Y.
Laws 196, 196–97
NY 1866 $2.00 Act of Mar. 31, 1866, ch. 307, sec. 1, § 1, 1866 N.Y. paying no more than $2 per
Laws 660, 660 day
NY 1864 $1.50 Act of May 2, 1864, ch. 545, sec. 1, § 1, 1864 N.Y. Laws paying no more than $1.50
1197, 1197 per day
NY 1828 $1.00 Act of Dec. 10, 1828, ch. 10, § 38, 1828 N.Y. Laws 507, paying no more than $1 per
535 day
NC 1983 $12.00 $30.00 5 Act of July 20, 1983, ch. 881, § 2, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws paying $12 per day for the
1080, 1080 first 5 days and $30 per day
thereafter
NC 1979 $8.00 $30.00 5 Act of July 1, 1979, ch. 985, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws paying $8 per day for the
1323, 1323 first 5 days and $30 per day
thereafter
NC 1969 $8.00 Act of July 1, 1969, ch. 1190, § 32, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws
1369, 1374
NC 1965 $7.00 Act of Apr. 27, 1965, ch. 310, § 7A-312, 1965 N.C. Sess.
Laws 369, 416
NC 1951 $3.00 $8.00 Act of Feb. 23, 1951, ch. 98, § 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws paying between $3 and $8
74, 74 per day
NC 1949 $3.00 $6.00 Act of Apr. 13, 1949, ch. 915, § 1, 1949 N.C. Sess. Laws paying between $3 and $6
1039, 1039 per day
NC 1947 $2.00 $5.00 Act of Apr. 5, 1947, ch. 1015, sec. 1, § 9-5, 1947 N.C. paying between $2 and $5
Sess. Laws 1475, 1475 per day
NC 1920 $2.00 $4.00 Act of Aug. 25, 1920, ch. 61, § 1, 1920 N.C. Sess. Laws paying between $2 and $4
93, 93 per day
NC 1919 $2.00 $3.00 Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 85, § 1, 1919 N.C. Sess. Laws paying between $2 and $3
128, 128 per day
NC 1871 $1.50 Act of Mar. 21, 1871, ch. 139, § 6, 1871 N.C. Sess Laws paying no more than $1.50



































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
NC 1855 $0.50 $2.00 N.C. REV. CODE ch. 28, § 15 (1855) paying between $0.50 and
$2.00 per day
ND 2001 $25.00 $50.00 1 N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-14 (Supp. 2001) paying $25 for the first day
and $50 per day thereafter
ND 1981 $25.00 Act of Apr. 6, 1981, ch. 319, sec. 43, § 27-09.1.-14, 1981
N.D. Laws 857, 868
ND 1971 $20.00 Act of Mar. 17, 1971, ch. 304, § 14, 1971 N.D. Laws 700,
707
ND 1949 $6.00 Act of Mar. 5, 1949, ch. 209, sec. 1, § 27-0905(1), 1949
N.D. Laws 271, 271
ND 1943 $4.00 N.D. REV. CODE § 27-0905 (1944)
ND 1903 $3.00 Act of Feb. 9, 1903, ch. 117, sec. 1, § 2096(1), 1903 N.D.
Laws 157, 157
ND 1899 $2.00 N.D. REV. CODE § 2096 (1899)
ND 1875 $0.50 Act of Jan. 9, 1875, ch. 10, § 75, 1875 Territory of Dakota
Laws 8, 15
OH 1998 $0.00– $15.00– 10 Act of Jan. 15, 1998, sec. 1, §2313.34(B), 1998 Ohio paying from $0–40 for the
40.00 80.00 Laws 7172, 7173 first ten days and then
between $15 and $80 after
OH 1974 $0.00– $15.00 10 Act of Dec 3, 1974, sec. 1, § 2313.14, 1974 Ohio Laws paying no more than $15 per
15.00 405, 405 day, but at least $15 after ten
days
OH 1965 $10.00 Act of Aug. 12, 1965, sec. 1, § 2313.34, 1965 Ohio Laws paying no more than $10 per
657, 657, 1691–92 day
OH 1931 $5.00 The Jury Code, sec. 1, § 11419-43, 1931 Ohio Laws 193, paying no more than $5 per
205 day
OH 1921 $3.00 Act of May 14, 1921, sec. 1, § 3008, 1921 Ohio Laws
234, 234
OH 1865 $2.00 Act of Apr. 8, 1865, § 1, 1865 Ohio Laws 105, 105






























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
OH 1831 $1.00 OHIO STAT. 1788–1833, vol. 3, ch. 840, § 15, at 1770,
1773 (Chase 1835) (enacted in 1831)
OH 1824 $0.50 OHIO STAT. 1810-11 to 1824-5, vol. 2, ch. 602, § 14, 2, at
1354, 1357 (1824)
OH 1792 $0.15 OHIO STAT. 1788–1833, vol. 1, ch. 36, at 133, 137 (Chase
1833) (enacted in 1792)
OK 1996 $20.00 Act of June 12, 1996, ch. 339, sec. 7, § 86, 1996 Okla.
Sess. Laws 1571, 1581–82
OK 1977 $12.50 Act of June 14, 1977, ch. 189, sec. 1, § 86, 1977 Okla.
Sess. Laws 460, 460–61
OK 1963 $7.50 Act of May 21, 1963, ch. 79, sec. 1, § 86, 1963 Okla.
Sess. Laws 107, 107
OK 1947 $5.00 Act of May 16, 1947, ch. 1b, sec. 1, § 86, 1947 Okla.
Sess. Laws 248, 248
OK 1923 $3.00 Act of Feb. 13, 1923, sec. 1, § 6441, 1923 Okla. Sess.
Laws 5, 5
OK 1910 $2.00 OKLA. REV. LAWS § 3236 (1910)
OK 1897 $1.00 Act of Mar. 12, 1897, ch. 15, § 48, 1897 Okla. Sess. Laws
160, 177
OK 1895 $1.50 Act of Mar. 8, 1895, ch. 25, § 47, 1895 Okla. Sess. Laws
124, 141
OK 1890 $2.00 OKLA. STAT. § 2903 (1890)
OR 1999 $10.00 $50.00 2 Act of Sept. 1, 1999, ch. 1085, § 4, 1999 Or. Laws 2909, paying $10 per day for the
2909 first 2 days, then $50 per day
thereafter
OR 1971 $10.00 Act of June 9, 1971, ch. 358, sec. 1, § 10.060, 1971 Or.
Laws 522, 522
OR 1955 $7.50 Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 296, sec. 1, § 10.060, 1955 Or.
Laws 327, 327
OR 1907 $3.00 Act of Feb. 23, 1907, ch. 68, 1907 Or. Laws 120, 120



































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
OR 1845 $1.00 Act of Aug. 15, 1845, § 3, 1845 Or. Laws 30, 31
OR 1844 $0.25 Act of Dec. 24, 1844, § 1, 1844 Or. Laws 97, 97
PA 1980 $9.00 $25.00 3 Act of June 26, 1980, No. 78, § 4561, 1980 Pa. Laws 266, paying $9 per day for the
273 first 3 days, then $25 per day
thereafter
PA 1959 $9.00 Act of Oct. 15, 1959, No. 446, sec. 1, § 1, 1959 Pa. Laws
1322, 1322–23
PA 1951 $7.00 Act of Mar. 22, 1951, No. 12, sec. 1, § 1, 1951 Pa. Laws
56, 56
PA 1949 $5.00 Act of Apr. 6, 1949, No. 44, sec. 1, § 1, 1949 Pa. Laws
398, 398
PA 1943 $4.00 Act of Apr. 30, 1943, No. 66, sec. 1, § 1, 1943 Pa. Laws
133, 133
PA 1933 $3.00 Act of May 22, 1933, No. 153, § 1, 1933 Pa. Laws 851,
851
PA 1907 $2.50 Act of June 1, 1907, No. 262, § 1, 1907 Pa. Laws 364,
364
PA 1873 $2.00 Act of Feb. 28, 1873, No. 12, § 1, 1873 Pa. Laws 37, 37
PA 1805 $1.00 PA. STAT. 1802–1805, vol. 17, ch. 2589, § 13, at 1011,
1018-19 (Mitchell et al. 1915) (approved Mar. 29, 1805)
PA 1795 $0.26 PA. STAT. 1682–1801, vol. 15, ch. 1863, at 359, 368
(Mitchell & Flanders 1911) (approved Apr. 20, 1795)
RI 1967 $15.00 Act of May 24, 1967, ch. 150, sec. 1, § 9-29-5, 1967 R.I.
Acts & Resolves 496, 496
RI 1951 $10.00 Act of Apr. 19, 1951, ch. 2707, sec. 1, § 8, 1951 R.I. Acts
& Resolves 102, 102
RI 1930 $5.00 Act of Apr. 10, 1930, ch. 1535, sec. 1, § 8, 1930 R.I. Acts
& Resolves 242, 242
RI 1923 $3.00 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6641 (1923)





























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
RI 1870 $2.50 Act of Mar. 31, 1870, sec. 1, § 12, 1871 R.I. Pub. Laws
623, 623
RI 1844 $1.00 Act in Relation to Jurors, § 13, 1844 R.I. Pub. Laws 154,
157
SC 1974 $2.00 $12.50 Act of Sept. 4, 1974, No. 1265, § 1, 1974 S.C. Acts 2988, varying rate by county
2988
SC 1964 $2.00 $10.00 Act of Mar. 21, 1964, No. 853, § 2, 1964 S.C. Acts 2068, varying rate by county
2068
SC 1963 $2.00 $7.50 Act of May 15, 1963, No. 204, § 1, 1963 S.C. Acts 234, varying rate by county
234
SC 1960 $1.50 $7.50 Act of May 24, 1960, No. 851, § 1, 1960 S.C. Acts 1984, varying rate by county
1984
SC 1947 $1.50 $6.00 Act of Jan. 30, 1947, No. 1, § 1, 1947 S.C. Acts 1, 1 varying rate by county
SC 1933 $1.50 $5.00 Act of Mar. 2, 1933, No. 100, sec. 1, § 632, 1933 S.C.
Acts 111, 111–12
SC 1920 $3.00 Act of Feb. 19, 1920, No. 365, sec. 1, § 4040, 1920 S.C.
Acts 735, 735
SC 1907 $2.00 Act of Feb. 20, 1907, No. 244, sec. 1, § 2938, 1907 S.C.
Acts 518, 518
SC 1836 $1.50 Act of Dec. 21, 1836, ch. 27, § 1, 1836 S.C. Acts 63, 63
SC 1816 $1.00 Act of Dec. 19, 1816, 1816 S.C. Acts 10, 10
SD 1999 $50.00 Act of Feb. 26, 1999, ch. 107, sec. 1, § 16-13-46, 1999
S.D. Laws 169, 169
SD 1991 $40.00 Act of Feb. 25, 1991, ch. 176, sec. 1, § 16-13-46, 1991
S.D. Laws 205, 206
SD 1974 $20.00 Act of Feb. 20, 1974, ch. 157, sec. 1, § 16-13-46, 1974
S.D. Laws 283, 283
SD 1967 $7.50 Act of Mar. 11, 1967, ch. 141, 1967 S.D. Laws 283




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
SD 1933 $3.00 Act of Feb. 14, 1933, ch. 75, sec. 1, § 5305, 1933 S.D.
Laws 70, 70
SD 1921 $4.00 Act of Feb. 8, 1921, ch. 184, sec. 1, § 5305, 1921 S.D.
Laws 276, 276
SD 1909 $3.00 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 181,sec. 1, § 1843, 1909 S.D.
Laws 278, 278
SD 1869 $2.00 Act of Jan. 14, 1869, ch. 6, § 15, 1868 Territory of Dakota
Laws 181, 192
TN 1973 $10.00 Act of Apr. 23, 1973, ch. 138, § 1, 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts
376, 377
TN 1965 $8.00 Act of Feb. 18, 1965, ch. 61, § 1, 1965 Tenn. Pub. Acts
158, 158
TN 1949 $4.00 Act of Apr. 11, 1949, ch. 129, sec. 1, § 10042, 1949 Tenn.
Pub. Acts 412, 412
TN 1915 $2.00 Act of Apr. 3, 1915, ch. 70, sec. 1, § 4031, 1915 Tenn. paying $2 per day or $3 per
Pub. Acts 194, 194–95 day depending on county
TN 1871 $1.50 TENN. CODE § 4031 (1871)
TN 1866 $2.00 Act of Nov. 21, 1866, ch. 3, § 1, 1866 Tenn. Pub. Acts 5,
5
TN 1858 $1.50 TENN. CODE § 4031 (1858)
TN 1835 $1.00 Act of Dec. 3, 1835, ch. 6, § 8, 1835 Tenn. Pub. Acts 45,
4748
TN 1817 $1.00 Act of Nov. 22, 1817, ch. 171, 1817 Tenn. Pub. Acts 203, paying no more than $1 per
204 day
TN 1822 $2.00 Act of Aug. 23, 1822, ch. 44, § 1, 1822 Tenn. Pub. Acts paying no more than $2 per
39, 40 day in ”Western District“
TN 1817 $1.00 Act of Nov. 22, 1817, ch. 171, § 3, 1817 Tenn. Pub. Acts
203, 204






























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
TX 1997 $6.00 $50.00 Act of June 17, 1997, ch. 758, sec. 1, § 61.001, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 2469, 2469
TX 1979 $6.00 $30.00 Act of June 6, 1979, ch. 401, § 1, art. 2122(a), 1979 Tex.
Gen. Laws 881, 881
TX 1975 $5.00 $30.00 Act of June 19, 1975, ch. 510, § 1, art. 2122(a), 1975 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1353, 1353
TX 1965 $4.00 $10.00 Act of May 21, 1965, ch. 426, § 1, art. 2122(a), 1965 Tex.
Gen. Laws 484, 484
TX 1953 $4.00 $5.00 Act of June 8, 1953, ch. 379, § 1, art. 2122, 1953 Tex.
Gen. Laws 917, 917
TX 1925 $4.00 Act of May 24, 1945, ch. 239, § 2, 1945 Tex. Gen. Laws
371, 372
TX 1919 $3.00 Act of Feb. 19, 1919, ch. 26, § 1, 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws
35. 35
TX 1911 $2.50 Act of Mar. 13, 1911, ch. 66, § 1, art. 1113, 1911 Tex.
Gen. Laws 109, 110
TX 1881 $2.00 Act of Mar. 15, 1881, ch. 40, § 1, art. 1081, 1881 Tex.
Gen. Laws 31, 3132
TX 1852 $1.50 Act of Feb. 16, 1852, ch. 104, § 6, 1852 Tex. Gen. Laws
129, 129
TX 1848 $1.25 Act of Mar. 18, 1848, ch. 111, § 1, 1848 Tex. Gen. Laws
139, 139
UT 1998 $18.50 $49.00 1 Act of Mar. 14, 1998, ch. 74, sec. 1, § 21-5-4, 1998 Utah paying $18.50 for the first
Laws 278, 278 day and $49 per day
thereafter
UT 1989 $17.00 Act of Mar. 13, 1989, ch. 153, sec. 4, § 21-5-1, 1989 Utah
Laws 363, 364
UT 1979 $14.00 Act of Mar. 29, 1979, ch. 130, sec. 1, § 78-46-18, 1979
Utah Laws 742, 749




































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
UT 1933 $3.00 Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 36, sec. 1, § 48-0-5, 1933 Utah
Laws 36, 36
UT 1929 $4.00 Act of Feb. 27, 1929, ch. 13, sec. 1, § 2542, 1929 Utah
Laws 14, 15
UT 1913 $3.00 Act of Feb. 15, 1913, ch. 7, sec. 1, § 991, 1913 Utah
Laws 11, 11
UT 1882 $2.00 Act of Mar. 9, 1882, ch. 49, § 1, 1882 Utah Laws 94, 94
VT 1977 $30.00 Act of Apr. 12, 1978, No. 222, sec. 22, § 1511, 1977 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 331, 345
VT 1969 $15.00 Act of Apr. 9, 1970, No. 294, sec. 21, § 1511, 1969 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 444, 455
VT 1957 $10.00 Act of June 29, 1957, No. 298, sec. 7, §10,504, 1957 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 318, 320
VT 1951 $7.00 Act of May 11, 1951, No. 233, sec. 1, § 10,504, 1951 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 323, 323
VT 1945 $5.00 Act of Apr. 18, 1945, No. 190, sec. 1, § 9000, 1945 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 257, 257
VT 1933 $3.00 Act of Mar. 22, 1933, No. 153, § 36, 1933 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 190, 197
VT 1921 $4.00 Act of Feb. 15, 1921, No. 245, sec. 1, § 7447, 1921 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 239, 239
VT 1919 $3.00 Act of Feb. 27, 1919, No. 217, sec. 1, § 7447, 1919 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 222, 222–23
VT 1917 $2.00 Act of Mar. 16, 1917, No. 251, sec. 1, § 20, 1917 Vt. Acts
& Resolves 272, 272
VT 1912 $2.50 Act of Nov. 16, 1912, No. 250, sec. 1, § 6246, 1912 Vt.
Acts & Resolves 321, 321–22
VT 1866 $2.00 Act of Nov. 12, 1866, No. 18, sec. 1, § 39, 1866 Vt. Acts
& Resolves 33, 33






























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
VT 1849 $1.00 Act of Nov. 6, 1849, No. 5, 1849 Vt. Acts & Resolves 5,
5
VT 1802 Act of Nov. 12, 1802, ch. 117, § 2, 1802 Vt. Acts & paying $6 per trial
Resolves 198, 198
VT 1799 Act of Nov. 8, 1798, ch. 3,1799 Vt. Acts & Resolves 3, paying $1.50–$5.00 per trial
11–12 depending on circumstance




VA 1996 $30.00 Act of Mar. 22, 1996, sec. 1, § 14.1-195.1, 1996 Va. Acts
ch. 332
VA 1982 $20.00 Act of Apr. 11, 1982, sec. 1, § 14.1-195.1, 1982 Va. Acts
ch. 610
VA 1980 $15.00 Act of Apr. 3, 1980, sec. 1, § 14.1-195.1, 1980 Va. Acts
ch. 593
VA 1973 $12.00 Act of Mar. 20, 1973, sec. 1, § 8-208.33, 1973 Va. Acts
ch. 438
VA 1968 $8.00 Act of Apr. 4, 1968, sec. 1, § 8-204, 1968 Va. Acts ch.
632
VA 1958 $5.00 Act of Mar. 13, 1958, sec. 1, §8-204, 1958 Va. Acts ch.
303
VA 1944 $3.50 Act of Mar. 29, 1944, sec. 1, §§ 4928, 6007, 1944 Va.
Acts ch. 325
VA 1928 $2.50 Act of Mar. 14, 1928, sec. 1, § 6007, 1928 Va. Acts ch.
212
VA 1908 $1.50 Act of Feb. 8, 1908, sec. 1, § 3160, 1908 Va. Acts ch. 21
VA 1867 $1.00 Act of Trial and Its Incidents, § 10, 1867 Va. Acts ch. 38
WA 1979 $10.00 $25.00 Act of May 7, 1979, ch. 135, sec. 7, § 1, § 2.36.150, 1979 paying between $10 and $25



































State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
WA 1959 $10.00 Act of Mar. 3, 1959, ch. 73, sec. 1, § 2, § 2.36.150, 1959
Wash. Laws 474, 474–75
WA 1943 $5.00 Act of Mar. 19, 1943, ch. 188, sec. 1, § 4229, 1943 Wash.
Laws 584, 584
WA 1933 $3.00 Act of Mar. 2, 1933, ch. 52, sec. 1, § 4229, 1933 Wash.
Laws 285, 285
WA 1927 $5.00 Act of Feb. 24, 1927, ch. 171, sec. 1, § 4229, 1927 Wash.
Laws 192, 192
WA 1863 $3.00 Act of Jan. 28, 1863, sec. 1, § 8, 1862 Wash. Laws 391,
396
WV 1986 $15.00 $40.00 Act of Mar. 7, 1986, ch. 94, art. 1, § 52-1-17(a), 1986 W. paying between $15 and $40
Va. Acts 684, 698 per day
WV 1974 $15.00 $25.00 Act of Mar. 8, 1975, ch. 126, art. 1, § 52-1-21, 1974 W. paying between $15 and $25
Va. Acts 362, 382–83 per day
WV 1957 $5.00 $8.00 Act of Jan. 28, 1957, ch. 101, § 21, 1957 W. Va. Acts paying between $5 and $8
541, 542 per day
WV 1943 $2.00 $5.00 Act of Mar. 1, 1943, ch. 57, § 21, 1943 W. Va. Acts 207, paying between $2 and $5
208 per day
WV 1933 $2.00 $2.50 Act of June 3, 1933, ch. 46, § 21, 1933 W. Va. Acts 340, paying between $2 and $2.50
340–41 per day
WV 1923 $2.00 $3.50 W. VA. CODE § 52-1-21 (1923) paying between $2 and $3.50
per day
WV 1909 $1.50 $2.50 Act of Feb. 20, 1909, ch. 37, § 23, 1909 W. Va. Acts 375, paying between $1.50 and
375 $2.50 per day
WV 1882 $1.50 Act of Mar. 6, 1882, ch. 83, sec. 1, § 23, 1882 W. Va.
Acts 186, 191
WV 1870 $1.50 $2.00 Act of Feb. 7, 1870, ch. 20, § 23, 1870 W. Va. Acts 19, paying $1.50 per day but $2
20 for felony jurors
WV 1868 $1.50 W. VA. CODE ch. 116, § 23 (1870)






























State Year $Per Day $Min $Max Time Time Limit Statute Misc.
WI 1977 $16.00 Act of May 18, 1978, ch. 318, sec. 30, § 255.25(1), 1977 paying no less than $16 per
Wis. Laws 1306, 1312 day
WI 1975 $4.00 Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 224, sec. 128, § 255.25, 1975 paying no less than $4 per
Wis. Laws 744, 804 day
WI 1955 $4.00 $16.00 Act of June 11, 1955, ch. 187, 1955 Wis. Laws 190, 190 paying between $4 and $16
per day
WI 1949 $4.00 $8.00 Act of July 22, 1949, ch. 498, sec. 2, § 255.31, 1949 Wis. paying between $4 and $8
Laws 455, 455 per day
WI 1919 $4.00 Act of Apr. 14, 1919, ch. 76, 1919 Wis. Laws 72, 72
WI 1903 $3.00 Act of Apr. 28, 1903, ch. 126, 1903 Wis. Laws 176, 176
WI 1870 $2.00 WIS. REV. STAT. ch. 133, § 49 (1870)
WI 1849 $1.50 WIS. REV. STAT. ch. 131, § 28 (1849)
WI 1839 $1.00 Act Concerning Costs and Fees, § 23, 1839 Wis. Laws
387, 399
WY 1984 $30.00 $50.00 Act of Mar. 7, 1983, ch. 138, § 2, 1983 Wyo. Sess. Laws paying $30 per day and an
402, 405 additional $20 per day at the
court’s discretion; took effect
1984
WY 1967 $12.00 Act of Feb. 20, 1967, ch. 129, sec. 1, § 1-136, 1967 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 154, 154
WY 1959 $7.00 $12.00 Act of Feb. 19, 1959, ch. 112, sec. 1, § 12-303, 1959 paying between $7 and $12
Wyo. Sess. Laws 126, 126 per day
WY 1937 $5.00 $6.00 Act of Feb. 16, 1937, ch. 43, sec. 1, § 61-242, 1937 Wyo. paying between $5 and $6
Sess. Laws 54, 54 per day
WY 1921 $4.00 $5.00 Act of Feb. 16, 1921, ch. 82, sec. 1, § 1245, 1921 Wyo. paying between $4 and $5
Sess. Laws 86, 86 per day
WY 1870 $1.00 Act of Dec. 16, 1871, § 50, 1870 Wyo. Sess. Laws 15, 31
WY 1869 $3.00 Act of Dec. 10, 1869, ch. 33, § 15, 1869 Wyo. Sess. Laws
373, 381
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